A Defense of Mind-Body Dualism

Kemi Anthony Emina(1*),

(1) 
(*) Corresponding Author



Abstract


The great majority of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy have practised some kind of dualism. Even pervasive throughout the majority of western and non-western religious ceremonies and customs. Even prevalent in the majority of western and non-western cultures and religious activities. Christianity and Islam both believe in an everlasting, non-physical soul. The Hindus believe in the Atman, or divine self, within. Buddhism is the only religion that denies the concept of an enduring inner self or soul. Thus, regardless of whether we are monists, dualists, pluralists, or anything else, when we reach the world of consciousness, we must acknowledge that, on the one hand, there is an unchanging relationship between mental and physical, and, on the other hand, they are two distinct, independent things. The major issue in the philosophy of mind is whether scientific progress is sufficient to overcome the mind-body dilemma. If this is insufficient, can the scientific method solve the mind-body problem? If our answers to philosophical problems, whether scientific or philosophical, have been unsatisfactory over the years, what is the only way forward? In this work, I will develop arguments in defence of mind-body dualism. The first, second, third, and fourth sections of this work are designed to show the problems in earlier theories of Cartesian dualism, biological naturalism, the multiple draughts model theory, and the hard problem of consciousness, respectively. This research is carried out using the research methods of critical and contextual analysis.


Keywords


Mind-body problem; mind-body dualism, Cartesian dualism, biological naturalism, the multiple draughts model theory, hard problem of consciousness.

Full Text:

Untitled PDF

Article Metrics

Abstract view : 191 times | Untitled view : 0 times PDF view : 14 times

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.