A Critique of Charles Taylor's Theory of Recognition

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Abstract. This paper seeks to appraise Charles Taylor's theory of recognition which revolves around equal dignity, the ideal of authenticity and the fusion of horizons. This paper found out that Taylor's theory holds that our individual identity is shaped by recognition or its absence. Hence, a person or group of people can suffer real imagery damage or the distortion of the same if the people or society hold a distorted and demeaning image of them to the extent that misrecognition on the one hand or non-recognition, on the other hand, can both inflict psychological harm and distort their mode of being. In this paper, I argue that Taylor's theory of recognition, as plausible as it seems, is flawed. The conclusion that is reached therefore is that Taylor's three modes of recognition is inadequate in the formation of a multicultural society that will guarantee tolerance and peaceful authentic existence in the society.

Keywords: Recognition, Non-Recognition, Tolerance, Multiculturalism, politics.

https://ojs.unm.ac.id/societies/index

INTRODUCTION

The *Politics of Recognition* (1994) is no exception to Taylor's major works which primarily develop his argumentations about the philosophies of history because he wants to show human beings as a process of becoming, not simply having a fixed nature. In addition, his major works attempt to demonstrate that our self-understanding of human nature is espoused by the correlation between morality and meaning. Specifically speaking, the *Politics of Recognition* (1994) enunciates that recognition as a concept sharpens our identity partly in the sense that for one's authenticity to have meaning, one must be recognized by others. This is captured by the thesis statement in the 48-page pioneering paper thus:

> *The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being (Taylor 1985).*

It equally serves as a theory of justice in the sense that attends to the injustices precipitated by discrimination and domination by evolving an egalitarian measure that will remediate undue harm done to the individual or group as the case may be. The work in its entirety is divided into five parts to make it more accessible to the reader. However, in other to drive home the point on the objective of the background studies to the *Politics of Recognition* (1994) we will unravel/ unbundle the morphology of the dialectic reasoning in order to x-ray how Taylor makes a felicitous transition from the ideal of authenticity to the fusion of horizons. This ill-fated transition helps him to surreptitiously establish the validity of claims for the commensurability of cultures. Taylor's idea of multiculturalism which he tries to give as a synopsis in the *Politics of Recognition* (1994) revolves around three fundamental concepts namely the notion of *Equal Dignity*, Ideal *of Authenticity* and the *Fusion of horizon*s. These three key philosophical concepts are explained in a philosophy of history that is couched in a dialogic process. To expound these, we must retrace our steps back to a Hegelian style of dialectical reasoning.

Basically, the work has two streams of dialectical reasoning; in the first where Taylor traces the roots of the concept of dignity through the antithetical notion of honour, he then follows through with the thesis-antithesis-synthesis sequence to a logical conclusion by arriving at our modern-day notion of rights liberalism. However, in the second Taylor starts with a thesis namely the ideal of authenticity but does not show how an antithesis (inauthenticity) arises as a reaction to the thesis but surreptitiously arrives at a synthesis which he finds in the fusion of horizons. This synthesis in the second case is the key presumption that he uses as a panacea to the validity of claims to the commensurability of cultures.

Taylor's philosophy of History divides the correlation between recognition and identity into two fundamental eras; the first is the imminent collapse of the era of social hierarchies personified in the notion of honour. This type of honour stems from a preferential treatment that basically breeds a system of inequalities. Subsequently, as an antidote to this perverse notion of honour arose the notion of equal dignity which provided a remedy to the system of inequalities by an egalitarian and universalist approach (Taylor 1985). So summarily speaking the notion of honour engendered and conferred a *demeaning recognition*. However, this subsequently had to give way to the flourishing of the notion of dignity which enhanced the consolidation of *equal recognition*. This in turn ushered in the era for the blossoming of the democratic culture (Taylor 1985). We shall subsequently see how Taylor in the course of his dialogic process tries to reconcile these two strands of dialectic reasoning into *reciprocal recognition*.

The second epoch consists of the 18th-century development of the notion of the autonomous self as a rational and moral agent with ethical consequences. This came against the backdrop of the rival moral view that primarily had utilitarian implications (Taylor 1985). This consequently gave rise to the notion of authenticity. It is pertinent to note that Taylor places a special emphasis on the Romantics. This could be attributed to his aversion to the Analytic and Logical Positivists approach to viewing human nature. On the contrary, the romanticists built on earlier traditions like romantic love and integrated emotions and aesthetics into their accounts of the human self and embraced nature in new positive ways. Prominent among them are Jean-Jacques Rousseau who helped to make living in accord with nature into an ideal This basically served as a displacement of the culture that promoted mastering nature and escaping from "baser" instincts or fallen character; and Johann Gottfried Herder who argued that human nature is not a determining force but a range of possibilities and capacities demanding expression.

Summarily speaking, the key point for the Romantics is the notion that so basic is the notion of self-expression that moderns can hardly think of the self without it. As a whole, this transformed the Christian idea of vocation or calling and underpinned a new idea of equality based on recognition of difference (Hahnenberg 2010). These two key proponents we shall examine in detail most especially how Taylor uses their ideas to arrive at the idea of equality based on the recognition of difference. Coming back to how Taylor develops the notion of authenticity from the autonomous self as a moral and rational agent, Taylor debuts by retracing back to a time when the source of our morality as extraneous (God) was displaced by a newer moral accent, a new subjectivism that pointed at us as moral beings with inner depths. St Augustine gave this new moral order its theistic slant while Jean Jacque Rousseau gave it an atheistic colouration (Tuck 2002). In other words, the voice of nature within us is the new morality. Sadly enough, in reality, this voice is eclipsed by the passions that are induced by our dependence on others namely *Amour Propre* as Rousseau diagnoses it (Oprea 2020).

The moral redemption of the self comes about from recovering the authentic moral contact within. This has evoked the genesis of what could be referred to as modern consciousness. According to Herder this perspectival and attitudinal nuance of the modern consciousness is fundamentally what constitutes the difference/uniqueness between human beings and it also has a moral implication there. In other words, in plain terms, each of us has an original way of being human and each of us is being called to be true to ourselves. Furthermore, Herder makes an important connection between the ideal of authenticity and the principle of originality in the sense that the latter enhances the importance of the former (Zammito 2002). To put this correlation in another way, in articulating one's originality, I am also defining myself. In addition, this connection primarily brings out the presumption that the ideal of authenticity is synonymous with the goals of self-fulfillment and self-realization. Herder applies this concept of originality at two levels: Individual and Collective (Wiborg 2000). This fundamental delineation Taylor introduces here to draw our attention to the delineation he will subsequently make between individual rights and collective rights.

At this point in the dialogic process, Taylor connects us back to the first dialectical tension between honour and dignity by claiming that the antidote to the notion of honour that is still very much prevalent in contemporary democratic society today is the idea of authenticity itself. This is because this way of being cannot be socially derived but must be inwardly generated (Abbey 2002). Taylor then introduces a huge category in his espousal of the Philosophy of identity by attempting to underscore the relevance of Language. For Taylor, self-realization which confirms our authenticity as full human agents is basically achievable through the acquisition of language (Taylor 2004). Language, for Taylor, is constitutive of the human being; we are language animals. Taylor expands on the famous Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, showing how basic language and culture are to how we know other human beings and indeed the material world. This is one reason why cross-cultural understanding requires mutual learning, not just translation. It is also among the reasons why interpretation is basic to the human sciences. In practical terms, for Taylor, Language is a crucial medium for this expression, along with art, religion, action and ethical relationships. Humanity expressed itself differently in different cultures and even person by person. This diversity was not determined by a fixed human nature; it was made available by the natural capacities of human beings (Braman 2008). That is the reason why Taylor summarily writes "we become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves and hence of defining an identity through our acquisition of the rich human language of expression" (Taylor 1992, p. 33).

This language needed for self-definition as described above is not acquired nomological but rather dialogical. In other words, we define our identity in dialogue with our significant others. Having espoused the relevance of language in such a manner, Taylor uses the dialogical character of language to allude to an attribute of authentic identity. This can be seen when he compares and contrasts identity borne

from the notion of honour and identity borne from the notion of dignity. From this analysis, we are to deduce that from the former, that which an *a priori* socially derived identity stems from, depends on social categories/hierarchies while from the latter, that which inwardly derived original identity stems from, depends on the exchange. Given that Taylor explains the relationship between Authenticity and Identity in such a manner, he returns back to the concept of Recognition to keep the discourse in perspective. As a thoroughbred from the Hegelian legacy, he refers to Hegel as the earliest advocate for recognition.

He then stresses that as far as the culture of authenticity is concerned, recognition is important at two levels: 1) At the social plane, the principle of Equal Recognition forges the appropriate model for a healthy democratic society. 2) At the intimate plane Self-Discovery and Self-Affirmation are cultivated through relationships. These are crucibles for inwardly generated identity.

These two levels aforementioned further translate into the public sphere and private sphere respectively. Out of these, he narrows his interest on the Public Sphere where he proffers interpretation for two key social changes. The first involves the development of the modern notion of Dignity from the notion of Honor. This has brought about the Politics of Universalism which is the equalization of rights and entitlements. The second change is the modern notion of Identity which has brought about the Politics of Difference which is the recognition of the unique identity of individuals or groups. He then drives home the point that it is the very idea of sameness as it is encapsulated in the politics of universalism that exposes the harm done to the distinct individual of the group thus: "The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity. And this assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of Authenticity" (Dyzenhaus 2007, p. 448).

So as far as the harm done by bigotry is concerned, the Politics of Universalism resolves the effects of discrimination by equal treatment while the Politics of Difference resolves the same issue of discrimination by differential treatment. In essence, a new understanding of the human social condition has naturally evolved the politics of identity out of the politics of dignity thereby imparting radically new meaning to an old principle. Given that the notion of the politics of difference and the politics of universalism both stem from the notion of dignity there is a sort of contradiction since the former recognizes and fosters particularity while the latter recognizes and fosters sameness. In other words, despite this organic chemistry between the two notions aforementioned, they equally amount to very sharp areas of divergence which amounts to a conceptual area of conflict (Oben & Egege 2018).

To amplify this divergence issue, Taylor resorts to investigating the intuition of values in both cases by tracing his steps back to the Metaphysical background concerning the notion of Dignity as furnished by Kant (Levinas 1995). In Kant, Taylor picks up the idea of Universal Human potential emanating from a politics of universalism. In the same vein, he picks up the idea of universal cultural formation

potential from a politics of difference for the formation of individual and collective identity. He further instantiates this by citing the comment of Saul Bellow on the Zulu Culture as not only factually mistaken in its evaluation but also morally wrong in the denial of a fundamental principle of the commensurability of cultures (Lash & Featherstone 2001). So even though both modes of politics have a common denominator metaphysically speaking in the sense that human potential is pursuant of the same notion of equal respect, their areas of reproach are at variance. The politics of difference has a difference-sensitive approach and therefore fosters particularity; while the politics of universalism has a different blind approach that engenders sameness. This fundamentally amounts to an area of conflict (Clarke 2002).

From the foregoing, therefore, for Taylor, what is supposedly neutral in the difference blind principle is actually promoting a hegemonic culture. This could be discriminating in the sense that it amounts to the suppression of minority cultures who are under duress to imbibe alien cultures in the name of sameness. Furthermore, He critiques difference blind principle as a reflection of particular cultures thereby a pragmatic contradiction of what they stand to represent namely sameness. He then presents Rousseau and Kant as the key proponents of the politics of equal dignity and draws from their espousal of the politics of dignity this flaw of homogenizing cultures. In furtherance of this claim, He focuses on Rousseau who is not only one of the original users of the concept of Recognition but who also strongly advocates that Recognition of equal respect is indispensable for freedom. Also of equal importance is the fact that Rousseau makes the correlation between other-dependence and Hierarchy. In his investigation, this correlation amounts to esteem (Preference) which is weighed as a positional good.

Therefore, in Rousseau's account of any good society, esteem as he perceives it from the negative standpoint of honour, has no role to play in it. Despite this abnegation of esteem, Rousseau still held on to the claim that public recognition still mattered because balanced reciprocity between the slave and the master is still vital to attain equality. This reciprocity brings about the concept of reciprocal recognition. In his work, *Considerations sur Le Gouvernement de Pologne* (1782), the root of this reciprocal recognition was the total absence of differentiation or distinction between different classes of citizens and this type of recognition aimed to heighten patriotism and culture in early Greek societies. Therefore, with a potent and systematized combination of equality, reciprocity and unity of purpose that engenders reciprocal recognition, Rousseau remediates the alienation hierarchical honour is subjected to thereby entering a different system that trans-valuates esteem as a principle that animates equal dignity. Having identified the importance of Reciprocal recognition in this manner, Taylor using this Rousseau eanlogictries to demonstrate how the notion of dignity is complementary to the notion of identity through this regime of Reciprocal Recognition. Taylor avers to the Hegelian school of thought in asserting that the reciprocal Recognition is the reason why in the social contract state the people must be both sovereign and subject.

Cumulatively speaking then, Rousseau's model of dignity is enunciated by three principles: Freedom, non-differentiated roles and unity of purpose. However, going down memory lane these three have equally been the root cause of totalitarian regimes in History as confessed by Taylor himself. Therefore, they are faulted on the grounds of their homogenizing propensity. Having rejected the Rousseauean trinity in such a manner, Taylor resorts to a Kantian model that focuses on equality of rights accorded to citizens. Pertaining to this Kantian model of liberalism, Taylor cites its inadequacy most especially its failure to acknowledge distinctness. This is so because there are proponents of liberalism of equal rights that have the very restricted acknowledgment of distinct cultural identities. This makes the possibility of variation in the interpretation of distinct societies in different parts of a country unacceptable. Most importantly, this also confirms the presence of the same homogenizing propensity at work in the Rousseauean model equally manifest in this instance. Therefore for Taylor, examining why this variation is restricted is the crux of understanding the correlation between liberalism and diversity in the fourth part of the *Politics of Recognition* (1994).

To instantiate this, Taylor wades into the Canadian Constitution which pristinely like constitutions of other western liberal democracies are centered on the protection of individual rights. Subsequent amendments to the Canadian constitution introduced other grounds that reflected collective goals such as the aboriginal rights and the linguistic rights. Now in certain political quarters in Canadian diverse society this provision for a 'distinct society' contravenes the provisions for individual rights already enshrined in the Canadian constitution. The distinct Society clause is problematic on two counts: 1) The collective goals may require restrictions on the behavior of individuals that may violate their rights. 2) Espousing collective goals on behalf of a national group can be thought to be inherently discriminatory.

This advocacy for the individual rights taking precedence over collective rights is recognized as Procedural liberalism which acknowledges a commitment to deal fairly and equally with other members of the society regardless of how they conceive their ends. Prominent names in this school of thought are Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman and others (Koppelman 2013). Now the key point that Taylor drives home here is that Procedural liberalism portends the value of dignity as neutral. This thought stems primarily from Kant who views or understands human dignity to consist basically of autonomy. Autonomy here is seen as the ability of each person to determine for himself or herself the good life (Koppelman 2013). In other words, the human agent is seen as primarily a subject of self-determining or self-expressive choice. Therefore, dignity should not be closely tied   to any particular conception of the good life.

Procedural Liberalism has become the endgame of the dialectical style of reasoning Taylor had persuaded us to follow up until now. It is pertinent to recall that Taylor has being trying to articulate how the antithetical relationship between demeaning recognition (honour) and equal recognition (dignity) has been reconciled

through reciprocal recognition. However, despite the painstaking effort, this does not give him the desired outcome due to the fact that Procedural liberalism still portends a Difference Blind outlook for his formulation of a politics of identity through recognition. This is the reason why Taylor at this juncture strongly contends that Political Society is not be or remain neutral between those who value remaining true to the culture of their ancestors and those who might want to cut loose in the name of some individual goal of self-development. A culturally diverse society particularly must be difference sensitive, thereby acknowledging both mutually exclusive approaches to culture.[33]

Taylor the goes ahead to advocate for a shift from a liberalism of rights that is inhospitable to difference to one that is hospitable to difference. He grounds this paradigm shift by employing the logic of reciprocity thus: 1) Distinct Societies legitimate collective goals. 2) Collective goals engender difference sensitivity. 3) Cultural survival is seen as a collective good.

Therefore, distinct societies are entitled to collective rights based on the need for cultural survival. The real issue as he puts into proper perspective is whether cultural survival will be acknowledged as a legitimate goal. This makes for two key demands: 1) That we allow culture to defend themselves , 2) That we recognize the equal value of different cultures. In this second demand, Taylor advocates for the commensurability of cultures. Here we must keep in view that Taylor at this juncture evinces a preliminary assumption of these demands namely that recognition recasts identity in revised molds that are devoid of subjugating dominated images in a discriminatory or hegemonic manner. In addition, it would be observed for the second time in the entirety of the *Politics of Recognition* (1994) we sees Taylor having recourse to the intuition of values without any axiomatic connection. For what it is worth, Taylor readily admits that the validity of the claim of the commensurability of culture is assailable.

This assailability stems from the manner in which the value of culture originates from the accepted norms of equality in a less apposite manner. The outcome of his dialogic process is less desirous as he had anticipated. The movement from basic philosophical assumption to a well-grounded schedule of rights is not fully plausible. Since this claim cannot be axiomatic he states it as a presumption thus:

> *"As a presumption, the claim is that all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings" (Heidegger 2010, p. 276).*

Conclusively, this presumption serving as a hypothesis is a prerequisite approach to the study of culture. This study is attainable through what he adapts from Hans Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method* the 'fusion of horizon' (Vessey 2012). As highlighted above, we see at this stage Taylor curiously introducing the fusion of horizons as a panacea to the absence of the ideal of authenticity in the way human beings organize and identify themselves in any given civil society. This amounts to a

felicitous transition from the notion of authenticity to the fusion of horizon. Taylor makes this inappropriate quantum leap without demonstrating adequately what problematizes his initial position (*terminus a quo*)namely the ideal of authenticity leading to a plausible resolution in an end game (*terminus ad quem*) namely the fusion of horizons. For us to exhaustively investigate this matter concerning Taylor's latent pattern of dialectical reasoning subsumed in his overt dialogic reasoning, we shall look at the problem of Authenticity as diagnosed in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time*, Hans Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method* and Charles Taylor's *Ethics of Authenticity*, three aforementioned Philosophers in order to arrive at my point.

CRITIQUE OF MODES OF RECOGNITION

Generally speaking, in the "Politics of Recognition" (1994), Charles Taylor alludes to three forms of recognition. First, "politics of universalism" aims at the equal recognition of all persons in a common humanity based on the valuationof the person as an autonomous agent, that is, who has the capacity to respond to reason. This amounts to the mode of Respect. Second, a "politics ofdifference" emphasizes the uniqueness of specific and especially cultural features. This is designated as Esteem. The mode of Esteemcould also be said to be the mark or right to an opportunity to attain positional good through legitimate distinction.

Finally, Taylor thematizes the recognition of concrete individuality in contexts of loving care that are of utmost importance to subjects as the mode of Love. It is these three dimensions of the modern recognition order (primarily traced back to Hegel's treatment of the subjectivity) that would be primarily analyzed in the discussion. They have even been interpreted as genealogically distinct stages along which individual persons gain self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Seymour 2014 p. 237). Having introduced the three modes in such a manner, Taylor contextualizes them in two spheres of recognition. One situated in the intimate sphere and the other two are situated in the public sphere.

The Intimate Sphere

This is the sphere in which we understand the formation of identity and self are being forged in an ongoing dialogue and struggle with significant others. On this level which is personal, innermost and portends mutual affection, Taylor describes it as one where the vulnerability and needs of an original identity is weighted against the responsiveness or lack of, thereof, of significant others. Love relationships are not only crucial for the fulfillment of emotional needs but they are equally imperative since the serve as a melting pot for the forging of inwardly generated identity. He then goes further to use this said loci of self-discovery and self-affirmation to establish the correlation between identity and recognition which amounts to the notion of authenticity (Seymour 2014 p. 238). From this Taylor further draws another connection with the idea of identity as affected by the notion of personhood namely self-realization and self-fulfillment. In effect, Love is a positive affection or emotional attachment to a necessarily restricted numbers of significant others. Love is a basic

requisite to all further modes of recognition. Love is conceptually and genetically prior to Esteem and Respect. Despite this prominence given the mode of love by Taylor and Honneth, Frazer distances herself from what she terms as a psychological account of subjectivity. This is because in her reckoning an account of the mode of Love such as one articulated by Taylor and Honneth has a psychological underpinning to it. She further critiques the psychological account as that which overlooks the historicity, complexity and mutability of the subject. Thompson confirms Frazer's position when he captures Frazer's avowal to the discursive account of the subject as not being merely fixed position within a stable linguistic structure. Rather, it portends the possibility of theorizing of emancipatory social change since the notion of discourse can be jostled over and subjected to ongoing contestation. That is to say, we can demonstrate that subjects are able to emancipate from the constraints that currently shape them in order to make themselves a new.

In a similar manner, Honneth argues that this notion of bodily integrity, together with the need for love and concern it entails, captures something important that traverses differences of cultural and historical contexts. For him, this parental upbringing culture or love have gone unchanged whereas that capacity to trust one's own sense of what one needs or wants is a precondition for self-realization in any human community.

The Public Sphere

The study mentioned earlier that public sphere borders rest on the modes of Esteem and Respect. Axel Honneth from the historical background holds that public sphere is defined by two timelines. In pre-modern historical setting, one's standing in society and one's status as a moral and political agent were fused, typically, in the concept of 'honour' (Thompson 2002). However,Honneth posits that the modern period, makes a clear cut distinction between the fundamental principles subjacent to the domain of law and rights came into friction with the idea of according legal status on the basis of class privilege. In this way, the notion of one's 'status as a person' was historically differentiated from the notion of 'social standing', giving rise to psychologically and analytically distinct modes of recognition, as well as to the corresponding notions of 'self-respect' (*Selbstachtung*) and 'self-esteem' (*Selbstschatzung*) (Munzer 1993). Honneth further elaborates that Self-respect is a matter of viewing oneself as entitled to the same status and treatment as every other person; self-esteem involves a sense of what it is that makes one special, unique and 'particular' (Munzer 1993). To be sure, Honneth contends that this enabling sense of oneself as a unique and irreplaceable individual cannot, however, be based merely on a set of trivial or negative characteristics. This is because what distinguishes one from others must be something valuable.Having expounded the historicity of the Public Sphere in such a manner, it is pertinent to note thatthis conceptual entanglement and the cogent need for a delineation is one of the key issues Taylor preoccupies himself with in the *Politics of Recognition* (1994) .

As already demonstrated, there is a conflationary issue between the modes of Respect for autonomy and Esteem for identity requires urgent redress if the Theory of Recognition is to have any significance. Particularly, as a result of the conflation of these two modes of recognition, the conflict between universalism and difference appears to be zero – sum game. That is,Any gain for the politics of universalism must be a loss for the politics of difference and vice versa.[47]Misrecognition becomes the outcome of this mutually trumping endeavour. That is the reason why, in the opening statement of *Politics of Recognition* (1994), Taylor identifies Misrecognition as a major determinant of identity because it can entrap the self in a false, distorted or all together reduced mode of being. This has very serious implications for political and economic theories that are tied to the issues of Justice.

Therefore, Taylor's failure to explicitly distinguish between respect and esteem creates serious problems for his theory most especially establishing the correlation between autonomy, culture and identity. Take for example, Thompson points out the fact that Taylor suffers from the indictment of not being able to defend one collective right namely, the right of a collectivity to cultural survival (Taylor 1985). This is because defending a rigid principle of cultural survival may undermine the possibility of each culture learning from others in such a way that all may liable to transformation. In this case, Taylor's presumption of Cultural Survival conflates with Taylor's espousal of cross cultural exchange. To further drive home the point Iris Marion Young instantiates the repercussory effect of Taylor's failure to delineate between Esteem and Respect. In her reckoning, Esteem can be ascribed to the realm of Cultural conditioning while Respect is exclusively identified with Cultural Process. In her own words: "The point here is that none of the forms and not all of the conditions of self-respect can meaningfully be conceived as goods that individuals possess; they are rather relations and processes in which the actions of individuals are embedded" (Young 2011, p. 27). Agreeing with Young, McBride avers that a just society is one that will maintain the tension between Respect and Esteem. It would on one hand, respect the right to distinguish oneself by making use of rights to self-expression in certain instances while it seeks to ensure that the unequal distribution of social distinction tamper with wider social relationships and institutions (McBride 2013).

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy also proffers another way Esteem and Respect can be conceptually delineated. It posits that most discussions in moral and political philosophy can be narrowed down to contentions over what it means to recognize the other as equal or what proper respect requires. Therefore, such concept that connotes 'regard for the humanity in each person' necessarily needs to be distinguished from a common usage in which "respect" has an entirely different connotation namely respect for the ethical values tied to a particular person's character or conduct. This is the reason why Stephen Darwall in his essay, *Two Kinds of Respect*, proposed that the former should be termed "recognition respect" whereas the latter should be labeled "appraisal respect" (Darwall 1977, p. 37). In this regard,

"recognition respect" connotes "respect as such" with regard to the equal moral standing of persons and their demands or their capability for autonomous agency while "appraisal respect" is associated with esteem in the sense that particular properties of a person are valued as positional goods.

Turning our attention to Taylor's presumption on cultural value, Thompson attests that a number of Taylor's critics are deeply engrossed in his contention that the worth of cultures must be tested within a shared horizon of values. Accordingly, the said critics fault this presumption on the basis its conception of value horizons and cultures in terms of ideas, goods and values. Such an account they term as rather overly abstract. By so doing, Taylor deracinates the said value horizons and culture from the economic, social and political institutions in which they are inevitably located. So as an overall corrective, Thompson strongly recommends that if Taylor were to acknowledge that the first sort of recognition is respect for autonomy, and the second is esteem for identity, then he might be able to avoid some of the difficulties that have beenidentified.Therefore, Thompson makes a hypothetical case that if Taylor were to make a categorical delineation between respect for rights and esteem for culture, then he would be able to argue that the rights system and the appropriate value horizon must co-exist as interdependent components of a society that can show due recognition to all of its members.[57]

Having exhaustively analyzed and corrected the blurry conceptual lines between the concepts of Esteem and Respect as to distinct modes of recognition; this brings us to the all-important question can justice require an equal distribution of recognition? McBride makes further delineatory analysis by answering in the affirmative for the concept of Respect. This is so because, Respect, if it is distributed at all, must be distributed equally. This idea lies in the heart of the formal equality that provides the foundation of all contemporary theories of justice: all human beings are entitled to equal respect. However, on the other hand the same cannot be said of Esteem. The point of esteem is that it is distributed unequally, because an equal distribution of esteem would fail to distinguish its recipients. It would make no sense to demand an equal share of esteem on account of the sort of good that it is, namely a positional commodity. Esteem as a positional good has a valency that depends entirely on that good being unequally distributed, so that the value of a share of it is determined by its position in the larger societal hierarchy. Therefore, Esteem's worth or value can only be measured at all, only to the extent that it is distributed unequally (Burns 2020). This leads us to a reassessment of the paradigm shift. This consists of the purported transition froma theory of Redistribution unto an identity politics that is indicative of a theory of Recognition.

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing, attempts have been examine the epistemic understanding of the fusion of horizon Taylor converts to an ethical principle as seen in his *Politics of Recognition* (1994). Here we observed how over time his idea of epistemic

recognition gradually gravitated to ethical principle of multiculturalism, and how he thereby advocates that this sort of exchange engendered the understanding articulated in the fusion of horizon must lead to a culture of acceptance and tolerance.We also in this paper critique Taylor's three modes of recognition with the aim of showing how it is inadequate in the formulation of multicultural society and hence tolerance. The implication here is that the purported transition from the position of redistribution it will become an identity politics that will be a indicative of a theory of Recognition.

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