A Critique of Deep Ecology

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Abstract. Deep ecology, in its broad meaning, is used by Naess to refer to the broad ecocentric grass- 
root effort as contrasted with an anthropocentric approach to achieve an ecologically balanced future. 
Deep ecology embraces a deep approach by speaking about the intrinsic value of nature. In this 
connection, Naess advocates the principle of biospheric egalitarianism claiming equal moral worth of 
all beings, human and non-human alike. It is an approach of realising man’s position in the larger web 
of things. In practice, deep ecology is a movement which is concerned with the solution of grass-root 
social and political problems for an ecologically sustainable future. In principle, it upholds a holistic 
view of nature transcending the narrow ego-centric self that undertakes a thesis of Self-realization or 
identifying oneself with the greater ecological-Self. This work is a critical study of the deep ecology philosophy. The basic focus of this work, centres around the debate among the different schools of environmental philosophy, particularly, the criticism of deep ecology by social ecology.

Keywords: Deep Ecology, environmental ethics, Naess, Ecosophy.
INTRODUCTION

The phrases “Deep Ecology Movement”, used in the broad sense and -Deep Ecology, used for Naess’s self-realization thesis to refer to his deep ecology philosophy are theoretically intertwined to such an extent that it is impossible to distinguish the two. Deep Ecology takes a holistic view of nature. The basic norms of deep ecology is that every life form in principle has right to live and blossom. Its image of the natural world is that of a field-like whole of which one is just a part. With maturity one experiences joy and sorrow when there is the joy and sorrow of other living beings. It encourages one to seek one’s true identity by identifying with wider and wider circles of nature, presenting the natural world as an extension of oneself. The essence of deep ecology is to ask deeper questions. Deep ecology principles are the result of deep questioning of conventional values, beliefs, and practices. It tries to clarify the fundamental presuppositions underlying our economic approach in terms of value priorities, philosophy and religion (Edet 2002; Edet 2014; Andrew 2014; Andrew 2016). It is to be noted that Naess coined the term -deep ecology in the spirit of religion. During a climbing expedition in Nepal, Naess discovered with surprise that the Sherpa people would not venture on to certain mountains they considered holy or sacred. Naess and two of his Norwegian friends took inspiration from this reverence for mountains to formulate a new philosophy that would extend the same regard to all of the nature.

For Naess, offering a definition of deep ecology movement is the task of dictionary editors. He himself acknowledges the difficulty of defining deep ecology. In order to make other understand what deep ecology is, Naess proposes a tentative formulation of views that most supporters of this movement have in common. According to him, -there is no reason why supporters of movements should adhere exactly to the same definition, or to any definition, for that matter (p. 67). Though Naess’s coinage of the term - Deep Ecology appeared in 1973, its meaning can be understood by taking his -Platform Principles prepared with George Sessions in 1984. This paper looks at the basic tenets of shows the meaning of Deep Ecology by distinguishing it from Shallow Ecology.

DEEP VERSUS SHALLOW ECOLOGY

In 1972 Naess delivered a lecture at the Third World Future Research Conference in Bucharest and the following year published it as -The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary in the journal Inquiry. In this paper, deep ecology has been described as a worldwide eco-centric movement that contrasts an anthropocentric or human-centric value approach. With the coinage of the term -deep ecology Naess offers a broad, long-term and skeptical position towards environmental policies of any agency. For instance, Naess points out to the strategies adopted by the agencies like International Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN) in cooperation with the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) for the conservation of nature. Naess tags the polices of these agencies as standard view of conservationists which are individualistic. Naess tries to develop an ethics of responsibility which is deeper than ecologically responsible policies prevalent in the nation-states. In its initial conception developed in 1973, the tag -deep ecology of Naess referred to a movement as characterized by the following seven points.

1. Rejection of the person-in-environment image in favor of the relational, total-field image;
2. In-principle support of biospheric egalitarianism;
3. An embrace of the principles of diversity and symbiosis both within human populations and in the natural world;
4. An anti-class posture;
5. Active opposition to pollution and resource depletion;
6. Stress on complexity, not complication;
7. Support for local autonomy and decentralization.

But Naess acknowledges the difficulty of formulating a general view among the supporters of deep ecologists in 1970’s by which the tag -deep ecology can be characterized. Naess in his paper, Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects, analyses the shallow-deep distinction under different heads of pollution, resources, population, cultural diversity and appropriate technology and land and sea ethics (Ravikanth 2021). In this paper, Naess says that -shallow ecology is an ecological movement to fight against pollution and resource depletion. The central objective of shallow ecology is health and affluence of people in the developed countries. In this system, importance is given only on minor reform of the system of industrial nations. Thereby, in shallow ecology, no fundamental changes occurred in the values and practices of the industrialized nations. Naess observes that ecological policies of nation-states may reduce pollution but increase problems of various sorts. Shallow ecology does not address these -other points‖ that may arise in the fight against pollution. He says that in adopting an antipollution device for the life necessities, there may be some other points which are left unaddressed. For example, in adopting some so called modern way of the eco-friendly device there may be the price increase that may cost an increase of class differences between rich and poor, have and have-nots. But very often it is seen that the state machinery ignores side-effects of any fight against pollution and resource depletion. These other points are overlooked in shallow approach. Therefore, it fails to address the philosophical, social and political roots of the environmental crisis.

Shallow ecology is also known as reform environmentalism. The reason for conserving wilderness and preserving the biodiversity of reform environmentalism is only tied to human welfare. The relationship between human and non-human nature is not grounded on any ultimate premise. According to Naess, in deep ecology, the impact of pollution is not looked in the context of human interest. Rather, deep ecology is concerned with the impact of pollution on life as such. Any form of
exporting pollution is not only a crime against humanity, but it is a crime against life in general (Umukoro et al., 2020). A natural object is not to be treated as a resource. Therefore, Naess raises his voice against the human modes of production and consumption. Naess prefers the standard of production and consumption regarding ultimate human values. For meeting the ultimate human values, Naess advocates a change of economic, legal and educational institutions to counteract any destructive increases. Naess emphasizes on the ‘quality of life’ by the use of resources. He considers that economic standard of living which is promoted by the human modes of consumption is only a shallow approach. This is not ecosystem approach. It encourages only isolated life-forms. The shallow approach, therefore, advocates only a man-environment image. It goes against deep ecology’s long-range total field image. Naess believes that overpopulation is a threat. Shallow ecology overlooks this problem. Instead, population increase is considered as beneficial for fulfilling shortsighted economic, military or other goals. Over-population is discussed concerning its effect on human lives only without any reference to non-human life-forms. As the social relations of animals are ignored in the shallow approach, decreasing wild habitat areas is economically acceptable.

Deep ecology conceives that the earth does not belong to humans alone. Humans only inhabit the lands. With the same tone with Leopold, Naess says that humans belong to the land. Land does not belong to them. The concept of fragments of natural entities that belong to diverse agencies like individual, organization, state, etc. is a narrow concept from the perspective of deep ecology. Naess cites the example of his birthplace Norway. He says that the landscapes, rivers, flora and fauna of Norway are not the property of Norwegians only (p. 74). Any natural entity does not belong to a particular state or a particular community or humanity alone. Humans use natural resources to meet their vital needs only. Though the term ‘vital needs’ is used to considerable differences in its meaning, in a very plain language it means minimum essentials for the sustenance of all. According to Naess, vital needs are seen as the needs of the ecosystem. At the same time, it is meant considering the needs of other species as the needs of humankind. In this process of comprehending the needs of nonhuman nature, there is no conflict of interest. It is long-ranged and a deep approach. Naess says that the identification of vital needs is the course of realization. This is the distinctive property of man that authorizes him to lead the globe. If humankind is not bothered with the pattern of production and consumption, then the ecological crisis is not going to be stopped. Identification of vital needs can only interfere in the present pace of consumption pattern. It is also the requirement of present human generation. Deep ecology suggests meeting the vital needs only.

**THE PROBLEM WITH THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

In the Naessian perspective, social causes of the ecological crisis are accredited to the ‘shallow’ category. However, the social justice schools of environmentalism give a lot of importance on social equality by eliminating dominations and
hierarchies. It is alleged that Naess has not written a single line about the social issues like decentralization, a non-hierarchical society, democracy, small-scale communities, local autonomy, mutual aid, communalism, and tolerance. Critics contend that deep ecology locates the origin of the ecological crisis in belief systems. These belief systems cover religious as well as a philosophical belief system. In its approach, it is seen that Naess is more inclined to eastern religions. Bookchin holds that deep ecology is a varied blend of eastern traditions with western heterodox philosophers which result in inconsistencies, immune to reasoned critique and validation. According to social ecology, Naess views - first nature, in the abstract, as a - cosmic oneness which bears fascinating similarities to ethereal perceptions common to Asian religions. It is alleged that deep ecology stresses on the subjective factors to deal with environmental issues. As such, deep ecology in the face of social injustice is - quietist and escapes from activism. It speaks about an ecological consciousness which is - quasi-mystical. Timothy Morton, an eco-critic, says:

"The most ethical act is to love the other precisely in their artificiality, rather than seeking to prove their naturalness and authenticity. Deep ecology ironically does not respect the natural world as actual contingent beings, but as standing in for an idea of the natural. Deep ecology goes to extremes on this point, insisting that humans are a viral supplement to an organic whole (2007, p. 195)."

The chief concern of social ecologists in their debates with deep ecologists is the failure of Naess to make a distinction between human and non-human nature. They are of the view that the theoretical structure of deep ecology is entirely a product of human agency. This conceptual structure imparts to the - human species a unique status in the natural world. Bookchin does not agree with Naess that human beings are simply part and parcel of nature, plain members of the biotic community. One’s true human potential is a function of one’s place in nature. Insofar as deep ecology fails adequately to recognize the uniqueness of human life and attribute moral worth with other life forms, he argues, it promotes - eco-fascism, namely the sacrifice of individual humans for the benefit of the ecological whole. Social ecology holds that all ethical systems are formulated by human beings in distinctly cultural situations. Therefore, if one removes human agency from the picture, one will find that there is not the least evidence that animals exhibit behaviour that can be regarded as discursive, meaningful, or moral.

Bookchin claims that humans are more advanced as a result of the evolutionary process, a fact that the deep ecologists overlook. Denial of -human distinctiveness might invite stupidities like the legal cases against animals that damage crops. It is to be mentioned that there were some instances of this sort in medieval Europe. If it is the case, then one is to bear in mind that what makes humans morally relevant is also what makes a carnivore’s eating out on its prey morally neutral. Bookchin argues that such an egalitarian attitude that deep ecologists promote presupposes the uniqueness of human rational and moral
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capacity to think conceptually and feel empathy for the planet. Denial of difference-in-kind is, itself, embedded within the discourse of human distinctiveness.

According to Bookchin, there are contrasting points in deep ecology’s presentation of ideas. As it is believed that in order to regain a balanced ecology one needs to interfere in the rapidly deteriorating environmental situation. As far as the question of altering the behaviour of a human being is concerned to meet up the ecological crisis, man is to become decisive. But Naess emphasizes on contemplative thought instead of interference. Human intervention on the first nature is considered as destructive. The objective of deep ecology is to attain a state of awareness of the alleged absence of boundaries between human consciousness and cosmic oneness (Arumugam 2008). In one occasion Naessian deep ecology says about the catastrophic consequence of human interference on first nature and in another occasion, it urges human beings to be decisive to protect the natural environment. There is the claim that the intervention in nature should be guided by the need to preserve biotic integrity. As such, Bookchin believes that there appears a logical contradiction in theorizing the deep ecological framework.

Both social ecology and ecofeminism express the dissent over the conceptual framework of deep ecology which is based on the philosophy of privileged male, white academics. It is criticized as a biased theoretical set up of a highly privileged sector of Euro-American society that has never reflected on the needs of the underprivileged section of human beings. Similarly, the third world critics are of the view that deep ecology is elitist. Guha (1989) refers to the over-consumption and industrialization based American environmentalism as deep ecology and thereby offers a critical stand against it. He believes that the roots of global ecological problems lie in the disproportionate share of resources consumed by the industrialized countries as a whole and the urban elite within the Third World. The economic growth in the West has historically rested on the economic and ecological exploitation of the Third World. Guha insists that the deep ecologists are not aware of this problem particularly because, they are lacking of concern with inequalities within human society. Particularly, Guha opines that the distinction between anthropocentrism and biocentrism is untenable. Guha claims that in deep ecology if a human being makes an intervention in nature that is only for the meant of fulfilling the need of integration among the life forms. Thereby, giving importance on preserving biotic integrity is considered as biocentric in deep ecology. Fulfilling the needs of humans is considered as anthropocentric in deep ecologists’ interpretation of intervention in nature. Guha holds that an acceptance of the primacy of this distinction (anthropocentric-biocentric distinction) constitutes the litmus test of deep ecology (1989, p. 73). In the same tone, Bookchin says that this is a fictitious opposition that stems from a non-dialectical view of natural and social evolution. Bookchin does not view humans in anthropocentric terms as essentially apart from and above nature. According to him, humanity has evolved out of and remains inextricably continuous with the nonhuman world, but is no longer part of it, in just
the same way that other species are. In their critique of anthropocentrism, according to Bookchin, deep ecologists employ the concept of -humanity indiscriminately, neglecting the social, ethnic and gender differences, thus, implicating every human being equally and confusing the target of political critique. Bookchin writes,

*Deep ecology, despite all its social rhetoric, has virtually no real sense that our ecological problems have their ultimate roots in society and in social problems. It preaches a gospel of a kind of “original sin” that accurses a vague species called humanity---as though people of colour were equitable with whites, women with men, the Third World with the First, the poor with the rich, and the exploited with their exploiters.* (1999, p. 283)

Similarly, ecofeminism rests on the belief that -androcentrism, not anthropocentrism, is the source of the worldview related to the environmental crisis. More or less all ecofeminist critics target deep ecologists as the advocates of androcentrism. Deep ecology of Naess speaks of a gender-neutral anthropocentrism as the root of the domination of nature. The main thesis of eco-feminists’ critique of deep ecology is that deep ecology ignores the decisive phenomena of -patriarchalism and androcentrism. According to Zimmerman, -feminists’ critique of deep ecology asserts that it speaks of a gender neutral anthropocentrism as the root of the domination of nature when in fact, androcentrism is the real root (1990, p. 183). Zimmerman writes that only the interpretative lens of androcentrism enables us to understand the origin and scope of dualistic, atomistic, hierarchical and mechanistic categories. Women’s complex treatment as a sexual, reproductive, and labour resource, Zimmerman observes, is polished over the role of patriarchal ideology in creating socioecological problems. Deep ecology obscures the crucial issue by talking about humancenteredness, instead of about male-centeredness.

Bookchin suggests that a non-hierarchical society will necessarily be an ecological one. Zimmerman points out that deep ecologists try to develop the human-nature relationship -without taking any radical step of eliminating both man’s domination of woman (including the woman inside of each man) and the culturally enforced self-denigration of woman (1990, p. 183). Zimmerman alleges that deep ecology is formulated by man only. Men under patriarchy think only in distorted ways. Therefore, if anyone tries to find similarity between deep ecology and ecofeminism, then it can be found only in a superficial level. Similarly, Salleh criticizes Naess for trying to establish an abstract environmental ethics. She says that deep ecology is a -self-congratulatory reformist move (1984, p. 344). According to her, deep ecologists are males who are damaged by patriarchy and are seeking to heal themselves. But many of the problems that Naess sought to overcome are male-constructed problems. For example, problems of pollution, resource depletion, destructive science, centralization, etc. are male created. When deep ecologists call for decentralizing society, Salleh says, they ignore the fact that patriarchal culture has always favoured hierarchy and centralization. Therefore, unless patriarchal consciousness is abandoned, the advocacy for decentralization is meaningless.
Moreover, Salleh blames that deep ecology presupposes a masculinist psychology. For example, the concept of extending rights of nonhuman beings to protect them from human abuse is one of the theses of deep ecology. But the concept of rights is very much bound up with a masculinist interpretation. Therefore, it cannot serve to end the exploitation of nature. Therefore, ecofeminists are of the view that, deep ecology, to be successful in meeting its objectives, would have to be informed by the insights of ecofeminists because ecofeminism links the male domination of nature with the male domination of woman. Due to its pervasive masculinist bias, Naess' thesis of equality loses its strength. Therefore Salleh observes that deep ecology movement will not truly happen until men are brave enough to rediscover and to love the woman inside themselves (1984, p. 345).

MISANTHROPY

‘Mis-anthropism’ implies - hatred of humankind. Deep ecologists are accused to be misanthropists. According to Michael Zimmerman, Bookchin has attacked deep ecology by statements made by certain -Earth First! members who sometimes seem to risk ecofascism in their passion for protecting the planet. The reason of Bookchin to these attacks was an interview by Bill Devall with Dave Foreman, the editor of Earth First! In this interview, Foreman issued some shocking statements. When Foreman was asked about the best solution for the problem of famine in Ethiopia, he suggested the possibility of stopping international aid so as to give nature a chance to repair its stability. Critics of deep ecology believe that the denial of human uniqueness is an inconsistent and impractical ethical principle for action. If taken, for example, it might mean that human beings have no right to eliminate AIDS virus or malaria mosquitoes. Bookchin criticizes the role of Foreman, for publishing an article behind the pseudonym “Miss Ann Thropy,” where it is written that AIDS is desirable as a means of population control. The article entitled “Population and AIDS” in the Earth First! Keulartz explains the proceeding of the fierce attacks on the advocates of deep ecology. He continues the proceeding:

To cap it all, the house magazine of Earth First! published a statement by someone writing under the pseudonym of ‘Miss Ann Thropy’, to the effect that AIDS should be welcomed as a blessing since this disease would help relieve the human population pressure on the earth. It is no wonder that these statements - immediately disowned by prominent deep ecologists, incidentally-should have prompted Bookchin to launch a frontal attack (Keulartz, 1998, p. 117).

Bookchin is very much worried that these people feed on human disasters, suffering, and misery, preferably in Third World countries where AIDS is by far a more monstrous problem than elsewhere. Bookchin -considered the misanthropy to which these statements testified to be not just an incidental derailment of a bunch of runaway activists but a symptom of ecocentrism, which does not distinguish between oppressors and their victims and which, moreover, lumps human beings together
with all other forms of life, from mammals to germs (Keulartz, 1998, p. 117). According to Bookchin, there is a kind of -eco-brutalism in deep ecology that has not come out of Hitler’s Mein Kampf, the autobiography. For this alleged encouraging of -eco-brutalism, the deep ecology activists are compared with Hitler who killed millions of people. Bookchin charges that deep ecology belittles the position of humanity which is allegedly gulping down the resources by over populating the planet. He draws up:

This vague and undifferentiated humanity essentially seen as an ugly “anthropocentric” thing – presumably a malignant product of natural evolution – that is “overpopulating” the planet, “devouring” its resources, and destroying its wildlife and the biosphere – as though some vague domain of “nature” stands opposed to a constellation of non-natural human beings, with their technology, minds, society, etc., (1999, p. 283).

Social ecology’s assertion is that the one-sided critique of humanism reinforces - anti-humanism and -misanthropy. It says that -humanism does not simply mean a presumptuous claim of superiority over the non-human nature but more significantly an appeal to reason, care, and cooperation. But deep ecology says that mere biological presence of human beings (second nature) in large extent is intrinsically harmful to the first nature. It even advocates the exclusion of human beings from ever larger tracts of land and forest. In this connection, Arumugam says that -Maximizing wilderness and minimizing human population, some deep ecologists look upon even farming as such with disfavour, views that have rightfully given rise to charges that deep ecology is misanthropic (2008: 117).

Social ecology even targets Malthusianism for applying “the ecological concept of carrying capacity.” Bookchin says that Malthus tries to demonstrate that hunger, poverty, disease, and premature death is inevitable precisely because population and food supply increase at different rates. For this reason war, famines, and plagues and even "moral restraint" are necessary to keep the population down. George Sessions and Bill Devall, two of Naess's defenders of deep ecology extol Malthus as a projection of prophet for advocating population control. Bookchin charges Devall and Sessions are calling them as -the nineteenth-century radicals who have opposed the vicious abuses inflicted by industrial capitalism on the oppressed of the world, often in the name of Malthusianism (1999, p. 293). He writes:

Thomas Malthus was not a prophet; he was an apologist for the misery that the Industrial Revolution was inflicting on the English peasantry and working classes. His utterly fallacious argument that population increases exponentially while food supplies increase arithmetically was not ignored by England’s ruling classes; it was taken to heart and even incorporated into social Darwinism as an explanation for why oppression was a necessary feature of society and for why rich, white imperialists and the privileged were the “fittest” who were equipped to “survive” – needless to say, at the expense of the impoverished many (Bookchin, 1999, p. 294).
Bookchin’s assertion is that by population control these thinkers always kept aside the privileged class, the whites and elite rich. Same is the case with the Darwinism which says about the survival of the fittest. The social aspect of Darwinism considers the rich, white imperialists and the privileged as the fittest. Bookchin is of the view that hunger has its origins not in “natural “shortages of food or population growth but in social and cultural dislocations (1999, p. 295).

Bookchin observes that there is a close connection between social factors and demography. He says that population growth and attitudes toward population vary from society to society according to the way people live, the ideas they hold, and the socioeconomic relationships they establish. Again, it can be said that the reproductive behaviour of humans is profoundly conditioned by cultural values, standards of living, social traditions, and the status of women, religious beliefs, socio-political conflicts, and various socio-political expectations. For this Bookchin suggests providing people with decent lives, education, a sense of creative meaning in life, and above all free women from their roles as mere bearers of children and population growth begin to stabilize and population rates even reverse their direction.

In “A letter to George Sessions”, ecofeminist Greta Gaard (1996) maintains that ecofeminists are opposed to coercive population control methods. In this connection she condemns Sessions and Naess, the joint formulators of deep ecology platform principles, as racist, sexist, imperialist, anti-poor. According to her they have denied the basic human rights in formulating the population control thesis. She adds that the contentious population control policies advocated by deep ecologists illogically blame their female counterpart for over-breeding, polluting and exhausting resources. This tendency of deep ecology ignores the original causes of these problems. Mies and Shiva, in their book Ecofeminism (1993), explicate the major causes of resource exhaustion and other social problems. And they suggest that local pressure of raw material extraction for debt servicing and other forces of economic exploitation should be properly addressed by deep ecologists. Moreover, deep ecologists fail to address the issues of power and control in looking at the population problem. Naess does not pay attention to women’s lack of power to control their own reproductive processes. Thereby ecofeminists suggest the deep ecologists, if they can, to control themselves their male counterpart in population control.

**BIOCENTRIC EGALITARIANISM IS PROBLEMATIC**

The term biological or ecological egalitarianism are used interchangeably by Naess. According to Bookchin, -biospheric egalitarianism reduces human species into an unqualified identity with the non-human nature. Bookchin criticizes deep ecology for projecting humans from complex social beings to a simple species. The denial of human uniqueness is an inconsistent and impractical ethical principle for action. The man has been given due position in social justice schools of environmentalism. Bookchin says that homo-sapiens are -one of the nature’s unique species. It has slowly and painstakingly developed from the natural world into a unique social world.
of its own (2005, p. 22). Human beings are potentially the most advanced life-form of natural evolution. They are superior in terms of intelligence; they have moral capacity and sharpness. Human beings are potentially intelligible of the natural processes. They are potentially able to organize society along ecological and rational lines. For all these, they are in no way licensed to destroy the first nature. Thereby, keeping human beings, the second nature with the non-rational line of first nature is problematic.

Bookchin is of the view that biocentrism threatens to trivialize humanity, particularly its capacity for moral agency in nature. This trivialization nourishes misanthropy. Besides, the ethical demand of biocentrism is twisted on a form of ecological circular reasoning. Bookchin’s argument rests on the conviction that biocentrists cannot assign human beings an imperative for ethical behaviour that they do not assign to other life forms. Biocentrists insist that humans are equal to other life forms regarding inherent worth. In the -Introduction to the 1991 Edition of The Ecology of Freedom entitled -Twenty Years Later... Seeking a Balanced Viewpoint, Bookchin points out that -if a ‘biocentric’ society were to emerge, it would be obliged to ‘intervene’ massively in first nature with nearly all the sophisticated technologies it has its disposal to correct ecological dislocations on a scale that would leave the more purist ‘deep ecologists’ utterly aghast (2005, p. 55). Bookchin argues that the notion of equality when applied to human beings alone ignores individual differences in intelligence, talent, age, health, physical infirmity, etc. Again, when intended to encompass the nonhuman world, the notion of equality proves to be inappropriate. As such, the biocentric equality thesis of Naess is problematic. The reason is very clear as the differences in species are far wider than that of individual human beings. Bookchin writes:

Any form of -equality including those among humans that fails to account for differences produced by the -natural inequalities of age, physical capacities, and subjective differences in the nonhuman world would be truly lacking in the empathy that underpins -biocentric attitudes. -Biocentrism, to put the matter bluntly, is as primitive and unsatisfactory ethically as -anthropocentrism (2005, p. 55).

On the other hand, social ecology emphasizes on the gradations between first and second nature. Social ecology sees the natural world as a process of the development of increasing complexity and subjectivity. With the emergence of the second nature or the human beings, the first nature or the biological evolutionary processes have continued in and been negated by social and cultural evolutionary processes. Therefore, social ecology says that there is the real boundary between human and non-human nature. According to Bookchin, Brian Morris’s review of Arne Naess’sEcology, Community and Lifestyle has revealed the intellectual poverty of the -father of deep ecology. At the same time, it has also revealed, Bookchin observes, the silliness of the entire deep ecology movement. By quoting the observation that Morris makes in his review, Bookchin wonders whether deep ecology’s philosophy
that all living beings can be equitable with one another would have had any meaning before human beings emerged. -Not Man Apart, according to Bookchin, is perhaps the best argument against deep ecology.

Bookchin outright rejects any notion like intrinsic value of nature. He is of the opinion that nothing has value until some agent values it. As such if there is anything like intrinsic value inherent in non-human nature as formulated by Naess, which is not dependent on being valued by some other agents, then it must mean that non-human natural entities confer value on themselves. Bookchin rejects this latter possibility and asserts that humans are what give value to the rest of the world. In an interview with David Vanek, published in Harbinger: A Journal of Social Ecology, Bookchin says:

One of my critics, Robyn Eckersley, challenged me in the journal Environmental Ethics to explain, “Why should human thinking be regarded more valuable than the navigational skills of birds?” But that’s just a silly question. In “navigating,” birds are affected by the magnetic field of the Earth, they’re affected by the changes of temperature; they’re adapting to their surroundings. But human beings, crucially, can innovate, as I pointed out, and they live on another level of phenomena, culture. They can make airplanes, and they know how to navigate. Now they can go beyond birds and farther than birds and higher than birds. (Vanek 2001, p. n.p)

In other words, Bookchin tries to place human beings in a higher place in the scheme of things. A human being is culturally sound. Bookchin is not ready to recognize the equal positions of biotic communities. The second nature is edged over the rest of the life forms in his social ecology thesis. His rejection of the intrinsic value of nature gives social ecology a polarized position to deep ecology. There is a lack of continuity between two positions of Naess regarding equal moral worth and that realistic egalitarianism determines how to deal with the nonhuman nature. Naess’s sense of being apologetic and the sense of regret when one is bound to kill a life form are not sufficient to fill up this continuity. According to French (2005), Naess’ view is utopian and normatively inconsistent. In concrete cases of moral conflict, this view is of no use and fails to give normative guidance in one’s decision making and to perform an action. Even a supporter of biocentric egalitarian principle can no longer continue to be governed by an equal inherent value which is supposed to be possessing in all species. If realistic egalitarian principle permits one killing, then there would necessarily be an apparent conflict between theory and practice in a moral situation.

...it is not helpful in ethics to separate as definitively as Naess does moral principles from moral practice. If Naess’s species egalitarianism can only be promulgated -in principle and must be consistently reshaped into a qualified realistic egalitarianism that allows human to kill or injure animals and plants and damage ecosystems in practice, then the latter
formulation is the genuinely normative position that governs decisions and actions (French 2005, p. 44).

From this observation, French is of the view that the Naessianbiospheric egalitarianism cannot guide an agent by any concrete normative judgment. To guide one to deal with a concrete situation there is no way but -reintroducing some normative ranking of species. French’s argument is that if the proponents of deep ecology who advocate biospheric egalitarianism cannot but acknowledge -a normative privileging of human interests and worth…. it is better to articulate our value hierarchy plainly, rather than having it remain cloaked and unarticulated. (2005, p. 52) In other words, French suggests for an anti-anthropocentric species-ranking position. The intention of French is to bring ethical consistency and clarity which he believes is lacking in Naess’s formulation of the ethical theory of deep ecology. To do this French adopts Lawrence Johnson’s Species Ranking Scheme from the book A Morally Deep World where a mid-course between atoms and ethical holism between anthropocentrism and biospherical egalitarianism is adopted. French quotes Johnson, -Although we ought to revere life ….some life is more valuable than other life. This is not because only some interests count while some do not –all interest count –but because not all interests are equivalent (2005, p. 53). French gives a little edge to Johnson over Naess for he believes that Naess moves away from the principle of biospherical egalitarianism -when adjudicating conflict-of-interest cases (2005, p. 57). The problem with Naess, according to French, is coherence and usefulness in the formulation of biospheric egalitarianism principle.

Similarly, eco-feminism holds that biocentric egalitarianism in principle cannot be achieved. Salleh views biological egalitarianism concept of Naess as an assumption, which is -cancelled in part by the implicit contradiction contained in Naess’ first premise. She maintains that -a self-consistent biological egalitarianism cannot be arrived at unless men become open to both facets of this same urge to dominate and use (p. 340). Again, Naess’s view that -total egalitarianism is impossible is criticized by Salleh. She writes:

_Ecofeminists of a socialist persuasion are disturbed to hear the father of deep ecology, Arne Naess, claim that -total egalitarianism is impossible, that some human exploitation will always be -necessary. Women's complex treatment as a sexual, reproductive, and labor -resource is glossed over in the deep ecological agenda. (1984, p. 226)._

Concerning Salleh’s criticism of biological egalitarianism, Mary Mellor maintains that -biological egalitarianism and the principles of diversity and symbiosis did not seem to take account of women’s experiences and lives (Mellor 1997, p. 139). Mellor adds that deep ecologists form an-abstract environmental ethics when they could start from women as the immediate living basis for an alternative consciousness. Every biotic community is related to each other. But they are distinct from each other. The suggestion of ecofeminism is that since they are distinct from each other, one ought to respect the individuality of these beings rather than seeking
to merge with them. It is true that deep ecology tries to relate them to egalitarian concept among all communities. Deep ecology says that all life forms are interconnected in the fabric or web of internal relations. Ecofeminism believes it to be an abstract metaphysical pre-conceptualization of deep ecology. Ecofeminism alleges that by this egalitarian biological concept of integral relation, deep ecology ignores the identity of each species. According to Zimmerman, this view may be only apparently consistent with the view that while men think atomistically, women think relationally. More than giving importance on 'contextual' metaphysics, Zimmerman believes in seeking a way to overcome the effects of hierarchal and dualistic thinking. Deep ecology fails while it is sympathetic to the aims of such an approach.

In this context, the view of Marti Kheel (1991) is important who says that we cannot solve the ecological crisis simply by ridding ourselves of metaphysical and social atomism and replacing such atomism with a metaphysical and social relationalism. Kheel (1991) further adds that it is important to remember that relationships can only obtain between individuals that have some measure of importance and reality of their own. If we reduce individuals merely to the status of interconnection in a field of internal relations, Kheel (1991) observes, we run the danger of removing all obstacles to regarding the nexus of internal relations as being more important than the individual nodes comprising the biome. That is, for the sake of the “overall good” of the whole set of internal relations, individuals could justifiably be sacrificed since after all, they are only temporary coagulations of the dynamic patterns at work in the vibrant field of life.

Guha points out that, biospherical egalitarianism of Naess is mere impossibility if there is a dualism of rich and poor and inequality among the people of first and third worlds. Egalitarianism will be meaningful if the problem of poverty of third worlds is given due place in any ecological movement. A deep ecologist’s objective cannot be fulfilled until the issue of the poverty is not attached in environmental agenda. At the same time Guha states that rich countries or already developed economies cannot become environmental bosses at the cost of a glossy egalitarianism which is nothing but a new means of exploitation.

THE CONCEPT OF WILDERNESS IS PROBLEMATIC

Deep ecology advocates the preservation and expansion of the wilderness. Naess advocates wilderness as well as the wild, -non-rational as opposed to the irrational side of human nature. Deep ecology’s ecological consciousness suggests feeling human beings as the part of the natural world. In concrete terms, it views first nature as -wilderness, a concept that by definition means nature is essentially separated from human beings and hence -wild. -The myth of wilderness considers the presence of humans as a threat to other species. Critics consider this myth as ridiculous and anti-civilizational in character.

Social ecology charges the notion of wilderness as the advocacy of primitivism. Bookchin does not prefer to stand in the row of the Primitivists. One can see the
twenty first century’s man-made world. According to Bookchin, this stage of humancivilization utterly rejects deep ecology’s optimism of returning to a primitive world. The Primitivists believe that mankind has acquired too much of civilization. But according to Bookchin, we are not civilized enough. Primitivists believe in personal autonomy. But Bookchin believes in social freedom. Primitivists believe that there is a natural man, an uncorrupted ego which civilization has corrupted. But for Bookchin, competition and other class and hierarchical relations have corrupted society. Therefore, Bookchin is in favour of a cooperative civilization which he believes goes against deep ecology. Moreover, -deep ecologists emphasize an ungraded, non-evolutionary continuity between human and nonhuman nature, to the point of outright denial of a boundary between adaptive animality and innovative humanity (Biehl and Bookchin1995).

Plumwood (1997) criticizes Arne Naess who advocates a road to ecological selfhood in terms of the concept of self-realization in which the self is identified with as much of the world as possible. In this concept of Naess, wilderness is suggested to be seen as part of the self. According to Plumwood, there certainly seems to be something problematic and even paradoxical in the notion of relating to uncolonized areas via their incorporation into or assimilation to self. Deep ecology, according to Plumwood, fails to recognize and value nature’s otherness and independence as exemplified in the wilderness. She writes that -accounts which stress only the independence of wilderness have foregone any basis for countering the western construction of nature as alien, or for providing a foundation for ethical relations to it (1997, p. 161). Plumwood says that the use of hyper-separated concepts of human and nature rule out the ground of interaction. Deep ecology says that the true nature excludes all human influence on it. According to Plumwood, the concept of wilderness is extremely problematic in relation to indigenous peoples who both sustain and are sustained by their land and its ecosystems. What is wilderness in the terms of the master identity is to these others a home. Plumwood observes that the forest gardens and tended landscapes which are home to such people come to be viewed by the ‘master consciousness’ as pure nature.

Plumwood writes:

‘Wilderness’, traditionally the territory excluded as the underside of the contrasts of reason and civilization, is also traditionally a wasteland empty of culture and inviting colonization. It is named as terra nullius, the alien, fearful and disordered domain of animals, women, savages and the underside of the human psyche. (1997, p. 163)

In this connection, Plumwood gives the reference of Vandana Shiva who speaks about the master culture. The master culture, according to Shiva, arrogantly speaks of ‘discovering’ and ‘exploring’ areas which other species and other human cultures have been occupying for an immensely long time period, and appropriates as ‘nature’ germplasm which embodies the labour of generations of indigenous agriculturalists (1997, p. 163). Freya Mathews (1994) alleges that -the typical deep ecological...
reverence for untouched Nature, idealized in the concept of wilderness, is rooted in the very same dualistic understanding of the world that by setting humankind above and beyond Nature, paved the way for ecological crisis (164). He elaborates that if we make a fetish of untouched Nature, then we are implicitly reinforcing the dualistic view. It contradicts the basic metaphysical premise of man-nature-oneness thesis of deep ecology.

The third world critics assert that preserving wilderness is an agenda for economically and socially well-offs. Quoting Gandhi, Guha says, -Even God dare not appear to the poor man except in the form of bread (1989, p. 71). Guha’s allegation is that the international conservative elites are using the philosophical, moral, and scientific arguments in the name of deep ecology in advancing their wilderness campaign. The Third World countries are being affected in the name of environmental and biodiversity protection. Guha justifies it by tracing the historical legacy of wilderness. According to him, from the perspective of ancient lineage of wilderness, one can see the -elite feudal traditions of ‘hunting preserves’ – prevalent in Norman England, Qing China and Mughal India– where animal species such as the tiger and the deer were reserved for the exclusive pleasure of lords and kings (1989, p. 61). In the modern perspectives, the legacy of wilderness is carried forth by the colonial powers of the America and Europe. Guha further adds, -The background to wilderness conservation was the despoliation of the American continent by the westward movement of European settlers (1989, p. 67). He considers these projects as -elite ecological imperialism that result in -a direct transfer of resources from the poor to the rich. He cites the example of the first-ever international conference which was held in London in 1900. The topic of this conference was -Protection of wildlife of Africa, where there was a discussion on the massive destruction of African wildlife by hunters. The delegates were from ministers of the European colonial powers where there was nobody from Africa.

Guha observes that -if there was indeed a ‘crisis of African wildlife’ this crisis had been created by the white man’s gun and rifle, not the native spear and sling shot (1989, p. 66). It is to be mentioned that the game reserves and national parks were the hunting and recreation grounds of the colonial whites which is positively harmful to the poor people of third worlds. Because the normal daily lifestyle which is coexistent with the natural environment in a rural set up is compatible with the view of wilderness. According to Guha, deep ecology’s thesis of wilderness preservation is of no use in third worlds. The implementation of the wilderness agenda is causing serious deprivation among the poor people of the Third World. This argument of Guha is based on the dichotomy of anthropocentrism and biocentrism. He says that biocentric egalitarianism of Naess -place humans on a more or less equal footing with other species (1989, p. 117). But this dichotomy is irrelevant when applied to the Third World. Guha has cited the example of India which is a long settled and densely populated country in which agrarian populations have a finely balanced relationship with nature. If wilderness is advocated by following the deep ecology principle then
one is to set aside the wilderness areas which will be resulted in a direct transfer of resources from the poor to the rich. Guha shows his concern to this acquiring and exploitative tactic of elite deep ecologists. He writes:

*The initial impetus for setting up parks for the tiger and other large mammals such as the rhinoceros and elephant came from two social groups, first, a class of ex-hunters turned conservationists belonging mostly to the declining Indian feudal elite and second, representatives of international agencies, such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IDCN), seeking to transplant the American system of national parks onto Indian soil (1989, p. 75).*

The marginalized section is the most sufferers in terms of environmental ill effects. The rich become policy makers being affluent in global perspective. In their own convenience, they try to expand the policy of establishing national parks in the third worlds advocating recreation centres in the name of wilderness. In this connection the view of Anil Agarwal, as quoted by ErachBharucha (2005), carries significance. In the Fifth World Conservation Lecture in London on “Human-Nature Interactions in a Third World Country: The case of India,” Agarwal states, -I am often amazed and extremely angry when people talk about environment education for the villages. It is the so-called, educated people who need environment education more than anyone else (Bharucha 2005: 184). In other words, people in the third world countries live in conformity with the balance with the natural environment. Guha alleges that the national park system set for ‘the general public’ and ‘city dweller’ refer exclusively to whites and males only. In his words, -These -over-civilized folk lived the year round in the cities and only seasoned their lives, a week at a time, with the wild. By the early twentieth century, growing urbanization had spawned a leisure industry which created a powerful social force for the preservation of wild areas. This is how the third world critics claim to have exposed the concealed intention of deep ecologists as the advocate of consumerist view in the name of conservation. For this wilderness is instrumentally advocated without having the least consideration for the poor of the third world countries. They condemn Naess and other deep ecologists for advocating wilderness without addressing the problems of the third worlds.

**CONCLUSION**

In the conclusion it can be said that, in his concern of social justice, Naess has used the broad meaning of social justice covering almost all facets of human problems inviting equality principle of mankind. It is seen that for an ecologically balanced future, deep ecology’s aerial view to its fellow counterparts falls short in comparison to the ideas of individual distinctiveness as well as love and kinship of social justice schools. Naess’ world view of -Man in Nature makes him view the humanity as a blanket category that has allegedly neglected social and gender differences. His overemphasis on the criticism of anthropocentrism keeps him away
to view the roles of white and rich-men’s world in creating many-sided oppressions and inequalities. Of course, Naess tries to defend his standpoint stating that he has been misinterpreted by the critics, however, thus far his defence has been insufficient.

REFERENCES


*Ecosophy, 11*(4), 159-166.


