Divine Reality and the Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Philosophical Analysis

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ABSTRACT

The cosmological postulation that there cannot be an "effect" without a "cause" is the underlying predicate of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). PSR states that everything must have a sufficient reason, cause, or foundation. Some theologians consider the above notions to be fideism, preferring to think that God's knowledge is founded on human reason, whereas "intelligent design" is a two-tiered argument that uses design to show the existence of a "Divine Realty" (God). Reality is subjective and is built indirectly depending on human perspective. The paper, therefore, aimed to philosophically analyze the Principle of Sufficient Reason to explain the notion of a divine reality. This analytical philosophical research employs the descriptive and conceptual analysis approaches and reveals that PSR, like other concepts, is not only improbable, but is also contradictory to divine knowledge. It concludes that although PSR uses contradictory terms such as "necessity" and "contingency" and fails to provide adequate justification for the existence of a divine reality, it could be justified that a "Divine Reality" (God or necessary being) must have a "sufficient reason" to exist.

Keywords: Divine; Reality; Principle; Sufficient; Reason; Philosophical.

INTRODUCTION

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is a significant and divisive philosophical idea that states that everything must have a reason, cause, or foundation. This simple need for complete intelligibility has resulted in some of philosophy's most daring and difficult theses. This paper discusses why Leibniz adopted the PSR, its varied uses, and its current relevance. The inquiry in this paper begins by presenting the concept before connecting it to explain the conception or existence of a divine reality. The study then argues that the principle should be looked at again in light of the idea of divine reality.

THE PSR DESCRIBED

The chief proponent of this principle was Gottfried Leibniz. However, Parmenides, Archimedes, Abelard, Spinoza, and Anne Conway were all

proponents of some variation of the idea prior to Leibniz. The idea may be expressed in a number of ways, but the following is arguably the finest summary:

1.   There is an adequate explanation for why every entity P exists if P exists.
2.   For every event S, there is a good reason why S happens when S happens.
3.   There is an adequate explanation for why Q is true for every proposition Q is true if Q is.

Because Leibniz, like many other philosophers of the time, did not distinguish between the two, an adequate explanation can be interpreted in terms of either reasons or causes. However, depending on which interpretation is used, the resultant principle is substantially different. Because axioms are assertions recognized as having no explanation imaginable inside the system, it is unclear whether the concept of adequate reason can be applied to axioms within a logic building like a mathematical or physical theory. The principle states that all true statements inside a system should be deductible from the set of axioms that form the foundation of the system. However, Godel (cited in Richardson, 2014) demonstrated that for any sufficiently expressive deductive system, there exists a claim that cannot be proven or refuted. One may wonder if there are any fundamental principles that cannot be described further.

Leibniz coined the PSR, but Spinoza is generally regarded to have put it at the heart of his philosophical system (Belot, 2001; Lin, 2011). Some PSR variations demand an explanation for objects' existence, whereas others want both an explanation and a cause for their absence (Melamed & Lin, 2022). A similar dilemma may arise when it comes to issues of identification. Thus, the question may arise whether one should accept identity or non-identity as a default position. The PSR holds that if q is problematic, q must have a cause or a reason for its malfunctioning. If it is claimed by the one attending to the problem of q that q has no cause or reason to malfunction or be problematic, then such a claim may be false.

According to the PSR, there are no brute, unexplained facts; no uncaused occurrences or anything that happens without a cause; and no assertions or beliefs are true without an explanation of why they are true. In a modally strong version of the PSR, the principle is necessary and obtains in all possible worlds, whereas it is merely contingently true in a weak modal version. The principle simply asserts that it is true in practice or even in all other worlds in a factual rendition. The regulative and factice versions differ in terms of allowing for the falsification of the principle. According to Leibniz (1989), no fact can be valid or be real, and no proposition can be true, unless there is a sufficient cause for it, which there is not in this situation. After Leibniz, philosophers such as Wolff and Schopenhauer supported variations of the PSR, but the PSR was never the majority position of most philosophers, including Plato, Descartes, and Hume, all of whom were opponents. But Leibniz's concern about avoiding raw facts, things that happen for no reason, and truths that do not have explanations is still a real concern for philosophers who want to learn more today, even if the words have changed.

VARIED USES OF THE PSR

The PSR has some crucial implications. For instance, Leibniz's PSR leads to his "Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles", which states that if two seemingly separate objects share all of their attributes, they are essentially one and the same thing (Bobro, 2018 p. 218). Assume there appeared to be two indistinguishable spheres with identical properties, each constructed of chemically pure iron, with a diameter of one mile, the same temperature, colour, and so on. However, there would be no compelling reason for one of the indistinguishable spheres to be in its current location and not the other. As a result, according to the PSR, if two objects appear to share all of their properties, they are truly one and the same thing. There is only one sphere. The PSR was also used by Leibniz to create a cosmological argument for the existence of God. When attempting to explain a contingent reality with another contingent truth, an unlimited number of "why" questions arise. A series of "why" responses that fizzle out or continue indefinitely cannot be considered sufficient. Such a rationale must be independent of the chain of events. In collaborating Leibniz's perception, Ottuh and Idjakpo (2021b) affirm that any successful search for causes must lead to the discovery of a necessary substance - a substance that must exist, namely, the God of religion.

In Leibniz's account of God's creation, the PSR plays a significant part. Since God's ideas contain an infinite number of conceivable worlds, yet only one of them may exist, there must be a sufficient reason for God's choice, a reason that leads him to one thing over another (Leibniz, 1989). In other words, there is no other world comparable to ours since God would not have created both if there were. Newton believed that space is absolutely uniform and that, without the things placed in it, one point of space absolutely does not differ in any way from another point of space. Leibniz uses the PSR to refute Newton's absolutist conception of space and time. Newton believed that space is absolutely uniform and that, without the things placed in it, one point of space absolutely does not differ in any way from another point of space (Jorati, 2017). As a result, it is unthinkable that there could be a reason why God, in order to preserve the same positions of bodies among themselves, would have placed them in space in one way and not another. In terms of time, the situation is the same (Bobro 2018). Space, in Leibniz's opinion, is nothing more than the arrangement of coexisting things and their states. Time is merely the sequence of events and their states.

The basic concept of thinking is that there is nothing without a reason; or, to put it another way, there is no truth that does not have a cause. According to Leibniz (1987), the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject in every true assertion. The concept-containment theory of truth is named after Leibniz. Every truth, according to Leibniz (cited in Longuenesse, 2009), has its own determining reasons, even those that exist only in conceivable worlds, because possible worlds have their own set of truths. This line of reasoning appears to point to the PSR as a necessary truth that holds true in all possible worlds. However, there is disagreement over its modal position, or whether it is necessary or contingently true. Is Leibniz implying that a cosmos with two or

more indistinguishable spheres cannot exist? Is he simply stating that such things do not exist in our universe?

Although the vast majority of critics favour the former, Pikkert (2009) and Jorati (2017), for example, argue in favour of the latter. Leibniz (cited in Bobro, 2018) seems to suggest the latter in a letter to Bernoulli. This is not to suggest that the vacuum, the atom, and other such concepts are impossible, but rather that they contradict divine knowledge. Even if God only created what is in conformity with the laws of knowledge, the objects of power and wisdom are distinct and should not be confounded, according to Ottuh and Idjakpo (2021a). This sentence appears to imply that intangible phenomena like vacua and atoms are feasible, that God has the power to manifest them, and that the PSR is thus contingent. However, because this is the only text of its kind, the jury is still out on whether Leibniz's PSR is modal. To the best of my knowledge, Leibniz never expressly selects between these two options - sufficient reason as a necessary truth or as a necessary methodological postulate - and commentary can only point out the benefits of either. The methodological suggestion is based on the idea that the world of facts will be incomprehensible unless sufficient reason is held in full generality (Savile, 2000). According to Plato (cited in Bobro, 2018), it is impossible for anything to come into being without a cause. This seems similar to the PSR, but he also argues that some things do not "come to be" and that some of these things, such as pre-existing disorderly motion before the demiurge impose mathematical order on it, has no cause or explanation.

Descartes (cited in Longuenesse, 2009) asserts that God "creates" metaphysical and mathematical truths (p.118). Despite his assertions that "nothing arises from nothing," they are not true in and of themselves, unless God chooses to make them so. According to Descartes, God generates these realities by a really free and indifferent act of will; there can be no cause for God's will to create any of these truths. This is contrary to the PSR. In the case of Hume (1978), while it may be true that everything that exists has a cause, the argument that everything that exists must have a reason is problematic. According to Hume, one may plainly imagine an item without its cause because the notions of cause and effect are distinct (Ottuh and Idjakpo, 2021a). To put it another way, while everything that exists may or may not have a sufficient reason, assuming that they do or must is rash.

THE CURRENT RELEVANCE OF THE PSR

The concept of adequate reason may be used to govern philosophical and scientific knowledge advancement. As a consequence, a connection between scientific fields and philosophy might be established, resulting in a mutually fruitful discourse. However, it can be shown that applying the idea of adequate reason to philosophical and scientific studies is ineffective and hence cannot be utilized to build a conversation. Ottuh (2020) argues that to build a relationship between science and philosophy, it is believed that other concepts, such as causality, ethics, humanity, and religion among others, must be strengthened. The adequate reason principle explains the nature of all existence. It promotes the idea

that everything in life has a foundation that justifies its existence. Sufficient reason, according to this theory, is inherent in all observed facts (Pruss, 2017). All beings, events, and propositions whose existence in a precise form can be confirmed are included in the phenomenon. The circumstances at issue must occur, proposals must be valid, and all entities must exist for this concept to apply.

The foundation of everything's existence, according to Leibniz, is either a reason for the specific observation or a cause justifying its current actuality (Leibniz, 1987). The concept of adequate reason solves two theoretical problems for which there is no direct solution. It explains the genesis of a chain of events that fails to accurately depict the development of any phenomenon or notion. It also explains the apparent differences in all elements of life that are otherwise thought to be flawed. In his *Principia Mathematica*, Leibniz discusses the process that connects the philosophical reason for life with the subsequent reasons discovered in the physical world.

Against significant objections, Pruss (2007) supports the premise that every true contingent statement must have an explanation, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's contention that the PSR implies modal fatalism (Richardson, 2014). Pruss also offers a variety of positive arguments for the PSR, based on topics as diverse as existence metaphysics, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the PSR's daily application. Furthermore, Pruss demonstrates how the PSR might enhance debate in a variety of domains, including meta-ethics and mathematical philosophy.

The degree of inclination of each argument towards existence is used to produce the sequence of reasons for existence. Because there is no other explanation for the existence of the ultimate reason, it is regarded as the truth. This timeless truth cannot be immediately perceived in the physical world. The concept of adequate reason, as articulated by Leibniz, seems to provide a solution to one of the issues that current philosophers are grappling with (Panda, 2019). All parts of life, it is evident, have a series of explanations that explain their existence. However, only a few causes may be deduced from an examination of the current situation and viewpoint (Longuenesse, 2009). Because the number of alternative reasons is endless, human thinking cannot lead to the ultimate explanation. There must be an adequate cause for every occurrence, statement, or physical thing. The fact that there is no single phenomenon in the modern world whose whole chain of causes can be articulated proves Leibniz's reasoning. A mysterious philosophical rationale appears at the conclusion of each sequence. According to Ottuh and Idjakpo (2011), this is the reason God - the source of all will to be, can never be fully comprehended.

DIVINE REALITY

The phrases "divine reality" and "God" are interchangeable. It does not relate to a specific God of any religion, but rather to the highest conceivable being discussed by religious philosophers. The term "ultimate reality" is also used to allude to God, albeit it may not always mean the same thing. Thus, "what is it" is

in-itself' of existence and is referred to as "reality". In this sense, "what is it" in-itself of a divine life is referred to as "Divine Reality". However, metaphysical inquiry is striving to see if there is such a thing as divine reality (Ottuh & Idjakpo, 2021a). Similarly, general epistemology is based on the recognition that people claim to know a variety of things about the universe. Ottuh and Idjakpo (2021b) argue that the divine reality epistemic is based on the recognition that people claim to know a variety of things about God. As a result, divine reality epistemology and divine reality metaphysics are inextricably linked (Krishnan, 2004). The phrases "divine reality" and "God" may be used interchangeably.

Theological methodology has always been essentially philosophical, in the sense that it encourages a free and critical approach to divine truth-knowing. Though theologically oriented, the search for divine reality in the West has not been without philosophical associations in one way or another. As a result, various philosophical conclusions about divine reality have emerged. Idjakpo and Ottuh (2021b) opine that as a science of divine reality, theology draws its knowledge from cherished tradition and seeks to comprehend through reason and experience. Any sanctified tradition's origins, on the other hand, can be traced back to reason, experience, or, as some argue, revelation.

Though not exhaustive, the resulting knowledge of God is at least epistemically harmonious. God is portrayed as being intellectual and empirical, as well as personable and concerned with human existence. God is intellectual and relational at the same time. To use a biblical example, God is both immutable and dynamic, which makes his relationality possible; without being unchanging, he cannot be trusted, and without being dynamic, he cannot be experienced (Marbaniang, 2007). It is possible for man to know God because of God's relationality. If God could not be concerned with human existence in order to show Himself, then he had no possibility of relationality. According to Ottuh and Jemegbe (2022), this relationality also serves as the foundation for human's existential relationship with God, while God's inherent rationality serves as the foundation for religious adherents' faith. According to Marbaniang (2007), this relationality demonstrates that God is both personal (to allow for reciprocal relationship) and concerned. He is concerned with human reality, and as a result, he makes himself known to man. Unity, necessity, immutability, transcendence, and infinity are the logical characteristics of God. Plurality, contingency, mutability, immanence, and finitude are the empirical qualities.

Because adherents of various religions claim knowledge of God, the metaphysics of God becomes a prominent topic of philosophical inquiry. The parallels and differences between distinct conceptions of God necessitate a thorough examination of the noetic foundations of the conceptions themselves. With the potential for significant loss for philosophy if it misses out on this fundamental aspect of reality known as divine, it becomes imperative for philosophy to devote itself to exploring the many origins, nature, scope, and method of knowledge, particularly in regard to God (Ottuh, 2020). The philosophical difficulties of God, freedom, and immortality, as stated by Kant (1963), are unavoidable. Yet, it is also incorrect to investigate these notions without first demonstrating the certainty of the tool or method employed to

investigate them. The propaedeutic to metaphysics, according to Kant, must be a severe critique of pure reason. Kant (cited in Hospers, 2021) claims that establishing the certainty of knowledge is necessary before forming any philosophical views. Obviously, unless the measuring rod is of standard quality, it is impossible to know if the measurement obtained through it is correct or not.

Similarly, one cannot be certain of a metaphysical consequence without first being certain of the epistemic that regulates it. As a result, divine reality epistemology becomes an essential and fascinating topic of study. For Ottuh (2022), the postmodern world exhibits skepticism, and on the other hand, it has abandoned any mathematical or rational confidence in knowledge. Empiricism, skepticism, positivism, pragmatism, subjectivism, and relativism were all explored along the way to this diametrical shift. All of these advances in knowledge theory have had an impact on theology. According to Idjakpo and Ottuh (2021b) faith has always been associated with religion, whereas reason, experience, and intuition have long been associated with philosophy. As a result, the study utilizes a technique that includes looking into the epistemic of reality and assessing the implications and conclusions of epistemic theories for divine reality.

RELATING THE PSR TO DIVINE REALITY

The PSR explains the real presence of Divine Reality (God), which states that there is an adequate explanation to account for the existence and character of anything that may potentially not exist. The ultimate adequate justification in each of these cases is God's free will. Cosmological arguments are used to prove God's existence based on a collection of facts about the universe. The reasoning follows *a-posteriori* statements regarding the causal character of items in the universe; that is, things exist, hence they must be reliant on something (a cause) prior to their being (Reichenbach, 2019). However, it is not restricted to causally inferred items; it may also include causes that are unrelated to the inferred object. For instance, one may be ill, yet one is ill for a reason, regardless of whether the cause (or causes) is known. Even so, the etiology of an illness should be stated. In the case of the universe, the attraction of creating cosmological arguments is to investigate the issue of why the universe exists or why there is something rather than nothing. In cosmological arguments, it is often said that the universe has contingent facts that need explanations for why they exist, are true, or are real.

The PSR has been employed as a cosmological argument to support the requirement for a God, a being whose existence is both essential and sufficient to enable the universe to exist - *creatio ex nihilo*. Plato summed up the PSR well when he stated that all that becomes must of necessity become due to some cause, since it is impossible for anything to accomplish being without a cause (Pedro, 2019). The First-cause argument and the argument from contingency are two types of cosmological arguments that employ the PSR center. An argument for first cause is based on the premise that anything must arise from somewhere else. The First cause argument is motivated by the possible regression implied by the concept of causality. In more technical terms, this means that whatever is a result

or outcome, let's call it P, must have been caused by something, let's call it A. Given A, one might conclude that A is caused by B, and so on, leading to a regress in establishing and sourcing causes. This may be readily avoided if we infer an uncaused cause to end the regress, such as God, who is the First Cause. Given that there are things in the universe that rely on other things for their survival or existence, the potential that their survival is contingent on another item that exists is allowed.

Furthermore, certain philosophers, like Russell and Hume, have been eager to bring up another issue: who produced the First Cause. After establishing the concept of causality, which states that every event must have a cause, every cause must also have a cause, they are motivated. Theologians have been less bothered by this since it allows for an uncaused causer, which they feel does not qualify for the idea of causality. It is debatable if this required cause or entity must be God, given that the universe may be its own necessary cause or perhaps another universe if the multi-verse idea is right. Aquinas (cited in Clarke, 2009) claims that in order to determine if God exists, we must first evaluate everything that makes up the universe. Importantly, since everything in the universe relies on a preceding cause to depart, everything in the universe must also rely on a preexisting cause, establishing God's necessary existence. This is often known as the argument from contingency. Consider Aquinas' answer to the argument that one cannot offer justification for God's nature itself, since God's essence is only to exist. This is similar to the argument that the universe exists because it exists because we can't explain why it does not depend on anything else.

Still, facts about objects in the universe might be used to demonstrate why the universe must be totally contingent by nature, necessitating the existence of a necessary and adequate cause. This empowers the PSR supporter to argue for the existence of a necessary being (God). This, on the other hand, may be disputed as a logical fallacy of composition, in which the character of the pieces of a whole is used to justify the nature of the whole itself. As a result, it seems that the argument from contingency fails to illustrate its claim of a necessary being from a logical position (Pedro, 2019). To define what constitutes a sufficient justification, one may state that an adequate explanation must be provided to connect the cause and the result.

A necessary truth would root out all contingent reasons for Leibniz, since it must come to an end at some point with some ultimate non-contingent truth, that is, God, according to the PSR. Nothing can exist without a sufficient reason, according to Leibniz's (1989) PSR, and the adequate reason for the creation of the universe cannot be discovered in the succession of contingent objects. He goes on to say that the adequate reason must be located outside of this succession of contingent things, in a substance in which a necessary being carries the reason for its being inside itself; otherwise, we would not have a good cause to stop. God is the ultimate purpose for everything. To prevent going down the rabbit hole, God, who must exist, must be proclaimed as a sufficient cause. The notion of a necessary being, according to Bertrand Russell, should be approached with care since whatever is judged necessary involves *apriori* propositional assertions, such as A is F, that are governed by logical axioms, such as the rule of non-

contradiction. If the a-priori argument about necessity was based on a-posteriori considerations, it would be a contradiction in terms.

USING THE PSR TO EXPLAIN DIVINE REALITY

There are generally held beliefs among Catholics about God's place in philosophy. When a Catholic refers to God, he or she is referring to the one true God, the Creator of all things visible and invisible (Newman, 2022). There is widespread agreement that metaphysics learns about God through answering the question, "Does God Exist?" An investigation of the interdependence discovered in beings of experience, as the names themselves suggest, is a confirmation of God's existence. The medium of demonstration in such a proof is a nominal definition of the subject, that is, a definition that simply conveys what the term "God" implies. The conclusion denotes God by all of these names, and the remainder of the philosophical discoveries concerning the divine nature and qualities are derived from its implications. A philosophical account of experienced reality can be developed along the lines necessitated by the human mind's gradual opening to the world of experience. Metaphysics does not set out to reveal God; rather, it is forced to do so by its topic, existence. It is already on its way to being self-vindicating through its awareness of being's own proof in its apprehension of being as such. The knowledge of God is the knowledge of all beings' dependence on Him.

The Christian's acknowledgement of God in this finding does not need to be included in the intellectual project. A faithful metaphysics with its own internal criterion achieves certainty in its statements about God. Any denial of God's existence is met with the resources of its own sense of self. Because of the Protestant rejection of natural theology, affirmations of God's existence and nature may only be made within the confines of faith. Recently, the debate has expanded beyond the Barth-Bultmann axis to include hermeneutical and eschatological theology. Some theologians have regarded the aforementioned ideas as fideism, preferring to base God's knowledge on human reason (Newman, 2022). Others have attempted to salvage the ontological argument by claiming that if "necessary being" has any meaning, it must mean something. In phenomenology, human existence appears in consciousness as radically dependent and insecure, pointing to God as necessary, not as a rational inference from the limited, but as a discerning of indications of a transcendent within the finite. As a result, in simple symbolic knowledge, God is communicated as Presence rather than Cause.

The empirical approach (Krishnan, 2004) suggests that Tillich's premise of correlation between man's existential predicament and any philosophical/theological solution, reduced from the ontological to the antic sphere, is suggested by the empirical approach. This amounts to redefining natural theology as a dynamic in which past religious knowledge articulates itself in forms that are neither persuading nor probative in and of them. The attempt to construct a critical epistemology in which the intellect is driven to affirm God as the Infinite Cause is known as transcendental Thomism. Knowledge is heuristic in this approach, addressing the question of God conditionally before rendering

God's affirmation a requirement for the intelligibility of the actual. The metaphysics of participation underpins this, and analogy, the expansive and projective potential latent in intellect to confirm the unknown, is its counterpart.

The existence of God, according to Aristotelians, Fideism, and Logical Positivism, cannot be demonstrated or refuted, but must be accepted on faith alone, because all scientific hypotheses must be falsifiable in the natural world. Belief in a supernatural God is outside the natural scope of scientific research under Popper's philosophy of science. The majority of popular conceptions of God expressly or implicitly presuppose an entity whose existence cannot be proven or refuted. The theories of quantum mechanics, according to Polkinghorne (1998), are the closest physical equivalent to the existence of God, as they appear counterintuitive but make sense of a huge amount of discordant data. Plantinga (cited in Stenger, 2007) compares the existence of God to the existence of other minds, stating that both are notoriously difficult to show against a zealous skeptic. The Intelligent Design argument is a two-tiered argument that uses design to show God's existence. The first prong states that the cosmos, humans, and all other species, in their whole, in their components, and in their interactions with one another and their surroundings, seem to have been intended for certain tasks and lifestyles. According to the second prong of the argument, the cosmos and everything in it is flawless and purposefully designed. Only an all-mighty Creator could account for this.

TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS

Aristotle's detached transcendent demiurges to Spinoza's pantheism are examples of Western God ideas (Wood, 2022). Augustine and Aquinas aimed to improve the rigour and coherence of religious conceptions. Others, such as Leibniz and Hegel, engaged with religious themes constructively and seriously. Even critics of the notion of God, such as Hume and Nietzsche, have to cope with them. Although contemporary thinking assumes a clear distinction between philosophy and theology, it is far from clear how to do so on a philosophical basis. For example, if there is a God, God must be one of reality's most basic qualities, to which all other features presumably connect (Zachhuber, 2022). Anselm claimed that as one's virtue increases, so does one's ability to think rationally and discerningly about God (Sweeney, 2011). According to the integration account, philosophy and religion are mutually supportive intellectual activities.

This research looks at why Leibniz adopted the PSR, as well as its various uses and current significance. The PSR is a philosophical principle that states that everything must have a reason, cause, or foundation. Some PSR versions need a reason for an object's existence, whereas others require both a reason and an explanation for its absence. Metaphysics learns about God by answering the question, "Does God Exist?" There is universal agreement that metaphysics learns about God by addressing the question, "Does God Exist?" (Ayala, 2006). As the titles imply, an exploration of the interconnectedness observed in creatures of experience is an affirmation of God's presence.

Metaphysics does not seek out to reveal God; rather, its subject, existence, forces it to do so. The understanding of God is the understanding of all creatures' reliance on him. The bulk of common conceptions of God assume an entity whose existence cannot be demonstrated or rejected, either explicitly or implicitly. Transcendental Thomism is an effort to establish a critical epistemology in which the intellect is pushed to acknowledge God as an "Infinite Cause". Intelligent Design is a two-pronged argument that uses design to show that God exists.

The principle of adequate reason, according to Leibniz, explains the essence of all existence and supports the idea that everything in life has a foundation on which it may stand. The PSR seems to suggest that the vacuum, the atom, and other such concepts are not only implausible, but also contradict divine knowledge. This sentence is supposed to imply that ethereal phenomena like vacua and atoms are feasible and that God has the ability to manifest them. Pruss (2007) agrees with Peter van Inwagen's notion that the PSR requires modal fatalism and Hume's imaginability argument.

In order to find divine truth, theological methodology has always encouraged a critical and open approach. This relationshipality, according to Marbaniang (2007), indicates that God is both personal and compassionate, allowing for reciprocal engagement. The cornerstone of human's existential relationship with God is also based on relationality. Human life seems to be fundamentally dependent and unstable in consciousness and phenomenology, hinting that God is essential (Ottuh & Idjakpo, 2020). Nothing can exist without an adequate reason, according to Leibniz's (1987) Principle of Sufficient Reason. Some theologians see the foregoing ideas as fideism, preferring to believe that God's knowledge is based on human reason. Others have attempted to save the debate by claiming that "necessary being" must have some significance if it does.

CONCLUSION

The PSR asserts that everything must have a reason, cause, or basis. Metaphysics does not strive to reveal God; rather, it is compelled to do so by its topic, existence. God's comprehension is the comprehension of all creatures' dependence on him. The endeavour to construct a critical epistemology in which the intellect is driven to admit God as an "Infinite Cause" is known as transcendental Thomism. Intelligent Design is a two-tiered argument that uses design to show God's existence. The PSR appears to imply that conceptions like the vacuum, atom, and others are not only improbable, but also contradict divine knowledge. It is agreed that modal fatalism and imaginability argument are required for the PSR. Some theologians consider the above concepts to be fideism, preferring to think that God's knowledge is founded on human reason.

One method to approach this challenge is to consider whether knowledge is rational or empirical in nature. If it is logical, unity, transcendence, infinity, necessity, and immutability must all be respected. If it is empirical, however, it must not be at odds with plurality, immanence, finitude, contingency, or mutation. Knowledge is never conceived of being gained in the rational view of God, which implies mutation. God is kept in the dark. Knowledge is static and free of subject-

object relationships, which implies that there does not have to be something definite for God to know, that is, he does not come to know in a subject-object relationship, but as oneness. As a result, knowledge is static and homogenous rather than dynamic and numerous. In that sense, the term foreknowledge refers to the humans, rather than the heavenly viewpoint. This logic of ultimate reality might entail that the Divine has no phenomenal knowledge if there is no Revelation of God as a separate reality from this-worldly reality or delusion.

The PSR as an explanatory model for arguing for the existence of a Divine Reality does not truly justify evidence of God's existence. When evaluating Leibniz's PSR, it is clear that the PSR uses contradictory terms such as necessity and contingency, and thus fails to provide adequate justification for the existence of a Divine Reality philosophically referred to as "Necessary Being" who must exist in order for contingent beings to exist. However, Leibniz's PSR could be justified in the sense that a Divine Reality (God or Necessary Being) must have a "sufficient reason" to exist – that is, for other beings to exist.

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