

An Examination of Brentano's Intentionality and Moore's Sense-Data Conception of Reality

Isenyo Solomon Ogaba

Department Of Philosophy, Faculty Of Humanities, Management And Social Sciences,
Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria.

Email: solomonogaba5@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

It's not very easy to assert or claim that our knowledge of reality is direct or indirect, so, it becomes difficult to establish that which constitutes our objects of knowledge. Equally, the fact that, it has not been objectively proven that the human mind has a precise location in or outside the body, does not invalidate the existence of the human mind. As such, this paper attempts at exposing the nature, character and objects of the mind in process of cognition by critically analyzing the distinction between Brentano's conception of intentionality which exposes the character of the mind to be about something (aboutness) and possible mental objects of thought and Moore's sense-data conception of reality which exposes the process by which cognition (perception) takes place. Consequently, the research uncovered that, the meta-epistemological outlook of both Brentano and Moore are more convergent than divergent because they hold strongly to the analytical, phenomenological and rationalistic approaches to knowledge formation. The paper, however, concludes that Moore was basically concerned with how the physical world and things in it appears or are given to us via the process of mind's cognition, while Brentano was concerned with what constitutes objects of the mental (mind).

Keywords: *Intentionality, sense-data, mind, proposition, cognition.*

INTRODUCTION

It is pertinent to note that, my interest in this area of epistemological research, was motivated by the fact that people do often say that they see things with their "minds eye" (Discover-2010), which most times got me perplexed. In my state of perplexity I began to ask the following questions:

1. Do humans really have a mind?
2. If yes, then, where is the mind located and what are its characteristics?
3. Do humans actually perceive (cognize) via the senses or the mind?

In a bid to resolving some of these perplexing questions raised by personifying the mind as having an eye, then, I came across the works of Franz Brentano titled: *Psychology from an Empirical standpoint. The distinction between mental and physical phenomena* and George Edward Moore titled; *A defense of common sense, Refutation of Idealism, and The Nature of Judgment*. Basically speaking, the work of Brentano focuses on the nature and character of the mind, while that of Moore is concerned with the process of cognition which are both epistemological and metaphysical inquiries. As such, the need to draw a distinction between Brentano's notion on "intentionality" (Brentano. 1995), as a character of the mind and Moore's "sense-data" (Huemer, 2011) conception of reality as a process of the mind's cognition cannot be over emphasized. Hence, the birth of this research work.

CLARIFICATION TERMS

INTENTIONALITY: this is the power of the mind to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs (Pierre, 2010). The term refers to the ability of

the mind to form representations and has nothing to do with intention, which means an agent's specific purpose in reforming an action or series of actions, the end or goal aimed at (Chisholm, 2008). The term dates from the medieval scholastic philosophy, but was resurrected by Franz Brentano and adopted by Edmund Husserl. It is pertinent to note that, "the earliest theory of intentionality is associated with St. Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God and his tenets, distinguishing between objects that exist in understanding and objects that exist in reality (Chisholm, 2008).

SENSE-DATA:- According to Huemer, Sense-Data are the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception (sense experience), and that have exactly the properties they appear to have (Huemer, 2011). For instance, upon one viewing a tomato in normal conditions, one forms an image of the tomato in one's mind. This image or percept is red and round. This mental image is an example of a sense-datum.

AN EXPOSITION OF BRENTANO'S CONCEPTION OF INTENTIONALITY

Brentano coined the expression "intentional inexistence" (Brentano, 1995) to indicate the peculiar ontological status of the contents of mental phenomena. As such in his classic work titled, *Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint* written in 1874, described intentionality as a characteristics of all acts of consciousness, psychical or mental phenomena, by which it could be set apart from physical or mental phenomena. As such, he writes:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an objects, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied. In love (something is) hated, in desire (something is desired) and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves (Brentano 1995, p. 65).

In an attempt at establishing the peculiar ontological status of objects of intentionality, he writes:

"The concept of this object A, like that of the person who is thinking, is the concept of a thing. We may also say of this thing A that it is an object which is thought about. It is just as true that this A is a contemplated A (*eingedachtes*) as it is that this A is an actual A, existing in reality. A can cease to be actual and yet continue to be thought about – if the person stops thinking about it – and yet continue to be actual" (Kraus 1966, p. 43).


There cannot be anyone who contemplates an A unless there is contemplated A; and conversely, but we must not infer from this fact that the one who is thinking about A is identical with the A which he is thinking about. The two concepts are not identical but are correlative. Neither can correspond to anything in reality unless the other does as well. But only one of these is the concept of a thing – the concept of something which can act and be

acted upon. The second is the concept of a being which is only a sort of accompaniment to the first: when the first thing comes into being, and when it ceases to be, then so does the second (Kraus 1966).

From the forgoing, one could deduce that Brentano brings out one or rather two features of intentionality. One is that concrete existence is irrelevant to intentionality; and consequently, truth understood as correspondence between an idea in the mind and its object in reality does not apply to intentionality (Agbakoba 2001). This could be further explained thus; concept unicorn as an object of thought in the mind of a person. Unicorn is a concept of a thing. Unicorn is an actual unicorn existing in reality. Unicorn might not be actual (concrete) yet being thought about even if the person stops thinking about it and yet continue to be actual in the mind (i.e existing as an inexistent reality that is why one is able to contemplate of it when necessary). By contrast are we saying that the contemplated unicorn is itself nothing actual or true ? Not really, contemplated unicorn can be something actual and true without being actual (concrete). Unicorn is an actual contemplated unicorn and therefore since this comes to the thing (same object in an existing mind) it is an actual contemplated unicorn (*einwirklichesgedachtesuniccrn*), which may be differentiated from what is a mere contemplated unicorn (*eingedachtes unicorn*). Actual contemplated unicorn is different from mere thinking of a unicorn. If there is no contemplated unicorn then there will be no one who contemplates a unicorn and conversely. That is to say the actual existence of human mind which contemplates a unicorn entails the actuality of a unicorn in the mind which exists because of the existence of a mind that contemplates it.

A Diagrammatic Illustration of Franz Brentano's Earlier Position on Intentionality

(Intentionally Inexistent).




It should be understood that in this case there is no direct or indirect relationship between *entiarationis* and concrete actual objects. From the diagram above one can deduce viz;

1. *Entiarationis* come to existence when we think of them and cease to be when stops thinking of them.
2. Devoid of objectivity
3. Object within itself although not always in the same way. Eg
 - * In presentation something is presented
 - * In judgment something is affirmed or denied
 - * In love (something is loved) in hate (something) is hated in desire (something) is desired etc.
4. As such, mental phenomena could be defined as saying that they are such phenomena as including objects intentionally within themselves.
5. No physical entity exhibits such an attitude its only the human mind that is capable of this state of affair.

ANOTHER FEATURE OF INTENTIONALITY ACCORDING TO K.V. WILKES IS “REFERENTIAL OPACITY”.

This is the fact that only the relevant description of the object of intentionality will serve, other description of the very object of intentionality will not be appropriate. For example assuming Gilbert’s 5230 (Nokia Phone) is the thousand Nokia phone produced this month by Nokia company; assuming further that Gilbert lost this Nokia phone and he goes searching for it, then Gilbert will be in the intentional state of searching, but his intentional state of searching as regards the phone will be as his property and not as the one hundredth phone produced by Nokia. This can be represented thus;



What this means is that *entia rationis* “Nokia phone” is indirectly but not directly) related to the concrete Nokia phone being searched for. So the phone in mind (*entiarationis*) is an actual object of thought in its own right though indirectly related to the concrete phone searched for. However, for Brentano in his earlier position there is no indirect or direct relation to object of the mind (*entiarationis*) with concrete existence. *Entiarationis* basically exist as actual object of the mind uncompromised (i.e not relating *entiarationis* with anything else because they exist uniquely on their own) which is to say, they have their own distinct ontological existence that is peculiar to them. So, for Brentano in the earlier example; Gilbert’s *entiarationis* (object of thought) or (intentionality) is an actual Nokia phone, having a distinct existence in Gilbert’s mind different from the concrete Nokia phone as his property. But K.V. Wilkes will say yes my brother Brentano you are right that *entiarationis* have a unique and independent existence different from actual concrete existence but there is an indirect relation between actual objects of thought and actual concrete existence however, both actualities are distinct in their own rights.

Consequently, in Agbakoba’s view, it could be deduced that two main theses underpins the views of Brentano and Wilkes as regard *entiarationis* which are;

1. Psychological thesis - there is a reference to something or about something (aboutness) psychical relationship of this type according to Brentano tend to invoke a relation like situation but not a relation as such. The relation between two actual concrete entities say a bottle of beer (star) (fundament) and its (terminus) say the crown cork is quite different from a psychical relation in that, in a psychical

relation of the type portrayed by intentionality there exist a fundament (say a human being who thinks) and is capable of thinking of nonexistent modes of reality but devoid of a terminus as it exist in the case of the relation between two concrete modes of reality.


2. Ontological thesis; this is reference to something or about something (aboutness) given referential opacity to something. Like in our example Gilbert's actual object of thought is the Nokia phone as it exist in his mind given failure of substitutivity or referential opacity to the concrete Nokia phone which is his property.

It then implies that our intentional state is always about nonexistent realities (i.e things) that don't exist (irrealia). If this is true about the status of conceptual entities in the mind of various marks or qualities of an object (notional beings), an idea, an opinion, fancy image, unreal mental apprehension: in idea not in reality, theoretical and other forms or irrealia (non things). That is to say, what is the difference between the mental apprehension (which could be so called *entiarationis*) of a concrete existence say a ball (as it exist in the mind) as an idea or image and an irrealia (non existent entity or things) e.g a unicorn as an object of thought (intentionality) ?. Or are notional beings and irrealia the same? Even if that is the case, then they are proposing a new mode of existential actualities which is quite different from our regular modes of existential actualities. According to George Berkeley "to be is to be perceived" "*esseespercipi*" (Aja, 1993). This issue brings to light the problem of universals which philosophers till date are at pains to demonstrate objectively. The problem of universals is whether there exists a generally acceptable abstract concept, idea, notion or term considered absolute?

For example when I say "fire" what is registered and apprehended by your mind? Please write down or describe the "fire" you have as the object of your mind. You will agree with me that there are disparities in each of our description of fire as such, one could say there is no general or universally acceptable ontological statuses or notions of "fire" as an *entiarationis* (i.e as an object of thought). This for me does not invalidate our general understanding of what fire is because if you take any kind of fire to anywhere in the world and ask what you are holding I wish to believe you will be told it is fire. But our problem is putting forth the very right universally or generally acceptable description of the actual concrete fire that exist in our minds. It is important to note that ,Brentano later changed his position when he came to appreciate the fact that, intentional in existence objects really exist.

By re-affirming Brentano's later position, R.M Chisholm in his work titled; *The True And Evident* asserted that "intentionality exist properly speaking only when a well formed sentence contain an intentional expression" (Agbakoba, 2001) for example; I know that I am standing before the four hundred level students of Bigard Memorial Seminary Enugu. This shows that I understand my position or environment where I found myself as my intentional state (*entiarationis*) reveals and affirmed by my intentional expression as stated earlier (i.e to say all true intentional statements are reducible to concrete individual entities). This type of intentionality as exposed or established by a well formed sentence that contains an intentional expression is called "derivative intentionality" (Kraus, 1996). It is in this sense that intentionality as a criterion for the metal may hold water.

A Diagrammatic Representation of the Short Comings of Intentionality as a Criterion for the Mental



nd but not directly apprehended by the intellect like other intentional objects perceivable via the intellect as they exist in the mind)

The diagram shows that intentionality as s criterion for the mental is too narrow because;

1. Pain which is an example of sensation is not captured in the concept of intentionality as it cannot be presented as visible object of thought.
2. The concept of referential opacity does not hold because there is no failure of substitutivity. There is a direct relationship between the actual pain and the depth and size of cut (though not visible to the mind's eye).

Another short coming of intentionality as a criterion for the mental is that, it is too broad because, non-living physical system such as machines, robots and cybernots exhibit intentional attitudes for example, a machine that does the job of selecting the substandard products from a conveyor belt could be said to have in mind the very characteristics of a substandard products such as shape, colour and size from standard ones. As such, for the physicalist machines could exhibit intentionality just as humans who are nothing but a complex complicated physio-chemical organism. However, since Brentano and K.V.Wilks are shying or running away from the fact that our intentional attitude is geared toward existent objects, Karl Popper came to establish the fact that, there exist objects of reality whose mode or nature are not that of a concrete existent object, which our international attitude could be directed at, which is the “formal world” (Popper 1982). Where the principle of organizations of exists. Examples of such principles include the principle of mathematics and physics.

MOORE’S IDENTITY THEORY OF TRUTH VIS-À-VIS PROPOSITIONAL REALISM

On the classical correspondence theory of truth, the truth maker is the object, not any subject who does the believing of this truth. That is, facts make truth be true; believes do not do this. But, going by the idealist ontological priority of the mental (idea) and internality of all relations, it follows that any judgment true is ultimately due to the Great Mind (The Absolute). Moore however, rejects the idealistic inversion of the correspondence theory of truth. He does not simply revert to the classical version, instead, he seeks to secure the objectivity of truth by eliminating the notion of correspondence entirely. Truth, for him, could not be a matter of correspondence between proposition and object; rather he argued that; “since in case like $2+2=4$ we regard the proposition as true though there is no object in the empirical world to which the proportion corresponds”

(Moore 2000). As such, proposition must be regarded as true or false in themselves, without reference either to a subject which entertains them as elements in an occurrent acts of consciousness, or to any object which they might be about, instead, when a proposition is true, it is because a peculiar relation obtains among the concepts that make it up. Baldwin therefore asserts that; “since this view casts the proposition as its own truth maker, it has been called the identity theory of truth (Baldwin 1991).

At this point in time, Moore understood proposition to be like Platonic forms; they are unchanging bearers of truth that exist independently of any instances of consciousness. According to Willard, historically, there is nothing peculiar in this line of thought apart from its appearance in the British context perhaps. As such Willard writes; “In fact, these views of Moore’s are keeping with what may be called the standard nineteenth and early-twentieth century view of proposition held by Bolzano, Frege, Russell, W.E Johnson, and L.S Stabbling” (Dallas, 1984, p. 180).

However, what is novel in Moore is his identity theory of truth, and his related identification of ordinary objects with propositions. One aspect of the standard view was that whenever a proposition happened to be involved in an occurrent act of consciousness, it played the role of “object” (the act was immediately of or about the proposition). As such, the only form of epistemological realism in line with the standard view is what is best described as ‘indirect’ or ‘representative realism’, ‘critical realism’ or ‘epistemological dualism’; which ascribes a critical role to the mind in knowledge formulation. Unlike pure objectivism, it distinguishes between sense data and objects of things known, as independent of mind the knower in the sense that thought refers to them (not merely as sense data or to the ideas of the knower). That is, it maintains that ideas represent objects (Aja 1993).

In a clearer form, representative realism is the view that the external world is not given to us directly, but only as mediated by a substitute object, like a proposition or, in Moore’s later epistemological position, a ‘sense-datum’. It is pertinent to note that this aspect of the standard view contradicts Moore’s conception of naïve or common sense realism or direct realism which he tried to defend on the long run but ended up with representationalism, thus, in order to secure direct cognitive access to the external world, Moore cleverly eliminated the would-be-mediators by identifying propositions with the object of ordinary experience themselves. The first he did was to later accept the fact that the identity theory of truth also implies not only a proposition like $2+2=4$, but also existential propositions of the form; the cat is on the mat. this, he argued, does not invalidate the fact that the proposition is the truth maker (identity theory of truth) because it is not only when the cat exists that the proposition is true rather the cat exist only if the proposition is true in virtue of its internal structure. This I would like to describe as ‘existential- propositional-realism’ (Ogaba 2015) ,Which is to say, perception, apprehension or cognition is about existential proportions. This implies that, proposition(s) is about existent object of thought (i.e. synthesis of concepts). Moore in trying to drive home his point as regard existential sentence such as the cat is on the mat, which could not be true in itself, like $2+2=4$, apart from a relation to some state of affairs in the empirical world, has this to say;

this description of truth will also apply to those cases where there appears to be a reference to existence. Existence is itself a concept; it is something which we mean; and the great body of proposition, in which existence is joined to other concepts or syntheses of concept are simply true or false according to the relation in which it stands to them. (Moore 1999, p. 181).

As such, by making existence both dependent on truth and, like truth, internal to a proposition, Moore is in effect identify the class of existents with the class of true propositions that involve the concepts 'existence' as a constituent. As Moore, goes on to say that "an existent is seen to be nothing but a concept or complex of concepts standing in a unique relation to the concept existence and thus; it now appears that "perception is to be regarded philosophically as the cognition of an existential proposition". He went further to say this way; 'the opposition of concepts to existents disappears'. As such, Moore secures a direct realist account of cognition. In the same scheme given the identity theory of truth, Moore states his world view thus; "it seems necessary to regard the world as formed of concepts" (Moore 1999-182). But he argued that, is not to be understood as a claim that reality is at bottom mentalistic or ideal, for his account of concepts and propositions has already made clear that these exists independently of any acts of thinking.

Having established his identity theory of truth, Moore went on to refute George Berkeley's claims that; to be is to be perceived (*esseestpercipi*). Moore argues that the claim is false. He begins by analyzing in great details several possible meanings of the assertion "to be is to be perceived" (*esseestpercipi*). He conclude that the idealist took it to mean an analytic truth, in that it is proved by the law of contradiction. He equally, went on to challenge the idealist doctrine of internality of all relations, which implies that existence and cognition is to be somehow identical. According to Moore, this cannot be true; for example "because for yellow to exist is for someone to have a sensation of yellow and the sensation of yellow is quite distinct from yellow itself" (Moore, 1993). He argued that, careful attention to the sensation of yellow, on the one hand, and yellow on other, will reveal that they are not identical. As he puts it ; "the idealist maintains that object and subject are necessary connected, mainly because he fails to see that they are distinct" (Moore, 1993).

Subsequently, Moore had put forth two arguments in favour of his position. The first argument which later was referred to as "paradox of analysis" (Moore 1993), involves the usual way of defining a term, according to him, in any definition there must be a definiendum (the term to be defined) and the definiens (the term(s) that does the defining of the definition itself). Both definiendum and definiens are supposed to have the same meaning ,else the latter would not be able to illuminate the meaning of the former. But if both terms mean the same, it is hard to see how giving a definition could be illuminating (Moore, 1993).

Consider the case of the definiendum 'bachelor' and its definiens 'unmarried man' in order for 'unmarried man' to be a good definition of 'bachelor', it must mean the same as 'bachelor'. But if it means exactly the same thing, then it seems that saying 'bachelor' means 'unmarried man' should not be any different from saying 'bachelor' means 'bachelor' or 'unmarried man' means 'unmarried man', and yet he argues that "there does seem to be a difference, in that we find one informative, but the other not"(Moore 1993-143).As such for Moore, "this implies that there is a difference in meaning between bachelor and unmarried man" (Moore, 1993). The paradox could summarily be put as a delimma thus:

If a definiens is correct, then its meaning is the same as that of the definiendum. If a definiens is informative, then its meaning is not the same as that of the definiendum. A definiens, meaning cannot be both same and not the same as that of the definiendum, thus, a definiens cannot be both correct and informative (Moore 1993).

So, according to Moore, just as with any definiendum and its definiens there exists a difference. It implies, therefore, that there must be a difference between existence and

cognition or yellow and the sensation of yellow. On the second argument, Moore tries to show the anti-psychologistic distinction between subject and object. He begins by comparing a sensation of blue with a sensation of green. These are same in one respect, in virtue of which one is said to be 'of blue' and the other 'of green'. Moore gives the name "consciousness" to the respect in which they are the same, and the respect in they are different he calls "object" of sensation or of consciousness. Thus, for him, "Every sensation is a complex of consciousness and object".

Having distinguished consciousness from object, Moore goes on to distinguish object from sensation. Focusing now on a single sensation, the sensation of blue, Moore argues that when a sensation of, say, blue exist, "either (1) consciousness alone exists, (2) the object alone (that is blue) exist, or (3) both exist together". He further states that each of these possibilities represents a different state of affairs: "neither (1) consciousness alone, nor (2) consciousness and blue together are identical to (3) blue. Thus, it is not the case that the sensation of blue is identical to blue, and it is therefore false that *essees tpercipi*" (Moore 1993).

For a person to have a sensation (idea) or consciousness of an object, say blue, then there must be actual blue else the person cannot have sensation of blue. That is, objects really exist the way they are and present themselves to us as such. So, you cannot have a sensation of blue without blue being there or presenting itself to you. On this count, the world is in the object not in the knower as the subjective idealist would say. As such, consistent with Moore's 1899 view we have direct cognitive access to the object of our experiences.

SENSE -DATA VIS-À-VIS DIRECT REALISM

It is pertinent to note that the direct realism of Moore's early period hinged on ontology of cognition that include both his propositional realism and his identity theory of truth. When Moore's ontological conception of cognition came under attack with the problem of objective falsehood as exposed by Bertrand Russell, Moore had to shy away from his identity theory of truth and propositional realism. As such, a revised account of cognition was required to secure some form of epistemological realism. Moore could no longer explain the difference between $2 + 2 = 4$ and the cat is on the mat by referring to the presence of the concept 'existence'. He now set out to explain the difference in terms of what he referred to as "sense-data" (Moore 2000). Although, Moore did not basically define what he actually meant by "sense-data" but he gave examples such as color patches (the octagonal patch of red associated with a stop sign) and appearances (the elliptical appearance of a coin when viewed at an angle). Moore initially accepted the views of most proponents of sense data who construed them as mental realities responsible for mediating our sensory experience of the external world (objects). For example, in perceiving a stop-sign, what one is immediately conscious of is some set of sense-data through which are conveyed the stop-sign's size, shape, color, etc. The stop-sign itself remain outside the circle of idea (sense-data) and we are thus aware of it only indirectly. In field of epistemology, sense-data theory is understood to be a form of representationalism consistent with indirect realism, not direct realism. Though, Moore accepted this representationalist view of sense-data, but he was not comfortable with it, since it was not in consonance with his commonsensical conception of the world.

Consequently, he tried to modify sense-data theory to make it a form of direct realism, just as he had previously done with proposition theory. His method in both cases was the same: by making the purported mental mediators identical with external objects, he would eliminate the need for a mediator and make external objects directly available to

consciousness. Consequently, for a period of about fifteen years, Moore attempted off-and-on to defend a view according to which sense-data were identical to the whole of an object or parts of such objects. For example, a sense datum could be identical to the whole of an object in case of a sound. While, for visible objects, which always have hidden sides (the underside of a table or the back side of a coin), a single sense-datum could be identical to only a part of the object's surface. In all, Moore could not sustain this sense-data version of direct realism any better than his previous, propositional version; as such he fell back on a version of direct realism in 1925.

AN EXAMINATION OF BRENTANO'S INTENTIONALITY AND MOORE'S SENSE-DATA CONCEPTION OF REALITY

Areas of Divergence and Convergence

From a divergent angle, Brentano is a naturalized epistemologist, while Moore is a dialectician. Also, Moore was out to refute skepticisms and absolute idealism, while Brentano was more concerned with establishing a stronger criterion for the mental. Which is to say, Moore was out to establish the fact that, our commonsense knowledge of the world is possible, and that there are external objects and an external world irrespective of a knowing subject. While, Brentano was more interested in establishing the basic difference between a mental phenomena and a physical phenomena. Moore was concerned with the process of knowing, to what we actually claim to know, while Brentano was concerned with the mind's content as distinct from concrete physical entities.

Subsequently, speaking from a convergent angle, they both rejected psychologism defined from a subjectivist and anthropocentric position. They rather looked at psychologism as a position according to which, "the essential theoretical foundations of logic lie in psychology, in whose field those propositions belong, as far as their theoretical content is concerned, which logic its characteristic pattern" (Husserl-2001, p. 40). Both thoughts are psychological, metaphysical and epistemological in that they are concerned with how our universal concepts are formed. Both thoughts are rationalistic in nature since they admit the deployment of reason (intuition) as a tool for epistemological and phenomenological inquiries.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the epistemological outlook of both Brentano and Moore as far as the issue of intentionality and sense-data are concerned, are more convergent than divergent in that a sense-datum is an example of what Edmund Husserl referred to as an "intentional content" (Husserl 2001). Which means that, cognition basically has to do with the senses in relation to the mind's power for critical reflection and analysis? However, it is pertinent to note that, Moore was basically concerned with how the physical world and things in it are given to us, while Brentano was concerned at establishing the exclusive and unique criterion for the mental (mind).

REFERENCES

- Discover (2010). 'The Magazine of Science, Technology and the Future' Waukesha, Wisconsin: KalmbachPub.Co
- Brentano, F. (1995). *Psychology from an empirical standpoint*. Routledge.
- Huemer, M. (2011). Sense-Data, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (URL=<http://Plato.stanford.edu/archievers/spr2011/entries/sense-data/>)

- Pierre, J. (2010). International, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (URL=<http://Plato.stanford.edu/archievers/spr2010/entries/intentionality/>)
- Chisholm, R.M. (2008). *Intentionality*. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 4)
- Kraus, O. (1966). *The True and Evident*. London; Routledge.
- Agbakoba, J. C. A. (2001). *Theories of Mind: A Case for Interactionism*. Enugu: Snaap Press.
- Aja, E. (1993). *Elements of Theory of Knowledge*. Enugu: Auto Century Pub.
- Popper, K., & Eccles J. (1982). *The self and its Brain*. London: Routledge.
- Moore, G. E. (2000). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.6
- Baldwin, Thomas (1991). *The Identity Theory or Truth: Mind*, NewSeries, Vol. 100.London: Routledge. 35.
- Dallas, W. (1984). *Logicand Objectivity of knowledge: A Study in Husserl's Early Philosophy*.London; Routledge.180
- Moore, G. E. (1999). *The Nature of Judgement*.Mind 8, London:Rutledge.
- Moore, G. E. (1993). *The Refutation of Idealism*. Mind 12, London: Rutledge.
- Husserl, E. (2001). *Logical Investigation*. London: Rutledge. 40
- Ogaba S. I. (2015). *Critical Examination of George Edward Moore's Direct Realist Epistemological Account of Cognition*. A PhD Thesis presented to the department of philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.