



Wittgenstein: Epistemology and Culture

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ABSTRACT

This work assumes that cultures are autonomous and complete within themselves. A particular system is not subject to criticism from the outside. Different cultures have their own systems which are independent of one another. Yet, all these systems and practices are called cultures by virtue of their family resemblance. Different cultures are in contact with one another, and they have to communicate with each other by using their own language-games and systems. When they are in contact with one another they have to reconcile this gap in their communication. Sometimes this can lead to problems in understanding each other. So, in this work, I attempted to make an assessment of these relationships between different cultures and try to give answers to the questions concerning these problems. To do this I gave an interpretation of Wittgenstein's writings on knowledge, most of which can be found in *On Certainty*. *The paper concluded that* the nature of the cultural relationships regarding knowledge and belief, and what we can find out from Wittgenstein's ideas on the relationship between different epistemic beliefs, is that they are unique in their own rights, and best understood from their specific cultural epistemic foundations.

Keywords: Epistemology; Culture; Epistemic belief; Language-game; World-picture.

INTRODUCTION

Wittgenstein's ideas on knowledge can be seen in detail in the notes he has written between 1949 to 1951 and later published under the title *On Certainty* (1969). Wittgenstein has criticized Moore's "Proof of an External World" (1939) and "A Defense of Common Sense" (1925), both developed as an argument against skepticism. In these works Moore claims that he has proof of an external world by uttering expressions like, "I know I have a hand", "I am a human being", "The earth exists" and so on. Moore claims that our common-sense propositions which we use in our everyday life are evidence of the existence of the external world. Wittgenstein was not wholly against Moore's ideas, but he was questioning the relevance of his ideas. He thought that Moore was right in claiming that some propositions about the external world have the same epistemological status as mathematical propositions and propositions about

sense data. He says, "We learn with the same inexorability that this is a chair as that $2 \times 2=4$ " (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 455). He continues: "I cannot be making a mistake about 12×12 being 144. And now one cannot contrast mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions" (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 651). Because, both are subject to our 'forgetfulness, oversight and illusion'. For Wittgenstein, like mathematical propositions, certain things are exempted from doubt, proved to be right in our lives over and over again.

Even though he accepted that Moore was right in claiming that certain propositions are exempted from doubt, he thought that Moore was wrong in believing that these propositions provided proof of the external world and Moore has misused the word 'know' with respect to those propositions. The propositions were not wrong, but it makes no sense to claim knowledge about what these propositions state. He says: 'Now, one can enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. – For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse, a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969). Moore's proposition, like "I know that I have a hand" is senseless when we use it out of appropriate context. 'Just as the word "I am here" have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly, - and not because they are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 347). Whether Moore is having two hands or not is of no philosophical importance, and it does not help his case against the skeptics. 'Moore's mistake lies in this- countering the assertion that one cannot know that, by saying "I do know it"' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 521). The word 'know' can be used in certain context, but the context where Moore was using was not in the proper context.

The proposition which Moore has claimed to 'know' are such that their denial will be difficult or senseless to believe. Everything which we have known are against the background of these propositions. The picture of the world we have is not based on our judgment and our conviction of its rightness or wrongness, they are rather inherited by us in believing our elders. Without believing those things it is impossible to know anything at all. Moore's certain propositions are senseless to proceed to anything, they are the basic beliefs from which humans as rational beings start their life as a member of the human community. These kinds of propositions are against the background on which we claim to know anything.

CERTAINTY AND KNOWLEDGE

Wittgenstein gave a new interpretation of certainty by separating it from knowledge. Certainty is at the basis of knowledge which cannot be doubted, they are not a knowledge or degree of knowledge. Without some of these basic certainties, steps cannot be taken on knowledge. These certainties are not based on anything; they are accepted without any justification. They have no foundation; even if the foundations are looked for, there is nothing to be found. But, knowledge on the other hand has foundation and can be justified. These basic certainties are the unfounded foundations of our knowledge. Wittgenstein in claiming that basic certainties are not doubted; refuted the skeptic and the methodological doubt of Descartes.

There are certain propositions that we cannot doubt. For example, 'The earth has existed for a very long time', is not doubted and to doubt, it would be madness or craziness. If we do not accept the idea that some propositions are not doubttable, it will lead to universal doubt. Universal doubt is impossible for Wittgenstein (Kenny 1973). 'A doubt that doubted everything

would not be a doubt' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 450). This doubt must stand on something which cannot be doubted. Even if we can doubt something it will not be possible to doubt everything. If everything can be doubted it will be nonsensical to say anything at all. If there is a person who doubted everything we will think of him as insane, if someone were to doubt every calculation we made, we will say that he is crazy. Wittgenstein made a distinction between a mistake and other forms of false belief. Some kinds of beliefs are happening not because of a mistake, but a mental disturbance. Mistakes and craziness are two different things. In the case of Moore's example, if anyone were to announce the opposite we will say that he/she is demented. Something must be taken for granted and not doubted in order to make any assertion or statement. Our doubt has to stand on something. To doubt anything, we have to be sure of something, the game of doubting presupposes certainty (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 115).

Wittgenstein's above anti-skeptical stance can be found even in *Tractatus*. He says, "Skepticism is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a question cannot be asked. For doubt can exist where there is a question, a question where there is an answer, and this only where something can be said" (Mounce 1889, p. 51). His main contentions against skepticism are that they are pointless and senseless. To say, "I doubt that p", we have to believe in the truth of the language we use, and we have to know the meaning of the words and the working of the grammar. The philosophical skeptics who tried to doubt everything are going beyond the actual practices of the world and they are detaching themselves from their everyday practices. 'If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of your words either' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 114). The word 'doubt' itself is based on our language-game, if we can't be certain of any facts it will be impossible to make any judgment.

These basic certainties are the foundations of our knowledge. What we claim to know is based on these certainties. Without these certainties, it is not possible to acquire knowledge. Wittgenstein says that the assumption like, "the earth has existed for a long time" is the foundation of our entire system of language-game. What we say and do depends on the assumption that the earth has been there for a very long time. What we read in history and science assumes that the earth has existed for a very long time. He says, 'the assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 411). The claim that there is a basis of our knowledge and action does not mean that Wittgenstein is holding a foundationalist point of view that an instance of knowledge is an instance of holding a foundational or basic belief or a belief logically deducible from some basic belief(s) (Ogaba 2019). For Wittgenstein, the beliefs with certainty are not necessary condition of knowledge. As Grayling points out, for Wittgenstein, they are only relatively foundational (Grayling, 1996).

THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

The foundations of knowledge are not justified and necessary. They are nonpropositional; they are neither true nor false. In Wittgenstein's words, "If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false" Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 205). If one asks, whether the statement "the earth has existed long before my birth" is true, and demands grounds for your answering "Yes", then, in accordance to Wittgenstein, you may say, "I can't give you any grounds, but, if you learn more you too will think the same" (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 206). The point here is that one might not be able to give the ground and the correctness of the statement that the earth has been there for a while. Even though this is the

case, to learn history one has to accept the assumption that the earth has existed and people have been there for a long time. To satisfy others or myself of the correctness of it will even be crazy; my knowledge and belief about the world and people are already based on the assumption that these statements are true.

Wittgenstein was well aware that our knowledge has to stand on something and to judge the correctness of it, it has to have a foundation, even though he does not accept the logically necessary foundation. Wittgenstein compares this needed (not logical necessity) foundation with a hinge; 'That is to say, the *questions* that we raise and our *doubts* depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 341), and 'If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 344). The basic certainties are like the hinge on which the door turn, and it is the foundation of our knowledge and even our doubt depends on it. So, our knowledge is based on this hinge which stays put. But, the problem here is that; how does the hinge stay put and where does it stand? Wittgenstein has given a simple answer, namely, *trust*; the trust that it stays put. He says, 'Language-game is only possible if one trusts something' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 509). To learn geometry, we rely on the basic axioms which our teacher taught us, if we can't trust these basic axioms it will not be possible to learn geometry. If one doubts that two points in space are separated by a straight line and asks for the ground it will not be possible for him to progress and learn geometry. We don't know that they are true and justified but, we trust them. This trust is not something one has learned, it is a part of life; 'My life consists in my being content to accept many things' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 344). We accept the basic certainties not because we know that they are well-founded, but because we trust them without questions.

The fact that these basic certainties are trusted is not based and justified by giving their trustworthiness; giving ground, evidence, and so on. It is rather shown in human actions and everyday lives (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 110). In Wittgenstein's words, "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 204). We do not trust the statement that the earth has existed for a long time because we are sure of its correctness, but by trusting indefinitely. This trust is shown in our actions, by following our adults and not questioning our teacher. It is also shown in our everyday life; our action shows that we trust our elders have been in this world before we were born. Here, the word 'elders' also presupposes the idea that we believe the world have been existing for a very long time (Jupp *et al.*, 2018). The meaning of the word 'elders' contains the idea that some people has been there before we were born.

WITTGENSTEIN ON WORLD-PICTURE

These basic certainties which we inherit give us a world-picture. The way Wittgenstein uses world-picture is different from world-view (Hamilton 2014). Unlike world-view, world-picture is not held consciously, and it is inherited. It is the system which one holds as true since one was born (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969). World-picture is the system of reference which is inherited from the society, which is not doubted. As mentioned before, the inherited world-pictures provide the foundation for knowledge claim. They can be learned practically without

knowing about their nature, 'like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969). Doubting the basic certainties which one inherits is practically the same as doubting one's world-picture (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969). If one doubts that the earth has existed for a very long time before one's birth, this will lead to doubting the world-picture which are derived from and connected with this statement.

This world picture comprises a vast element. According to Coliva, it includes methods of inquiry, theories, and propositions (Coliva 2009). What we have to note is that these elements do not always come out together. They should be understood as a different element of world-pictures. Also, the element given by Coliva can be controversial when dealing with a different world-picture which does not include theories, like religion, and no proper methods of inquiry and whether they are propositions (true or false) or not is a contested one (Moyal-Sharrock 2017). Kober has given a wide description of world-picture which contains traditions, tales, or legends concerning the origin of the world, the world's shape and processes (the season, the weather, the behaviour of plants and animals, the sexes, reproduction of the species, etc.) as well as political structures, instructions of medical and/or psychological treatment and religious belief (Kober 2017). World-pictures guide the behaviour of those who hold fast to them and it is a system of reference to the world and life.

Wittgenstein accepts that there can be different world-pictures and people can hold ideas that can be baseless and even crazy for others. Wittgenstein has given descriptions of the possibility that there can be other reasons to believe otherwise. One may have 'telling grounds' to believe that the earth came into existence just a moment before he/she took birth; if somehow he/she finds no reason to doubt that belief and 'suppose he had always been told that'. "Men have believed that they could make rain; why should not a king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way" (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 92). Wittgenstein is trying to show here that people can inherit a very different world-picture from others; it is also possible that people can believe this and accept it as true. What this passage also entails is that this particular king would be very difficult to convert to our world-pictures which are based on statements like 'The earth has existed for millions of years'. This is because this king does not hold only the proposition that the earth existed since his birth which gives him the world-picture, along with this many other propositions made up his world-pictures and that his claim as a king might be based on the world-picture which he holds and the propositions which make up the world-picture. His life may be guided by the world-picture which he inherits. His-world picture would be totally different from Moore, what Moore calls 'evidence' might not be enough for the king to change his world-picture. As Wittgenstein says, it will need a very special kind of conversion. Like Moore has inherited his world-picture, nothing in this king's world-picture tells him otherwise (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969).

On another passage, Wittgenstein says that, if Moore is suspected to be an alien and captured by a group of people who believe that man can fly, Moore 'can't give them the grounds for his certainty, because they have fantastic ideas of human ability to fly and know nothing about physics' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 264). Here, Wittgenstein is contrasting a world picture with a scientific knowledge and a world-picture bereft of what we call scientific knowledge of the physical world. The difference between them would be too deep and their

world-pictures would be so different that it will be very difficult for Moore to convince them that he is not from outside the earth. Wittgenstein is also pointing out here that the world-picture which we have, that 'human cannot fly' would be very difficult to prove to someone who believes and who is taught to believe that 'human can fly'. Moore might be able to give some evidence based on his world-picture, but he might not be able to convince them on what he calls 'rational ground'.

It can also be said that world-picture is a kind of presupposition on one's knowledge claim, like certainties, which are rarely mentioned and checked but function as a foundation of knowledge. From a vast amount of world-picture there is a system of knowledge and belief system, not believing or subscribing a world-picture amounts to not believing or not knowing a vast amount of presuppositions which others do. As Wittgenstein says, 'Our Knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 410). World-picture is not a set of limited statements and foundations of knowledge and belief system, but an unlimited amount of statements and beliefs which are presupposed and existed in a person's life. Changing a world-picture will also amount in changing one's presupposed foundations and eventually changing one's life. The everyday life of a person is connected with the world-picture he holds, and in the case of the examples given by Wittgenstein, everything one believes and knows is based on the world-picture which one inherits. Likewise, one's life is made up of this world-picture, one's hope and belief, and things which give meaning to one's life. So, to abandon a given world-picture almost equals changing one's life. This is why trying to change others or even one's world-picture is very difficult.

Wittgenstein gave another example of an alternate world-picture by taking the religious world-picture of Christianity; that Jesus has only a human mother (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 239). Most human beings believe that we have two parents. Christians also see the evidence that all human beings have two parents. In this case it will not be enough to change the Christian belief by giving evidence. To change this would almost amount to changing their religion or stop believing it totally. All the evidence we have might not be enough for the Christian to believe otherwise. What we call knowledge and evidence will not be enough to change their world-picture. In the case of religious world-picture, as mentioned in the previous paragraphs, one's life is controlled by the world-picture. It does not matter whether they can be proved or not, what matters is the meaning it has for the believer. For a religious person it is not just any world-picture, but the basis of their life and the window through which they look at life and lead their lives. So, changing one of the most important doctrines will amount in changing a whole lot of other things in the world-picture for the believers and it will also mean changing the important thing in life which is a part of their world-pictures.

Differences in world-pictures are not differences in a few sets of propositions, but what Wittgenstein called a 'nest of propositions' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 225). This nest of propositions forms an enormous system and they have meaning within this system. 'All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument.' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 105). The belief that humans can fly, or they cannot fly belongs to a system. People who believe that humans can fly do not make this statement in the system of physics. If one claims that 'humans can fly' within our scientific system, they would be wrong, or it will mean they do not have a knowledge of physics. Yet, as Wittgenstein has mentioned before (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p.

264) it is possible for others to have this belief which is outside our system or the modern scientific system. Our belief and our arguments have life only within the system where they are made. The belief that Jesus has only one human parent has meaning only within that religious system. Likewise, the truth of physics can only be tested as true or false within that frame of reference (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 83). The point here is that they are not a suggestions or advice that one has to believe this way or that way, but it is a statement which states that we always already judge and make arguments within a system.

At this point, I would like to go back to the passage where Wittgenstein says, “I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way” (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 92). Here, Wittgenstein shows his acceptance that one can change one’s world-picture, but this conversion, he said, will be of a *special kind*. Wittgenstein describes the nature of change in world-picture by giving the analogy of a river-bed (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, pp. 95-99). Within the nest of propositions some were hardened and functioned as channel for others which were not hardened but fluid. This relation altered with time where the hard one becomes fluid and fluid becomes hard. Here, Wittgenstein states that world-picture is a nest of propositions and compares these propositions with a mythology (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 95). He explains it like this: “The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thought may shift. But, I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other... And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited” (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, pp. 97&99). This change in world-picture is not happening by just a change in a single proposition as they are not based on a few sets of propositions. The changes in the process are not perceptible where one can point to the reason why a world-picture has changed, yet there is a change.

The conversion or change in world-picture happens through a kind of persuasion. Moore could convert the ideas of the tribe who captured him and might change the world-picture of the king who believed that the earth came to existence when he was born, but through persuasion (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, pp. 92, 264). Wittgenstein gave the picture of a man who had grown up in believing that the earth came to existence 50 years ago and he was also taught this way. He says, ‘We might instruct him: the earth has long ago...etc. – We should be trying to give him our picture of the world. This would happen through a kind of *persuasion*’ (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 262). Giving him our world-picture, and all the evidence we have would not be enough for this man to change his world-picture. It will not be possible for us to convert this man by using what we may call reason, because all his world-picture and his life would revolve around this idea. Wittgenstein says, “At the end of reason comes persuasion” (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 612), and he asks us to think what happens when missionaries convert the natives.

Wittgenstein has not given how the missionaries convert the native from their religion as well as culture. It can be said that the missionaries are forcing their ideas into the natives by preaching. They do not tell them about medical science, cosmology, physics, and so on and do not have a debate with them on these topics. But, they change their world-pictures by preaching them and persuading them to try their medicine and show them the advancement which science can bring. They did not argue with them or give justification and reason that their God or their medical practices are wrong and ineffective but changing these beliefs and practices slowly by

using persuasion, as shown in the analogy of the changing of the river bed and banks (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969). It is not just changing their ideas of God, but a whole lot of other things. But this change is not something visible or which happens in a short span of time.

To understand how the word “persuasion” is used by Wittgenstein it can be seen in the *Lectures on Aesthetics* (1967). To persuade others one has to believe and have the knowledge of what one is telling or in this case it can also be called preaching. As can be seen, persuasion is not a single process or method where one can say that this is the method of persuasion. But, what can be seen is that it is not a scientific method where one can solve their differences by giving facts and evidence. Unlike a difference within science or within the same system where differences can be solved by giving reason and justification, the difference in world-picture is a difference in a whole systems or a difference in the idea of the important things in life. So, no evidence or reason is good enough to change the world-picture of others, one has to rely on persuasion, trying others to see and believe what one sees and believes (Akwaji & Nchua 2018). Persuasion works where reason fails because, in a sense, the latter is pertinent to internal and the former to external questions of a framework. The second world-picture which has come out is the religious world-picture (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969). The difference of this world-picture is that it is not about the natural world or about science. Many people who believe in religion know perfectly well about science. But, they still believe that Jesus has only one human parent. This difference is not reconcilable by scientific knowledge. To see this difference clearer, we have to look at what Wittgenstein has said about religion. To do this I will look at his writings and remarks on religion in connection with epistemology.

The difference between the world-picture that everyone has two human parents and that Jesus has one human parent is not a difference in human biology. This world-picture is connected with how one leads one’s life and looks at the world. The claim that Jesus has only one human parent would be wrong if it is proclaimed as based on science. It is not only wrong, but also superstitious. Wittgenstein criticizes Frazer at this point when he explained the primitive practice and believes as an error and originated out of stupidity (Clack 1999). Wittgenstein defends the primitive practices; that they are not originated from faulty physics and misunderstanding of the natural world. They are rather a reaction to the things which happen in their lives. Likewise, the belief of Christianity is not a theory and explanation of the natural order of things and objects; rather they are about human lives.

Wittgenstein has talked about two different world-pictures: scientific and religious. This does not mean that world-picture can be categorized in these two. There can be different world-pictures which are indeed not doubted, but the way they are not doubted are different. I want to make a claim here that this religious world-picture does not have any epistemic entailment similar to our epistemic belief about the world and human beings. The religious world-picture can be extended to mean the world-picture which Wittgenstein called the important things in life. The important thing in life is a worldpicture which is not based on facts and evidence. On Wittgenstein’s framework, as we have seen in his writings and remarks, religious belief has nothing to do with science or history. In religious belief the words ‘believe’ and ‘know’ are used in different ways than we normally do. When a religious person proclaims that he knows that God exists it is very different from the way we say that planets exist. The use of the word “know” in religion is not the kind where one can give sure evidence and facts. They are not a knowledge system, which is why we tend to use dogma, faith, and so on. Wittgenstein writes about dogma in this way: For dogma is expressed in the form of an unshakeable assertion, but at the same time any practical opinion *can* be made to harmonize with it; admittedly more easily in

some cases than in others. It is not a *wall* setting limits which can be believed, but more like a *brake* which, however, practically serves the purpose; it's almost as though someone were to attach a weight to your foot to restrict your freedom of movement. This is how dogma becomes irrefutable and beyond the reach of attack (CV, 28). In dogma, logic and reason do not have place and it is not a claim of knowledge. In the case of religious claim and its supposed counter-claim by science and philosophy, they are of very different nature and distinct world-picture, that is why they are not contradicting claims of knowledge and contradicting world-picture.

The significance of this line of thought is that it is comparable to Moore's use of the sentence "I know". Further, Moore was using it out of the context. Wittgenstein describes how we usually use "I know": 'One says "I know" when one is ready to give compelling grounds. "I know" relates to a possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light, assuming that he is convinced of it. But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes' (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 243). One who claims to have knowledge should be able to give grounds and reason. If one cannot justify one's belief it cannot be counted as knowledge.

It is accepted that there can be different world-pictures and people have different cultures. Will it be right for one to interfere in the world-pictures and cultures of others? Or one must leave them alone on the ground that it is alright to have different worldpictures and cultures? Wittgenstein gives an example of people who consult an oracle instead of a physicist: 'Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist they consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? – If we call this "wrong" aren't we using our language-game as a base from which to *combat* theirs? And are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course, there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969). The idea which comes out clearly is that one could have been judging others by using one's own system, which is different from theirs. So, is it right to combat these practices and ideas or one must leave them alone? People who have modern education and scientific knowledge will have all sorts of arguments against people who consult an oracle. Wittgenstein said that he will combat those ideas which he does not believe in. But, as mentioned before the reason and justification one can give might not be enough to convert people who believe otherwise. At the end one has to rely on persuasion.

The reason one has to rely on persuasion is because when one's belief clashes with another and both of them stand their ground and give reason from their system it can lead to another problem. Wittgenstein says, 'Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 611). For Putnam the presence of the words "fool" and "heretic" has shown an important idea (Putnam 1992). It shows Wittgenstein's thoughts on when two different world-pictures clashed. When one says that someone is a fool or heretic maybe one doesn't understand the standpoint of others and judge their language-game from one's language-game. When one started out shouting slogan there will always be fighting and there can be no reconciliation. This spirit can also be seen in *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, when he criticizes Frazer for calling the primitive practice as false, stupidity, insane, and so on. Frazer was using his language-game to judge theirs. He might be right in judging them from his system which he possessed. But, he was wrong to say that they originated out of stupidity. Moreover, he believed that every world-picture, form of life, and culture are of the same nature. Frazer does not see

that others can have totally different practices from his world-picture. From what we seen in *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein might believe that he would write a better book if he did not treat their practices as a piece of stupidity.

Wittgenstein has criticized Moore on the way he used the word “know” by claiming that Moore’s propositions are the basic form of our language-game which we all know if Moore knows them (Conant 1998). But this is a mistaken claim; these are our basic propositions which no one doubted. They are the propositions which lie at the bottom of our world-picture. Doubting them would amount to doubting one’s own world-picture, which is impossible, because to doubt something we have to doubt from something else. They are not doubted does not mean that they are justified, and they cannot be said to be true or false. There are many things which one does not doubt which makes the existence of world-picture possible. There are different world-pictures which are also not doubted for the one who holds them. They are not doubted does not mean that one can give justification for one’s belief. The trust in one’s world picture which one inherits is not because of ratiocination but instinct. One can try to justify one’s world-picture and the basic certainties, but that justification cannot be as certain as those propositions which they are supposed to be a ground for (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969, p. 307). As there can be alternate worldpictures, there can also be a shift in one’s world picture. Also, one can convince others to change their world-picture by preaching and telling them their world picture. But the difference between them are not just a slight misunderstanding or differences in certain understanding, they are rather a whole system. So, for one to change their world-picture it will take a special conversion and will need a unique situation. The only way is by means of persuasion.

When Wittgenstein talked about our language-games, world-picture and knowledge that they are not founded on rationality and necessity, there are something more than just an epistemic idea which his words can imply. He does not say that every view is same or that they are all valid within their system. I think, he tries to show that there can be world-pictures, practices and beliefs which are very different from each other. These are inherited by one and one can really hold one’s world-picture based on what one is told. These world-pictures can be about the natural world or the spiritual world. Regarding the natural world, a culture can be ignorant about science and may not have education like us, not because of stupidity but because of lacking in the opportunity to know the modern scientific world-picture. When we encounter these cultures, it will be better to combat their ideas not by viewing their system as originated from stupidity or madness but try to look at their world-picture from their system. When encountering another culture Wittgenstein also ask us to realize the groundlessness of our believing before we call others “Heretic!” and “Fool!” What we think about our knowledge on society, science, and others are not rational and well founded as we suppose. If one is called to justify one’s beliefs and knowledge one might not be able to give the reason and ground to people who does not think as he/she does. The foundation of human values and practices are based on trusting and holding fast onto something, that very foundation and this trust come from human instinct, not by rational means (Ogaba 2019). Human actions and cultures are guided by instinct much more than what we think, and more than we might want to believe it otherwise.

These different cultures and world-pictures, even though they are very different, are connected by a human form of life. This is how it is possible to understand each other. Wittgenstein has expressed the similarities between human being and their shared form of life this way: There are dangers connected with eating and drinking, not only for savages, but also for us; nothing is more natural than the desire to protect oneself from these; and now we could

devise such preventative measures ourselves. It goes without saying that a man's shadow, which looks like him, or his mirror-image, the rain, thunderstorms, the phases of the moon, the changing of the seasons, the way in which animals are similar to and different from one another and in relation to man, the phenomena of death, birth, and sexual life, in short, everything we observe around us year in and year out, interconnected in so many different ways, will play a part in his thinking (his philosophy) and in his practices, or is precisely what we really know and find interesting (Wittgenstein *et al.*, 1969). These are the shared behaviour we have, by means of which we understand unknown languages and cultures.

CONCLUSION

This work has talked about different world-pictures and the nature of difference in culture. Also, there can be change in culture and world-picture which one holds fast. The change in culture can happen through an individual, and one can criticize their culture and change the course of culture. Yet, this work argues that world-picture is inherited by one from one's elders and the second holds the idea that culture is public and there can be no private culture. So, there can be no question regarding the status of relationship between individuals and the culture in which they are born.

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