Critiques of Dominant Tradition of Epistemology

Chris O. Abakare

Critiques of Dominant Tradition of Epistemology

Chris O. Abakare^(1*),

(1) Department of Philosophy, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Ifite Road, 420110, Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria.
(*) Corresponding Author

Abstract

Aquinas’ views on the soul follows closely those of Aristotle, but diverges on some key points. This study examines whether the soul for Aquinas is or is not a body, whether it is or not immortal. It further examines in detail Aquinas’ exposition of the fittingness of the soul to the body and why it is necessary. Herein, lies the most significant way Aquinas diverges from Aristotle. Aquinas’ re-statement and re-framing of the question in a new way also marks his unique and original contribution to the discourse on the Soul.

Keywords

Body; Soul; Immortality’ Man; Knowledge.

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