



An Ethical Hermeneutic Perspective to Globalizing African Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

In today's world of globalization, certain ideas/ideals are held to be global. These global ideal/ideals are held so in contradistinction to local ones. Beyond being different from the local ones, these global ideas are considered superior and of higher value compared to the local ones. But these global ideas/ideals did not just appear. They are products of processes. This suggests that at certain points such ideals were local, particular, and specific. What then are the processes through which these ideas have become global? What constitutes the driving force for the metamorphosis of these local ideas/ideals into global strongholds and focal points? Answering these questions and relating the answers to the quest for globalizing African Philosophy is the focus of this essay. This paper will show that there are four ways through which this globalizing process can occur: (i) through power matrices or the colonality of power; (ii) through the pragmatic potentials such ideals portend; (iii) from the philosophical perspective, the logical rigour which a local ideal embodies; (iv) the ethical and hermeneutic aura which a local ideal exudes. From all the above, the paper seeks to show that all these transformation processes swing the pendulum of the dialectics between the local and global more in favour of the global, but only the ethical-hermeneutic model swings the pendulum in favour of none. Rather, it holds both in a fruitful tension bearing in mind the pluriversal and multicultural nature of our time. The journey toward the globalization of African philosophy should go in this direction.

Keywords: African; Ethical; Global; Hermeneutics; Local; Philosophy.

1. INTRODUCTION

African Philosophy, in this discourse, refers to the expression of the African capacity for speculative thought. It refers to the African unique mode of critique of culture and the exhibition of deep thought. This understanding elicits the position that while rationality is universal, its expression and practice maybe particular and relative. Thus, the relative practice of the universality of reason within the African context is what is referred to as African Philosophy in this paper. African Philosophy is about the why and how of knowledge production in the African context. It is more about knowledge by Africans, rather than knowledge of Africa (Hountondji, 2009). How Philosophy produced at this local level can become global is the focus of this paper. This discourse will assess the efforts at globalizing African Philosophy from an intercultural perspective. The contention of the essay is that, there

are four ways through which the globalizing process can occur: (i) through power matrices or the colonality of power; (ii) through the pragmatic potentials such ideals portend; (iii) from the philosophical perspective, the logical rigour which a local ideal embodies; (iv) the ethical and hermeneutic aura which a local ideal exudes. Based on these, the paper seeks to show that all these transformation processes swing the pendulum of the dialectics between the local and global more in favour of the global, but only the ethical-hermeneutic model swings the pendulum in favour of none. Rather, it holds both in a fruitful tension bearing in mind the pluriversal and multicultural nature of our time. Let us contextualize globalization and African philosophy.

2. GLOBALIZATION AND AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

Giddens, defined globalization as “the intensification of world-wide social relations, which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa” (Prempeh, 2006, p. 21). According Kanu (2022) quoting Nsibambi (2001), “globalization is a process of advancement and increase in interaction among the world’s countries and people facilitated by progressive technological changes in locomotion, communication, political and military power, knowledge and skills, as well as interfacing of cultural values, systems and practices” (2022, p. 32). In a similar vein, Kwame Yeboah (2007) understands globalization as a ‘process of linking regions and/or nations of the world which is facilitated by information flow (communication) inducing changes in the pre-existing socio-cultural, political, economic etc, structures and systems of nations and peoples (Kwame, 2007). From these definitions, we can surmise that globalization as a human phenomenon came to birth at the point when human cultures started to meet and to interact rapidly at a world-wide level. Within the context of this interaction, certain ideals began to take the centre stage as global ideals.

It is within the context of this kind of world-wide interaction that question of the identity and the definition of the African becomes a problem for thought. It is because of the Whiteman’s contact with the alterity of Blackness on the Blackman’s continent that he began to seek ideations and categories for defining the Blackman. Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, gives the impression of a writer trying, hard as he could, to make sense of the Dark Heart (the Blackman and his abode) (Moore, 2004). The text seeks to give meaning to the distinctly unfamiliar in the language of familiarity as it is known to the author. The result is a tale which describes traditional Africans in animalistic and brutish terms. The credibility of that tale is not the fact in issue in this essay. But suffice it to say that, that tale would not have been a reality were it not for the contact of the author with the Heart of Darkness. That contact made the story a reality; globalization made the story a reality. It is for the reason of this kind of externally infused making of the identity of the Blackman that some African scholars today are of the opinion that the idea of the Blackman and even Africa, which is his

abode, is invented (See, the invention of Africa). Hence, there are multifarious definitions of Africa and Africanness.

The contention here is that the debate on the invention or otherwise of Africa cannot be taking place except for the reality of globalization. It is due to the inability of white consciousness to understand black reality, that white consciousness denigrates it. It is on the basis of this denigration that black reality writes back. Similarly, the question of the controversy concerning the identity, practice and content of African rationality came to the fore when Africa came into contact with other cultures, particularly the cultures of the West. It was only when the West began to peddle its brand of rationality as ideal, universal and a global alternative that the question of the particularity and inferiority of African rationality and hence African Philosophy was born. Africans in trying to show that they are not inferior in producing knowledge forms that could pass for global ideas, now formally began the business of African Philosophy. This is the point of intersection between African Philosophy and Globalization.

3. ON THE MODELS FOR GLOBALIZING IDEALS AND IDEAS

One question that readily comes to mind is, what are some of the ways through which ideas become ideal, universal and hence global in the face of other alternatives? This we shall try to answer in this section and subsequently try to relate to the attempts of African Philosophy at globalizing itself. In the globalizing process, a number of models can be identified for accomplishing the task. In this discussion, we shall highlight four of them. These include: the power matrix model, the pragmatic model, the logical model and the ethical-hermeneutic model.

3.1 Power Matrix Globalizing Model

We can also describe this as ‘the imperial code model’ for making ideals global. Mignolo borrows the terms ‘matrix’ (and ‘code’), as in ‘colonial matrix of power’, from Annibal Quijano to show the enduring structure of the ‘colonial difference’ and its impact on how knowledge is created, recorded, distributed and (mis)interpreted. For Mignolo in his *The Darker Side of Western Modernity*, the colonial matrix is the system of power that sustains the idea that there is only one code, the Western code (Mignolo, 2011). This is the code that decolonial thinkers such as Mignolo look to

break, as a means to shift from seeing Western modernity as The One True Code to one amongst a plurality of options. The hegemonization and subsequent universalization of western modern is consequent upon this matrix.

3.2 The Pragmatic Globalizing Model

The pragmatic principle developed first a coherent system of cross-cultural evaluation/interaction within anthropology. In this discipline, its basic presuppositions were laid out by Henry Bagish in his essay "The Confessions of a Former Cultural Relativist". Commenting on this Dennis Bartels writes that, "Henry Bagish also proposed a way of evaluating cultural practices; but, unlike Hippler, Kroeber, Kluckhohn and Bidney, he specifies conditions under which such evaluation might be universally accepted. In doing so he rejects cultural relativism" (Bartels, 1987, p. 43). For Bagish, people since time immemorial have been judging various cultural practices to be better or worse than others according to a pragmatic principle. In this regard "any belief or practice that enables human beings to predict and control events in their lives, with higher degree of success than the previous beliefs or practices did, can be said to work better" (Bagish, H.1990, p. 26). Thus, if you value being able to chop down trees and to chop up wood with a minimum of human efforts, then the steel axe is better than the stone adze. In his opinion, there is no ethnocentrism inherent in this, for the greater efficiency and utility of steel axes has never gone unnoticed by those peoples who had been using stone axes. In every case then, "...once they have learned about steel axes, they have eagerly sought the more efficient steel tools..." (Bagish, H.1990, p. 26). Based on this principle, Bagish goes ahead to submit emphatically that this principle falsifies hidden assumption of cultural relativism "that there is no specifically valid way to compare cultures, rate or rank them, to say one is better or worse than another" (Bagish, H.1990, p. 26). Despite this seemingly emphatic rebuttal of cultural relativism, there seems to be a qualification of the extent to which this pragmatic principle can be used. Writing on this qualification Bartels opines that

Bagish seems to qualify this claim, however, when he states that the pragmatic principle cannot be used to judge entire cultures or all cultural practices. While the pragmatic

principle produces a degree of cross-cultural consensus regarding the desirability of various cultural practices, such as vaccination to prevent children's diseases, a complete consensus cannot be achieved because of differences in values held by various groups and individuals. In addition, values in any culture are hierarchically orders. In North America, compassion, Bagish suggests, ranks higher than tolerance. Despite a relativist tolerance of a range of cultural practices, compassion for the victims leads to rejection of actions such as Nazi genocide (Bartels, 1987, p. 44).

This represents one phase of the pragmatic principle of cross-cultural evaluation/interaction. In this regard, that which works is the basis for cultural adaptation and appreciation.

In recent times, there is a further adaptation of this principle in what Fred Dallmayr calls the pragmatic-strategic communication principle. Here each partner seeks to advance his or her own interests in negotiation with other parties. To the extent one can describe such communication as 'dialogue,' it takes the form mainly of mutual bargaining, sometimes involving manipulation and even deception. This kind of communicative exchange is well known in international or inter-societal relations and constitutes the central focus of the so-called realist and neorealist schools of international politics. Prominent examples of such communication are trade or commercial negotiations, negotiations about global warming and ecological standards, disarmament negotiations, settlement of border disputes, peace negotiations, and the like. Much of traditional diplomacy is in fact carried on in this vein (Dallmayr, 2007; Eyo, Udofia & Edor, 2011; Eyo & Udofia, 2011). Here too, one sees that workability is the underlining principle. That which works in the manipulation process carries the day; such becomes the norm.

There are some objections to this principle particularly its initial form. While Bartels makes some crucial comments about the form of this principle in the first place, he also raises objections to this principle as well. In this connection Bartels want to establish that it is not always true as Bagish contends that people always go for the better option in the use of things. In Bartels' opinion, 'while Bagish's

examples concerns instances where non-industrial peoples have accepted products of industrial technology or scientific medicine, there are also rejections of technological innovations consistent with Bagish's pragmatic principle'. He then quotes from Asch to further establish this case,

In the feudal period it proved virtually impossible to introduce new and more efficient scythes. Although these would have lightened the labour of serfs, the latter strongly resisted their use. The reason was the scythes' very efficiency 'for, by cutting crops close to the ground, less would be left for gleanage which was a widely established right of serfs'. In this case, rights of gleanage were valued more than a labour-saving innovation, at least by serfs (Bartels, 1987, p. 43).

In this case, it is the efficiency of the system that plunges it into reproach. As such while, the efficiency of a particular innovation can be the reason for its massive adoption, it can also be the reason why it could be rejected. Another example is the resistance of the Mamluk knights of the Ottoman Empire to the adoption of field artillery. It becomes clear therefore that Bagish's pragmatic principle may not immediately engender universal applicability.

At another level, this principle as indicated by Bagish may not immediately be a justification for the universality in the true sense of the word. Within the discourse on universalism, Ihde, (2009) quoting Tong Shijun makes a distinction between 'generality and universality' based universalism. In his opinion,

these two types of universalism can easily be mistaken for each other. Hegel, for example, derived the conclusion that Western philosophy is a philosophy of universal validity from the fact that, in his mind, Western philosophy is better than any other kind of philosophy in grasping universality. There is, in my view, a middle term between the premise and the conclusion, that is, the more general a concept is in extension, the more universal is its validity. Here I use the term 'general' and the term 'universal' deliberately in different senses. In everyday life we usually

use these two terms interchangeably, but I think it important to make a distinction between them here. The universality in validity and the generality in extension are two different things. 'The Earth is elliptical', for example, is not general in its extension, since it refers to only one object; but this proposition is valid universally, on Mars as well as on the Earth (p. 75).

Thus, that a concept or innovation has a generality in extension does not immediately suggest it is universally valid. With regard to Bagish's pragmatic principle of universality, it only suggests that an idea can have a generality in extension, but it does not show the universal status of such a concept or idea as far as validity is concerned. This vital objection is properly dealt with in the logical principle of cross-cultural evaluation.

3.3.1 Logical Principles of intercultural Evaluation

The logical principle of cross-cultural evaluation began to develop within the Afro-constructivist school of thought within African philosophy. It is in the first place a universalist project within African philosophy and philosophy in general. The critical elements that this school of thought presents have the Integrated Approach (or development hermeneutics) as its most systematic approach. This approach proceeds with the following steps: identifying and classifying social phenomena and imperatives, philosophical analysis and evaluation of these phenomena and imperative, and establishing the hierarchy of causal efficacy about these phenomena. But the bulk of the work is done at the second stage; philosophical analysis and evaluation of social phenomena and imperatives. The tools adopted in this analysis are the principles of 'the internal consistency of the worldview' and 'the horizon of consistency of the worldview'. Logic is of the essence in the making and functioning of these principles. The basic presupposition is that "the formal quantification of any possible supreme belief can be schematically presented thus: any possible supreme belief (P) is such that it is either expressed universally in space (S) or not universally expressed in space (-S) ; its expression in space either includes itself (m) or does not include itself (-m); it is either expressed constantly in time T or not expressed

constantly in time $-T$; either it expresses commitment to constancy C or it does not express commitment to constancy $-C$. symbolically we have $(x)(Px \supset (Sx \vee \neg Sx)(Mx \supset \neg Mx)(Tx \vee \neg Tx)(Cx \vee \neg Cx))$. The structure for the maximal position or affirmative expression of a supreme belief symbolically is $(x)(Px \supset Sx \vee Mx \vee Tx \vee Cx)$ ” (Agbakoba). Despite the scheme as presented above, the principle of internal consistency of a worldview, defined as a system in which each proposition implies, and is implied by others, taken alone is insufficient in evaluating worldviews. But when the second principle that ‘of the horizon of consistency’, defined as the scope (breadth, depth, extent) of consistency, with regard to time and space such a system exhibits; the scope of reality such a worldview can actively or positively bring under its purview, the consistency theory of evaluating worldviews becomes totally complete (Agbakoba, 2005). The case here is hinged on the issue of commensurability and incommensurability of worldviews and when worldviews are incommensurable, this evaluation scheme should be applied to determine which should be upheld (Agbakoba, 2008). The Kind of universality sought after here is formal universality (Agbakoba, 2010). This kind of universality seeks more the validity of the worldview than the mere generality in extension of the worldview.

There is yet another application of this principle in what Fred Dallmayr calls the moral-universal discourse or principle. Here partners seek consensus on basic rules or norms of behavior that are binding on all partners, potentially on a global level. Here, the legacies of modern natural law and Kantian moral philosophy retain their importance. Basic rules of (potentially) universal significance include the rules of modern international law; the international norms regarding warfare, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; the Geneva Conventions; and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One does not need to be a Kantian in a strict sense to recognize the importance and even the ‘categorically’ binding character of these norms (which have been accepted by the great majority of governments and endorsed by the vast majority of humankind). Surely, this is not the time to disparage or tamper with the mandatory quality of international norms. Thus, the rules of the Geneva Conventions are mandatory, no matter what nomenclature individual governments choose to adopt. Likewise, launching an unprovoked war is a crime against humanity, whether particular leaders

choose to acknowledge it or not. So is the wanton killing of civilian populations. Here, the collective conscience of humanity has reached a certain level below which we dare not regress. This category connects with the logical principle in that they both have the Kantian imperative and the natural law principles in view. And based on these they proffer grounds for the universal justification and validity of certain values.

The key advantage in this principle is that it moves the quest for a principle of cross-cultural evaluation from the level of ‘mere generality in extension’, to an honest search for ‘universal validity’. The major problem, on the other hand, here is with the idea of the commensurability/subsumption of ideologies/beliefs. This principle, if followed strictly, drives at what Tong refers to as “homogenization in various other forms” (Ihde, 2009). This principle tends to make the world one whole that looks a like all through. Dialogue is only mentioned, but the processes and the ingredients of the dialogue are not fully mapped out. This model is painstakingly critical. At a closer look, one discovers that the little constructive elements it has collapses under the weight of its critical elements. Also, given the full focus of this model, the contention here is that this model is one suited more for evaluation than construction of worldviews. This is because it takes time to map out a model for evaluation rather than construction. It talks about ‘a standard evaluation scheme’, but nothing of ‘a standard construction scheme’. These then bring to the fore the need for another principle of cross-cultural evaluation.

3.2.2 The Ethical-Hermeneutic Model

The quest here is for an *other* principle of cross-cultural evaluation. One also notices that the *other* is hyphenated and italicized. This signals the fundamental dimension this principle is supposed to attract. This dimension consists first in the fact that this principle is hinged on the idea of epistemic disobedience. That is, it breaks from the conventional understanding of rationality and brings in prejudices and the historicity into the articulation and expression of rationality. This epistemic disobedience is already taking place in the transmodern emphasis on shifting the geography of reason. It is a radical violation of the familiar, it is changing the status of the game altogether rather than just changing the rules of the game. It is qualitative rather than a quantitative

change. And Mignolo is so apt in describing the value of this kind of disobedience. In his words,

epistemic disobedience is necessary to take on *civil disobedience* (Gandhi, Martin Luther King) to its point of non-return. Civil disobedience, within modern Western epistemology (and remember: Greek and Latin, and six vernacular European modern and imperial languages), could only lead to reforms, not to transformations. For this simple reason, the task of de-colonial thinking and the enactment of the de-colonial option in the 21st century starts from epistemic de-linking: from acts of epistemic disobedience (Mignolo, 2009, p. 15).

From the above, it becomes clear the connection between the 'body-politics of knowledge' and 'epistemic disobedience'. And the ultimate aim in this regard is to defy the 'monocultures of the mind' within Western imperial knowledge scheme, as well as its totalitarian and epistemically non-democratic implementations (Shiva, 1993; Udofia, & Uduigwomen, 2022).

This model is aptly designated by Dallmayr as the ethical-hermeneutic principle of cross-cultural evaluation/interaction. A description of this model in his words will warrant a long quote here. For him,

in ethical-hermeneutical dialogue, partners seek to understand and appreciate each other's life stories and cultural backgrounds, including religious (or spiritual) traditions, literary and artistic expressions, and existential agonies and aspirations. It is in this mode that important cross-cultural learning takes place ... *Ethics here is oriented toward the 'good life'—not in the sense of an abstract 'ought,' but as the pursuit of an aspiration implicit in all life-forms yet able to take on different expressions in different cultures.* Since ethics on this level speaks to deeper human motivations, this is the dimension that is most likely to mold human conduct in the direction of mutual ethical recognition and peace. Hence, there is an urgent need in our time to emphasize and cultivate this kind of

ethical pedagogy (Dallmayr, N.D, p. 251).

After this, he goes ahead to mention specific examples of some areas where this kind of dialogue is already in place. He talks about parliaments, and various forms of world forum where this kind of dialogue is already taking place. The aspiration of ethics is key in this regard and most important is the fact that this ethics moves towards an aspiration that is implicit in all forms of life, yet is able to take on different expressions in different cultures. This in the opinion of the paper is a classic statement of the idea of 'universality as a pluriversal project'. Here then, universality does not have any meeting point with uniformity or homogeneity. What is demanded is that the ethical aspiration of such a position is made most clear. In this context, it becomes very reasonable to argue that economic interactions are implicit in very human community, hence economic interactions are universal, but capitalism is only a specific mode of economic interaction therefore capitalism is not a universal. As such it will be wrong to think every economy must be capitalist for it to survive. The same argument can be made for the question of political structures within any human community. Every human community must have political organizations and structures, hence political structures are universal. But democracy is only a form of political organization within human communities therefore it is not universal. Instances can be cited on and on of examples where the West has valorized various aspects of its culture and made them into universals for others to follow in order to have eternal life as for as development is concerned. This should not be the case.

Dallmayr identified further another category of this ethical-hermeneutic principle of intercultural dialogue and evaluation. This he calls agonal dialogue or contestation. In the agonal dialogue Dallmayr contends that,

...partners seek not only to understand and appreciate each other's life-forms but also to convey their experiences of exploitation and persecution, that is, grievances having to do with past or persisting injustice and suffering. Along with better understanding, agonal dialogue adds the dimension of possible retribution and rectification of grievances. Yet retribution does not

necessarily involve the desire to “get even,” take revenge, and possibly repay injustice with injustice by turning the previous victimizers into victims. When the latter happens, the element of understanding—constitutive of genuine dialogue—is crushed in favor of sheer antagonism and possibly violent conflict. At that point, we reenter the domain of the “clash” of cultures and societies that is at the margins of intercultural dialogue. This is why I prefer to list the agonial case as a subcategory within ethical-hermeneutical dialogue. In this context, confrontation and contestation are not ends in themselves but are placed in the service of ethical reconciliation and healing (Dallmayr, N.D, p. 251-252).

He even goes ahead to mention some examples of the institutions that are aimed at arriving at this form of reconciliation. Some of these are the Truth and Justice or Truth and Reconciliation Commissions established in various parts of the world to investigate crimes committed during ethnic conflicts or by dictatorships (Eyo & Udofia, 2011). The point of these commissions was both to establish a record of past criminal actions and injustices and to promote a process of social healing that would prevent the recurrence of victimization. In light of the horrendous forms of oppression and injustice prevailing in the world today, one can only hope that humankind will someday have the wisdom and courage to establish a global Truth and Reconciliation Commission charged with exposing and rectifying existing abuses and laying the groundwork for a more just and livable global future (Amstutz, 2005). For those within the transmodern school of thought retribution for the crimes of colonialism should also be part of the functions of this kind of commission.

Integral pluralism is also what helps this model of intercultural dialogue to perfectly identify that sphere of universality and how particularity can be disguised as a universal in this sense. What then is integral pluralism? Dallmayr calls this ‘unity in diversity’ and “just as in the case of hermeneutical dialogue, *the point of intercultural encounter is not to reach a bland consensus or uniformity of beliefs but to foster a progressive learning process involving possible*

transformation. For this to happen, local or indigenous traditions must be neither jettisoned nor congealed (or essentialized)” (Dallmayr, 2010, p. 115). Dallmayr further quotes extensively from Gadamer to establish this. In Dallmayr’s words,

in an interview with an Indian political thinker conducted a few years before his death, Gadamer clearly pinpoints the global significance of hermeneutical understanding. ‘The human solidarity that I envisage,’ he states, ‘is not a global uniformity but unity in diversity [another name for integral pluralism]. We must learn to appreciate and tolerate pluralities, multiplicities, cultural differences.’ As he frankly concedes, such an appreciation is in short supply and is actually undermined by the rampant power politics pursued by military-industrial complexes: ‘The hegemony or unchallengeable power of any one single nation . . . is dangerous for humanity; it would go against human freedom.’ Hence, the unity in diversity that has been a European legacy must today become a global formula; it must be extended to the whole world—to include China, India, and also Muslim cultures. Every culture, every people has something distinctive to offer for the solidarity and wellbeing of humanity’ (Dallmayr, 2010, p. 116).

The last sentence re-echo’s the idea of Asouzu that everything in reality serves ‘a missing link’ (Asouzu, 2007), hence no culture can afford to be discarded within the context of this new discourse which seeks to found the new world order. The aim here is to touch and be touched and to be ready to revise our positions based on these touchings.

4. ETHICAL-HERMENEUTICS AND THE GLOBALIZING OF AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

From the above, three levels of operation can be identified in the ethical-hermeneutic approach to globalization. The first is the ethical level of operation. At this level, the focus is on the pursuit of ‘the good life’, which is implicit in all forms of living but capable of taking different forms within different

contexts. What this means is that all forms of philosophical ideals must aspire to approximate 'the good life'. This approximation should not only be in principle, but also in practice. African Philosophy should be attentive to this ethical aspiration in its pursuit of being globalized. The enterprise of African Philosophy should not be carried in such a manner that justifies all forms of unethical modes of living just for the sake of establishing the uniqueness of African Philosophy. Uniqueness may be part of what makes an ideal global, but the ethical credentials of such an ideal is what will give force to such global disposition. When African Philosophers place undue emphasis on communalism as integral to African culture even when communalism entrenches ethnic divisions and hampers the development of Africa, there is every need to question the ethical credentials of such an ideal (Udofia, 2021). At this level, ethics is vital to the philosophical enterprise and African Philosophy will do well to take such seriously as it works to become global brand.

The second level of operation is the agonial dialogue or contestation. Much as this dialogue requires addressing forms of grievances in view of accomplishing reconciliation, this contestation has to be internal before it is external. African Philosophy for much of its existence has continued to contest with external forces, especially the West and the impact of slavery and colonialism on its quest to become global. This means that much of the contestations of African Philosophy are focused on external contestations. The position of this paper is that the force of this external contestation is strong enough because the contestations at the internal front have not been properly addressed. One area of such contestation is that of slavery. Africans need to apologize to fellow Africans for their complicity in slave trade. In fact, in the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd and the burgeoning of the #BlackLivesMatter protest opinions have begun to emerge about the relationship between African Americans and Africans on the African continent. Opinions are that African Americans do not have any form of cordial relationships with Africans from the African continent. Part of the reasons for this was that African Americans are aggrieved about the notorious role that the Africans in the homeland played in the process of getting their ancestors into slavery. For reasons of this kind, there is almost no strong synergy between Africans in diaspora and Africans on the homeland. In this midst of this kind of disunity, philosophical productivity can hardly be

fruitful. The point to make here is that, before African Philosophy can conveniently contest with the wider world and win, the internal contestations have to be resolved.

At the third level, integral pluralism is another level of operation in the ethical-hermeneutic approach to globalization. This requires 'unity in diversity and diversity in unity'. The point to note here is the plurality of the African context. In Anyanwu's opinion, "we must admit plurality of cultural philosophical system" (Anyanwu, 1983, p. 35). Thus, African Philosophy, as it works to become part of the cultural philosophical system, cannot be a monolithic entity. This means that, given the nature of Africa, a multiplicity of voices should be heard from the Philosophical front in Africa. This does not mean the disintegration of African Philosophy. Here the warning of Dallymar in his articulation of integral pluralism becomes germane. For him, the move towards pluralism and emphatic rejection of totalizing monism of every sort portends the danger of cosmic incoherence whereby individual lives likewise become incoherent and unintelligible (Dallmayr, 2010, p. 1). As such, he advocates integral pluralism which entails "mutual embroilment, interpenetration and contestation ... differential entwinement without fusion or segregation" (Dallmayr, 2010, p. 9). In this context, pluralism is dangerous, but when these pluralities are integrated, it becomes strength. This strength, in the African context, lies in the integration of the plural voices that are contained in the continent. Much as there are arguments that, although there are different cultures in Africa, they share a fundamental background that justifies the attitude of referring to them together as African Philosophy, it is still important to insist on the plurality of these cultures. This insistence should only be in the form of highlighting the diversity on the continent. When this diversity is harmonized in the form of unity, the power and the strength of the continent becomes obvious. When this strength flows into making African Philosophy, African Philosophy becomes indeed a truly global brand.

5. CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, attempts have been made to articulate the various ways through which a local idea/ideal can become global. Having done an analysis of the various models for the globalization of local ideas/ideals, the conclusion is that the ethical-hermeneutic approach with its three elements of

ethics, contestation and integral pluralism are viable elements that can guarantee the project of globalizing African Philosophy.

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