



## A Defense of Mind-Body Dualism

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### ABSTRACT

The great majority of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy have practised some kind of dualism. Even pervasive throughout the majority of western and non-western religious ceremonies and customs. Even prevalent in the majority of western and non-western cultures and religious activities. Christianity and Islam both believe in an everlasting, non-physical soul. The Hindus believe in the Atman, or divine self, within. Buddhism is the only religion that denies the concept of an enduring inner self or soul. Thus, regardless of whether we are monists, dualists, pluralists, or anything else, when we reach the world of consciousness, we must acknowledge that, on the one hand, there is an unchanging relationship between mental and physical, and, on the other hand, they are two distinct, independent things. The major issue in the philosophy of mind is whether scientific progress is sufficient to overcome the mind-body dilemma. If this is insufficient, can the scientific method solve the mind-body problem? If our answers to philosophical problems, whether scientific or philosophical, have been unsatisfactory over the years, what is the only way forward? In this work, I will develop arguments in defence of mind-body dualism. The first, second, third, and fourth sections of this work are designed to show the problems in earlier theories of Cartesian dualism, biological naturalism, the multiple draughts model theory, and the hard problem of consciousness, respectively. This research is carried out using the research methods of critical and contextual analysis.

**Keywords:** Mind-body problem; mind-body dualism, Cartesian dualism, biological naturalism, the multiple draughts model theory, hard problem of consciousness.

## 1. CRITIQUE ON THE CARTESIAN DUALISM

I begin here with the critique of Cartesian dualism, which adopted some traditional philosophical notions and also introduced new methods in the philosophy of mind- dualism. Though the philosophical notion of dualism is not a new concept, present-day *mind-body* dualism obviously differs from the ancient notion of dualism (Plumwood, 1986). The ancient concept of dualism was primarily concerned with the relationship between primitive matter and life (Pálsson, 2003). Throughout scholastic philosophy, it shifted course and became soul-body dualism. We can even say that, though there were some religious influences on the ancient philosophical notions, such as those in Plato, in the mediaeval period more religious influences were working on the philosophical ideas. Descartes was well aware of the differences between the *soul* and the *mind*, and he was the first philosopher to explicitly abandon all of the conceptual baggage associated with the word “*soul*” in favour of a radically new term, “*mind*,” and its principal attributes.

Though the concept of mind existed prior to Descartes, whatever capacities he attributed to the mind were divided, some being attributed to the mind (*Nous*) and others to the other parts of the soul (Bennett, 2007). The role of Anaxagoras also cannot be ignored in developing the notion of the *mind* in the pre-Socratic era (Russo, 2003). The notion of the *soul* still plays a dominant role in religious and spiritual practices, but its role in other fields is totally ignored. There are many reasons for the demise of the concept of the *soul* (Bouma, 2007). Two important reasons can be stated here: first, its association with religious practices; and second, it is surrounded by some cultural, traditional, local, and some other prejudices. It is the Cartesian theory of *mind* that has taken the first brave step in the direction of removing the *soul* completely from the explanations of human nature, and we can even say that it has led to a more scientific understanding of human reality. But still, there are some issues in Cartesian dualism that do not seem to be acceptable:

1. I begin with the dreaming argument, where Descartes says that we cannot differentiate the dreaming state from the waking state. But I feel that our rational *mind* has the capacity to see them as separate states. When we enter the waking state from sleep, we realise that whatever had happened was a dream and not real. However, when we enter a dream in a state of sleep, we are unaware that whatever has occurred while we are awake is a dream. So our rational *mind* can clearly discriminate a dreaming state from a waking state.

2. Descartes introduced the example of the wax object to explain what really plays the key role in

understanding a particular object. He says that if we bring the wax close to the fire, then its properties change: the smell fades, the flavour evaporates, the colour changes, the shape changes, it becomes liquid, it becomes warm, it extends specially, and it cannot be touched (Galison, 1984). After all these changes, we still call it wax. To make us understand what is really going on, he asks us to take away all the properties of the wax. After taking away all the properties of the wax, whatever remains is the essence of the wax, which plays a key role in understanding the wax after having undergone many changes. But I feel that empirically, after taking away all the properties, there will remain nothing to understand. It can be argued that when all the properties of the wax are removed, there is nothing left to be understood. I feel that the idea of looking at what is left after taking away all the properties of the wax is a mistaken notion. This is not how the object is conceived.

3. There are two substances: *mind* and body; the essence of *mind* is *thought*, and the essence of body is *extension* (Garrett, 2009). And the physical stuff, to which the properties are attached, has something permanent in it that is essential for its existence. But in our understanding, we never encounter either physical or mental substances without their accompanying properties. It appears absurd to consider any object without its properties, because these properties have existential status as well. In the absence of the other, neither the object nor its properties can exist. It is an invariable relation between the object and its properties. There will be no substance if there are no properties.

For example, milk has certain properties; without those properties, we cannot call it milk. After boiling, if we add a spoon of curd to it, after a few hours it will become curd. We call it curd rather than milk. If we churn curd, then we can make butter out of it. When we melt butter with heat, we get ghee. In these four levels, the stuff is the same; we haven't added anything additional to it, but it has undergone many changes and four different names for four different states. If I call these four different states by one name, then it seems absurd. If Descartes says that these four states have the same essence, then they should have the capacity to get back into the state of milk, which is impossible. So along with the properties, the essence of a particular thing also changes simultaneously. It is not just extension that is essential to objects; they also always have some observable attributes. So proposing the existence of substance as the foundation on which properties reside is an unnecessary complication because such a substance cannot be discovered empirically; empiricists such as Hume do not regard it as a necessary condition.

4. Another important problem in Descartes' explanation is the interaction between *mind* and *body*. The

pineal gland is at the centre of the brain. I think the pineal gland has caused more problems than the *mind-body problem*. If anyone asks whether the pineal gland is physical or non-physical, and if the answer is physical, then immediately we have to face a primary question: how could it be different from any other part of the brain? But Descartes could not give a satisfactory answer. He says in a letter written to Princess Elizabeth of the Palatinate that "The union of mind and body is best understood by not thinking about it, and that it is just one of those mysteries that has to be accepted without being comprehended.", (Stroll & Popkin, 2012, p. 126).

5. While talking about the *Mind* Descartes says that I am not the bodily structure, not the air, not the wind, not the thing which walks or senses, not this and not that but I am a *thing* that thinks; I am a *thinking thing*, a thing that doubts, affirms etc. In the second Meditation Descartes says that we can know better about our *Mind* than the body. If it is the subjectivity of a person that Descartes is talking about then it can be argued that the subject/*Self* is already embodied as it cannot exist apart from the body. But Descartes says that the *Mind* can exist without the body. However, Descartes should explain to us what sort of thing this 'I' (the mental substance) who thinks really is which can exist without embodiment. I feel that though Descartes tried his best to say what the *Mind* is not but he could not succeed in explaining what the *Mind* is. There is more to the *Self* than mere thought.

1. How can Descartes notion of God, in relation with the *Mind*, be accepted as a rational thing? Descartes believe that, "Since I am a thinking thing with the idea of God in me, my cause, whatever it is, must be a thinking thing having in it the idea of every perfection that I attribute to God (Perry, et al., 2010, p. 146). If we accept it as rational then there are two problems; the first problem with the statement is that since I am a thinking thing so the substance of thinking thing must be a thinking thing. In this regard Descartes has to explain why he needs the God as the cause of the thinking thing. If God, the infinite *Being* is the cause of the thinking things the latter must be identical in other thinking capacity. But that is not the case.

The second problem is that if my cause is a thinking thing and also having in it an infinite perfect thinking thing which is attributed to God, then how could it cause me to be finite and imperfect in thought? And another thing is that if I am finite and my intellect doesn't have the capacity of conceiving of infinity then it obviously shows that I have certain limitations. How can limited being like me can think of an infinite *Being*, that is, God. What kind of logic we can apply to this conclusion? At the end of third Meditation he says that,

All that remains for me is to ask how I received this idea of God. For I did not draw it from the senses; it never came

upon me unexpectedly, as is usually the case with the ideas of sensible things when these things present themselves (or seem to present themselves) to the external sense organs. Nor was it made by me, for I plainly can neither subtract anything from it nor add anything to it. Thus the only option remaining is that this idea is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me (Finn, et al., 2012, p. 43).

If we consider the idea of God as innate then everyone should have this innate idea without having any difference. But we differ amongst ourselves regarding the idea of God.

7. Descartes says that in the idea of an infinite God has more objective reality than in the idea of a finite thing. But the idea of God is a mere conceptual entity, which has no more reality than our own *Mind* which is thinking.

8. However, the Cartesian dualism stands vindicated because we can never reduce *Mind* to the *Body* and therefore *Mind* has to be treated as an independent reality in the metaphysical sense.

## 2. CRITIQUE ON BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM

John Searle has delved into philosophical inquiry by questioning the notion that artificial intelligence cannot recreate cognition via the manipulation of physical symbols. His well-known thought experiment, *The Chinese Room Argument*, has made him a prominent contemporary philosopher (Buckwalter & Stich, 2014). He may claim, based on his biological naturalism, that mental events are created by neuro-physical processes in the brain and are themselves brain characteristics. By creating the silicon brain thought experiment to demonstrate that the causal capacities of the brain cannot be copied, John Searle has done an outstanding job. True, a synthetic object or Chinese room cannot cause mental events. Consider the invention of the LVAD (Left Ventricular Assist Device) in 2011 by Drs. Billy Cohn and Bud Frazier, which allowed blood to flow throughout the body. Craig Lewis, age 55, has been hospitalised due to a heart-related issue. The situation was dire, and physicians were compelled to act to save the patient's life. In such a dire circumstance, a LVAD was placed in lieu of the heart. A few hours following LVAD heart replacement, the patient became aware and resumed regular behaviour. The patient was released from the hospital without a heartbeat or pulse, but all other actions were normal.

The LVAD could not replicate all of the functions of the heart. It is correct that only a computer having the same causal capabilities as a brain could reason. On the basis of Searle's Chinese Room Argument, we may assert that a computer cannot have mental existence due to its syntactical (symbolic) or binary number causal

implementation. However, our mental phenomena are the result of semantic causal processes. Moreover, the approach he has chosen to demonstrate that all mental processes are conscious mental states is particularly commendable. Bringing together concepts like conscious, unconscious, and non-conscious, then concluding that there are no unconscious mental states and proposing that "all unconscious intentional states are in principle accessible to consciousness" as the connecting principle is a thought-provoking step (Buckwalter & Stich, 2014). However, he was unable to adequately describe the mind-body dilemma. His rejection of the concept of dualism was not entirely effective.

1. Searle's thought experiment on silicon brains demonstrates conclusively that a silicon chip may replicate causal capacities but not all other characteristics of neurobiological processes. Here, I will once again cite the same source I used to describe the second and third options of the silicon brain thought experiment. Based on the second potential outcome of the silicon brain thought experiment,

"You find, to your total amazement, that you are indeed losing control of your external behavior. You find, for example, that when the doctors test your vision, you hear them say, "We are holding up a red object in front of you please tell us what you see." You want to cry out, "I can't see anything. I'm going totally blind." But you hear your voice saying in a way that is completely out of your control, "I see a red object in front of me (Searle, 1992, p. 66).

According to the third option of the silicon brain thought experiment, we may envision no changes in our mental life after the implantation of silicon chips, but at the same time we are becoming more and more unable to put our objectives, emotions, and ideas into action. Neither body reacts to the ideas nor can thoughts function on the body. Eventually it causes us to suffer from utter paralysis, even while our mental life is unaffected. So in this scenario, Searle explains that we may hear the physicians saying...

The silicon chips are able to maintain heartbeat, respiration, and other vital processes, but the patient is obviously brain dead. We might as well unplug the system, because the patient has no mental life at all (Searle, 1992, p. 68).

Here as first person observers we know that the doctors are totally wrong. In that situation we really want to shout out and say that... "No, I'm still conscious! I perceive everything going on around me. It's just that I can't make any physical movement. I've become totally

paralyzed (Searle, 1992, p. 68).

An individual may only have one conscious mental state in a given location and time, yet in Searle's silicon brain thought experiment, there seem to be two conscious mental states (two subjects): the neurobiological brain state and the silicon brain state. Once my brain processes are replaced by silicon chips, I will no longer have any neurobiological brain processes; all processes, regardless of their nature, will be silicon brain processes (Jonas & Kording, 2017). Then, according to the second option of silicon brains, how can I have one mental state that says "I can see a red object" and another mental state that says "I cannot see anything"? The following is the third silicon brain potential: while on the one hand,

Searle contends that the implantation of silicon chips will have no effect on human mental existence because the neurobiological mechanisms that generate mental experiences will be replaced by silicon chips (Searle, 1992). Thus, the silicon brain mental phenomenon is the sole mental phenomenon. On the one hand, Searle asserts that physicians believe the patient is brain dead despite the fact that silicon chips can sustain a pulse, breathing, and other activities. In addition, he asserts that there are mental manifestations, prompting the patient to protest, "No, I'm still aware!" I am aware of everything occurring around me.

If it is a mental manifestation of the silicon brain, then doctors must be able to detect it based on its program. After detecting the lack of mental manifestations, doctors have declared the patient to be brain dead. However, Searle contends that mental phenomena do exist (Searle, 1984). How may a silicon brain implanted with silicon chips produce conscious mental phenomena? In this regard, Searle's silicon brain thought experiment has failed to demonstrate that mental events are possible.

2. According to Searle, the emergence of the mind occurs on two levels. Lower-level mental experiences and higher-level brain processes. The latter introduces a subjective experience ontology (Searle, 2004). But the puzzle is how lower-level brain processes might result in subjectivity. There are no mental phenomena if there is no subjective experience, as everyone acknowledges. I am not biased against the concept of subjectivity, but Searle's attempt to explain it is not persuasive. He was unable to reconcile subjectivity with neurobiological phenomena.

3. According to Searle, we must differentiate between unconscious mental states and nonconscious brain activities (Manson, 2012). We should not conflate unconscious mental states with unconscious brain activities, which have no psychological existence. Neurotransmitter secretions are unconscious neurobiological processes inside the brain.

4. According to Searle, consciousness is only a higher-level physical characteristic of the nervous system; the higher-level properties of physical particles have their own causal existence (Corcoran, 2001). The higher-level physical condition of the brain is consciousness. However, whether I am in a deep sleep, coma, or under anaesthesia, just the neurobiological process functions, not even the higher-order brain process. How, therefore, might neurobiological processes support subjective mental phenomena? Can subjectivity be a physical brain characteristic?

5. According to Searle, the philosophical tradition confuses the mind-body dilemma because of its conventional approach, which incorporates ideas of the mind as a subjective entity distinct from the body (Searle, 2008). We will never be able to address the issue if we continue to use the conventional method. The concept of higher-level brain processes, which he proposed to explain subjective experience, functions as a kind of linking principle between neurobiological processes and mental experiences. Science acknowledges neither the pineal gland nor the higher-level brain functions; it accepts only the neurobiological processes. Even if we accept Searle's theory of higher-level brain activities, we are unable to bridge the gap between neurobiological processes and mental events.

6. Does the existence of factual neurobiological phenomena entail the existence of ontological mental phenomena? The response, according to Searle, is affirmative. Searle could distinguish between lower-level and higher-level functional properties of neurons. If lower-level neurobiological processes might trigger the emergence of mental events on their own, then why higher-level brain are processes necessary? According to his own beliefs, there is no need to add the higher-level cognitive process, yet he did it nonetheless. It demonstrates that he considered closing the gap between the cerebral and the physical at any cost (Tollefsen & Dale, 2012).

7. Searle claims that once you recognise the reality of bottom-up, micro- to macro-scale causality, the concept of supervenience is no longer relevant in philosophy, despite the fact that he himself divided brain functions into lower-level and higher-level processes (Taylor & Cooren, 1997). He adds that they are superior because they possess ontological actuality. The difficulty is, however, how brain activities give rise to ontological reality (Taylor & Cooren, 1997).

8. According to Searle, his perspective is not a type of dualism, and he rejects both property dualism and substance dualism, as well as materialism and monism. To explain lower-level and higher-level brain operations,

he continues to use a type of dualism (Sorem, 2010). What distinguishes Searle from other contemporary materialists (identity theorists, functionalists, and eliminative materialists) and unites him with Descartes is his steadfast insistence that mental phenomena form an ontologically distinct class of natural phenomena, which are caused by and interact with, but cannot be reduced to, any of the familiar classes of physical phenomena (dynamical, electrical, chemical, biological, etc.). Despite the fact that he is not a Cartesian dualist, he is a dualist in another sense. Descartes asserts that subjectivity is a trait of consciousness, but Searle asserts that subjectivity is a property of consciousness (Rosenthal, 1993). Objective physical reality is the same for both parties.

9. According to Searle, awareness operates in a causal manner. Conscious mental states result from higher-level brain processes. However, he was unable to explain the higher-level causal functioning in the same manner he described the lower-level neurobiological causation for acetylcholine secretion.

10. In relation to the concept of intentionality, Searle argues that intentionality is biological and hence brain-based. However, intentionality cannot be reduced to brain processes alone (Gallagher, 2017). Therefore, it is difficult to establish a causal link between the brain and intentionality. Searle's acceptance of intentional causation is a separate issue, since intents do indeed cause actions (Searle, 1980). However, this does not explain how intentionality is created by the brain's physical processes.

11. While discussing the background of intentionality, Searle asserts that the backdrop is nonrepresentational; nevertheless, I do not believe this to be the case. For instance, if I am able to interpret some things differently due to my cultural talents and capabilities, then I am also exhibiting a cultural perspective of my background. Because it is the source of all representations, the background cannot be nonrepresentational. Even if we take Searle's temperature metaphors for emotional states literally, the concept of a "warm welcome" has some qualitative characteristics that describe the manner in which a community accords welcome.

12. According to Searle, we may feel the causal relationship between cause and effect because, in his view, the causal relationship is an intentional relationship (Searle, 1984). However, I believe this may not always be the case. By way of illustration, when we raise our hands, we experience both mental content (the desire to raise my hand) and physical movement (that I have raised my hand). The key question is how this mental material causes physical motion. Have we firsthand knowledge of this causal relationship? Maybe the correct answer is "not always."

13. Therefore, Searle cannot escape some type of dualism between physical brain operations and mental things in general.

### 3. CRITIQUE ON MULTIPLE DRAFTS MODEL THEORY

Another naturalistic approach to consciousness that was explained by Daniel Dennett is the Multiple Drafts Model Theory. Dennett & Akins (2008) established his theory of consciousness by using scientific development as the foundation. He tried to explain how consciousness emerges and functions without defining what consciousness is. There are many difficulties with Dennett's theory of consciousness.

1. In the study of consciousness, a heterophenomenologist must listen to the subjects, accept what they say seriously, and then compare it to the brain and environmental events of the subject. However, there is a chance that the statement will be incorrect. Descartes stated in his Meditations that during his life he had believed several falsehoods. Therefore, the subject's belief, which plays a central role in heterophenomenology, may lead us astray. There is also the chance that participants may make errors while expressing their opinions verbally. Dennett explicitly indicates in his book that he is sceptical of the subject's assertions, which is an intriguing aspect of the situation. Then, how might Dennett's heterophenomenology be used to investigate consciousness?
2. Dennett makes two points abundantly clear in Heterophenomenology: 1. Scientists should interpret a subject's first-person reports as expressions of the subject's beliefs (about their consciousness experience); and 2. Scientists should treat people as incorrigible regarding what it is like to be them. The second thesis, however, that scientists should approach humans as incorrigible about what it is like to be them, seems to contradict the author's first assertion. On the one hand, he adds, "You are not authoritative about what is occurring in you, but only about what seems to be occurring in you, and we are granting you absolute, dictatorial power over the account of how it appears to you, about what it is like to be you." On the other hand, he says that:

"There are circumstances in which people are just wrong about what they are doing and how they are doing it." It is not that they lie in the experimental situation, but that they confabulate; they

fill in the gaps, guess, speculate, and mistake theorising for observation. The relationship between what they say and whatever it is that drives them to say what they say could not be more enigmatic, both to us on the outside and to the subjects themselves. They don't have any way of "seeing" (with an inner eye, presumably) the processes that govern their assertions, but that doesn't stop them from having heartfelt opinions to express. My objection is that, in the case of what it is like to be them, he gives full authority to subjects and assertions while also being sceptical about them (Hirstein, 2005, p.14).

3. It is unclear what difference he established between "subject's beliefs" and "subject's conscious experience" while describing heterophenomenology. However, whatever the subjects consciously experience develops a belief in them, and this belief will become an assertion of the subjects' experience. Therefore, it is unclear how "subjects' beliefs" and "subjects' conscious experience" differ. In any case, they are related, even if they are not identical.
4. Chalmers (1997) observed, Dennett & Akins (2008). devotes a substantial portion of his book to defining a comprehensive cognitive model, which he proposes as an explanation for consciousness. The model seems to be essentially a model of a subject's ability to vocally convey a mental state. Instead of describing how consciousness arises from brain activities, Dennett actually reduces consciousness to the cognitive processes in the brain.
5. Dennett's effort to comprehend or explain subjective conscious mental experiences via an objective science of consciousness alters the idea of subject as if there were nothing else in the brain save computational operations.
6. The Multiple Drafts Model does not seem to be about consciousness but rather a third-person narrative of brain activity.
7. According to a number of philosophers, he is the sole one who rejects the reality of consciousness (Underhill, 2018). In one sense, it seems that they are correct; his explanation of qualia as being identical to their functional responsibilities demonstrates that there are no qualia. Similarly, if Dennett is correct and consciousness is nothing more than brain activities, then there is no place

for consciousness as a distinct entity. However, it seems he cannot discuss the experiences of the subjects without admitting the presence of consciousness.

8. All philosophers agree that there are qualitative characteristics of consciousness. We require a neurobiological explanation of how micro-level brain activities produce qualitative states of consciousness and how these states are characteristics of neurobiological systems. We have just a limited scientific understanding of input and processing. How can we create a theory of mental phenomena on this basis alone? "A theory of consciousness that does not contain mental experiences is like a book about Picasso that does not describe his paintings," argues Thomas Nagel (May, 1959). Dennett also asserts that mental events are the result of neurobiological processes, but he does not explain how this is possible. Everyone has developed their own concepts of awareness. Whenever we use the term "awareness," we do it in accordance with the established definition. Dennett does not, however, provide a definition of consciousness. How can we explain anything if we cannot define or describe it? According to his idea, neither we nor he can differentiate between human beings and unconscious zombies, who behave identically to humans.
9. Dennett's explanation of consciousness is neither a novel finding in the study of consciousness nor a viable explanation for consciousness; rather, it seems to be a type of intellectual disease. His explanation seems to want, at all costs, to establish consciousness as nothing more than neuronal activities in the brain.
10. Verificationism is the belief that only objects that can be scientifically proven exist (Schlick, 1936). Dennett believes that any claims concerning mental processes must be supported by scientific evidence. Dennett rejects the notion that first-person ontology can account for any occurrences based on this reasoning. He rejects the first-person perspective because scientific verification always employs the third-person perspective, and there is nothing that cannot be proved using scientific procedures. This is the most fundamental error in Dennett's thesis. Therefore, I believe that his theory is not a model of consciousness but rather a model of content and the relationship between content and awareness.

11. Dennett's *Consciousness Explained* does not explain what consciousness is or where it originates from; rather, it explains how it functions and the illusions it causes. Some have even parodied the book's title as "Consciousness Explained Away," with the implication that it cannot acknowledge the existence of subjective experiences of consciousness.
12. All living things are sentient, yet their degrees of consciousness differ.
13. Our conscious mental phenomena have a unique characteristic, and that is language. Language is crucial to understanding consciousness. Our language influences our beliefs, ideas, and behaviours. My question for Dennett is, "Who gives words and texts their meaning?" If there is no conscious being apart from neurological processes, it is impossible to explain how words and texts acquire their meanings.
14. Dennett's theory has not conclusively disproved dualism since there is still a subject of experience distinct from the material world and the brain.

#### 4. CRITIQUE ON HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. What is the difference between consciousness and phenomenal consciousness? As previously established, according to Chalmers (1997), consciousness is the psychological condition of awareness. When we are aware of a thing, we have access to information about that object. This access is consciousness, a psychological state with a causal basis. As psychological qualities, we might examine wakefulness, introspection, reportability, self-consciousness, attention, voluntary control, and knowledge. Appropriately, awareness is designated for the phenomenal part of consciousness. The phenomenal sense of awareness consists of emotions, aches, and sensations, among other things. According to this, consciousness is only the instantiation of some phenomenal quality. Many of these psychological states may also be related to phenomenal states of consciousness. There does not seem to be a clear distinction between psychological and phenomenal states, since any psychological state might have phenomenal properties.
2. Chalmers (1997) believes that if our neural organisation were replicated in silicon, the result would be similar to ours. However, according to



John Searle, the silicon brain cannot have a subjective aspect because consciousness is tied to specific biology. As a result, a silicon isomorph of a human will be devoid of consciousness.

3. Chalmers (1997) has failed to explain the abstract pattern of causal interaction between a system's particular physical components that is accountable for the emergence of conscious experience. He felt from the start that consciousness was irreducible to brain processes due to the fact that conscious experiences were not equal to physical brain characteristics. However, in discussing three concepts, he has attempted to connect the physical and the fantastic. This results in a kind of dualism.
4. Although subjective experience has a physical foundation, according to Chalmers (1997), it cannot be described by the functional organisation of the physical. However, while discussing the notion of organisational invariance, he associates fine-grained functional organisations with qualitatively comparable experiences. Additionally, he asserts that conscious experience does not exist in a void. It is always related to cognitive processing, and it is probable that it develops in some manner from cognitive processing. However, this just confirms a type of dualism.
5. According to Chalmers (1997), the abstract causal arrangement of the brain is crucial for understanding consciousness. However, this idea fails to bridge the gap between mental and physical explanations. He acknowledges the gap in explanation between brain activities and conscious experiences.
6. Chalmers' third principle is the double-aspect theory of information, which divides information space into two halves. Here, information space is an abstract entity; this abstract information space is incorporated in both conscious experience and physical processing. According to the double-aspect hypothesis, the phenomenal aspect of the information space cannot be compressed into the space itself. This does not mean that physical processing is the phenomenal information space in and of itself. As a result of the distinction between physical and phenomenal information space, dualism will be possible, but not in the Cartesian sense.

7. The "hard" issue of consciousness does not remove the Cartesian dilemma; rather, it exacerbates it by allowing for an irreducible, basic, and ontologically existent "phenomenal" consciousness.

## 5. THE POSSIBLE DUALISTIC APPROACH

Some may argue that to embrace dualism is to accept defeat, but I would argue the opposite: to abandon dualism is to abandon reality. Naturalist philosophers and natural scientists have criticised the philosophical doctrine of dualism for many years (Bhaskar, 2014). Similarly, contemporary neuroscientists and cognitive scientists strive to understand consciousness through scientific means. Despite significant advances in brain research, the mechanism of the brain, which is regarded as the key to understanding human consciousness, remains unknown. There seems to be no assurance that we will be able to describe human consciousness even if we understand every brain mechanism. Understanding consciousness, I believe, requires a paradigm shift that differs from prior and current techniques. Because consciousness is not simply about brain processing or neural mechanics, it is about the subjective awareness of the first person and its relationship to the external environment. It does not imply that we should explain consciousness independently of the brain; it just indicates that awareness is more than the neuronal processes in the brain. Each explanation of consciousness must have a unique methodology. As Dennett says:

The neuroscientists are right to insist that you don't really have a good model of consciousness until you solve the problem of where it fits in the brain, but the cognitive scientists (the AIers and the cognitive psychologists, for instance) are right to insist that you don't really have a good model of consciousness until you solve the problem of what functions it performs and how it performs them—mechanically, without benefit of Mind."

Similarly, dualists have an explanation for consciousness that is manifestly distinct from other explanations. According to dualism, describing consciousness on the basis of causal mechanisms or neural functioning only connects consciousness with causal mechanisms or neural functioning and is thus not the correct approach to explaining mental processes (Schwartz, et al., 2005). We may correlate the brain and mind through understanding causal processes or neurological function, but correlation cannot be called an explanation. Neurons are not thoughts; hence, neural activity cannot be considered mind processing. In actuality, there is no one in the brain to decide the brain process, no one in the heart to determine the blood pumping, and no one in the kidneys to determine how to remove extra organic molecules from the blood and how



to eliminate metabolic waste. No one in the body regulates or adjusts biological functions such as temperature or metabolism.

Seriously, there is no one in a mother's womb who controls the process of reproduction; the whole process occurs without any external or internal direction. We do not know when awareness first emerged in the embryo. Each and every organ in our body, as well as the organs of every other animal species, has a unique role, yet no one in the body or in that organ can define what those functions are. Although these organs lack conscious mental states, they do have conscious functional states. These organs possess their own intrinsic qualities; they do not work according to an established hierarchy, but they do function by nature. Liquidity is a characteristic of water, and its natural role is to flow downward. No one controls whether water will flow downward; it operates based on its inherent capabilities. However, someone is accountable for deciding how conscious mental occurrences are processed in the mind. Knowledge and experience determine a subject's cognitive process. Consciousness is always the conscious mental state of an individual, and it is always of something. Subjectivity is present everywhere awareness occurs, since consciousness cannot exist in the absence of a subject. Thus, understanding brain processing and causal mechanisms or correlating neural activities and thinking processes cannot be the genuine explanation of consciousness.

Thought processing is the major activity in a conscious state. Thought processing and neural processing are two separate things. Our scientific ideas are basically attempts to match brain activity with mental processing. By doing so, the issue of awareness cannot be overcome. For example, eating and the sense of hunger are two separate things. Hunger is not induced by food but by its biological processes. In the same manner, neural processing may induce more neural processing but cannot create "thinking" since neurons are neurons and electrons are electrons. A thought is an idea, and it cannot be produced from stuff since thinking is separate from matter. Neuroscience and cognitive science can only describe functional processing or functional processes; consciousness cannot be explained in this manner. Despite the fact that neuroscience can explain cognitive processes, consciousness cannot be fixed in functional systems. Explanations of our conscious experience in terms of our brain activity can never describe our experience since we don't feel our neurons, and our neural processing, or causal mechanism, doesn't know who we are. Our experience is something more than individual neuron activity. Our neurons don't carry our identity; they can only carry cognitive processes.

Whether or not my senses are in touch with my conscious state is not a criterion for having mental states and carrying on my identity. Mental phenomena and the

senses are two different entities. It is true, as Descartes says, that I am not conscious of the paper lying on the table, but I am conscious of the thought of the paper in my *mind*. So cognitive processing and thought processing are two different entities, and cognitive processes can be known from a third-person point of view, but thought processing only has access to the first-person point of view. Some say that the dreaming state is a conscious state; some say the dreaming state is not a conscious state; and some others say it is a semi-conscious state. But I am not clear which state it is, but my dreaming state maintains my identity. In a dream state, though my cognitive processes are not involved, I maintain my identity, which represents me only. So there is a clear-cut division between cognitive processing and thought processing. My dreaming state represents only me, that is, what I represent myself as when I am awake. The body alone cannot account for consciousness. It is critical to remember the Cartesian idea that thought is the essence of the mind and extension is the essence of the body.

Who in cognitive processing gives words and texts their meaning? Clearly, it is not neuronal processing or brain function. To some extent, we may agree with naturalist philosophers that conscious states are dependent on brain conditions. However, thinking or mental processes are not physical. The idea that consciousness and thought processing can be reduced to brain functioning is insufficient to account for mental events. As I have previously stated based on Searle's "silicon brain" thought experiment, mental experiences cannot be reproduced by silicon brain processes or other processes. Mental phenomena are natural, and they will continue to be natural so long as no artificial intelligence researcher finds a way to inject them into me. On this premise, we might argue that it is impossible to reduce mental phenomena to physical causal processes. If conceivable, the silicon brain thought experiment would have yielded favourable findings. Silicone brain processing could not replace all mental phenomena. Thousands of years ago, both the Bible and Indian intellectual traditions acknowledged this truth.

It is true that awareness is a set of mental processes that compels everyone to acknowledge its preeminence. Consciousness is not everything, but it is a gateway to having everything. Consciousness generates an observer-independent reality; it generates the reality of everything in the universe, including money, festivals, games, and parties, among other things. They are formed by the conscious subject, and their existence is observer-relative; their existence is related to the conscious agent. Consciousness is something that transcends the brain's atoms and molecules, and it is not a scientifically investigatable principle. The underlying structure of consciousness may be inaccessible to us since it is outside the purview of scientific research. The explanation, as

Searle explains, is as follows:

The difference is that consciousness has a first-person ontology; that is, it only exists as experienced by some human or animal, and therefore, it cannot be reduced to something that has a third-person ontology, something that exists independently of experiences." It is as simple as that (Schwartz, 2005, p. 86).

Therefore, we must exercise extreme caution when dealing with mental phenomena or thinking processes, since they lack third-person actuality and accessibility. It is an entirely subjective occurrence. Cognition is a completely biological phenomenon that has nothing to do with the mental process.

Reason, or rationality, plays a crucial role in comprehending the external environment throughout the conscious journey. With this cognitive ability, the subject, or subjectivity, comprehends the external world. It cannot be comprehended from an objective, third-person perspective. "What is it like to be a bat?" by Thomas Nagel is the most significant thought experiment regarding consciousness. He argues that no amount of third-person information can convey what it is like to be a bat. In accordance with Thomas Nagel Searle's assertion, "Mental ontology is essentially first-person ontology." That is just a fancy way of saying that every mental state has to be somebody's mental state. "Mental states only exist as subjective, first-person phenomena. (Block, 1997, p. 495).

Reason, like consciousness, is inextricably linked to mental occurrences. It is inconceivable to think of reasoning as being formed by brain processing or causal processes since it seems to be a characteristic of the functioning of the whole conscious person. This would indicate that reason is an irreducible mental function present in higher animals. The degree to which humans possess this reasoning ability varies from that of other creatures and animals. The lack of a Cartesian self is another important drawback of scientific explanation. All scientific explanations indicate that there is no central processing centre in the brain. Each component of their body is linked to a portion of their brain, but there is no central location where all brain activity converges to generate a mental state. If this is the case, then how can cognition, which requires several senses for perception, generate a unified mental state? How is a unified output achievable? For dualists, the presence or absence of a central processing unit is irrelevant. Those who want to identify consciousness in a causal mechanism must explain how these cognitive processes connect to form unified mental events, since I am not attempting to locate consciousness in causal machinery but rather in a person or self. The dualist, however, is unconcerned with the central processing unit or any Cartesian theatre in the Dennett sense. I believe that awareness transcends these

biological and neurological processes.

There exists a mind on top of all body functions and neurological processes. Regarding the subject of whether the mind is mortal or immortal, however, claiming that the mind survives after the death of the body is illogical since no one knows if the mind of a deceased individual lives after death. His mind remained to live after his body perished. However, I will not be conscious of my own existence when my body dies. If the mind survives the death of the body, then the mind itself should be aware of its own existence. Even if it exists, it cannot have any influence on this physical reality. Therefore, it appears useless to consider the presence of the mind after the death of the body. It does not imply that dualism has no role. It does not imply that there is no mind, but rather that it is beyond our ability to determine if the mind survives the death of the body. Knowing others' thoughts from a third-person point of view is not difficult. However, it is beyond our ability to comprehend other minds after they have left their bodies.

## 6. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding arguments, mind-body dualism appears to be reasonable and sensible. Consciousness is not an incidental aspect of the causal system but rather a persistent, essential aspect of reality. No matter how much neuroscience we learn, we will never be in a position to explain consciousness; it cannot be described by anything physical, biological, or chemical. The complex properties of thought, such as reason, emotion, contemplation, and decision-making, cannot be discovered in the functioning of our neurons. Language has a significant role in the organisation of the human mind. However, the languageless animals retain consciousness. As I have previously indicated, all organisms have awareness and reasoning abilities, although their conscious states and rational capacities vary in degree but are not wholly absent.

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